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Many of the notations we use are defined in the text where they appear for the first
time. However, the following symbols and notations are used throughout this thesis.
Let N b e a finite set. The power set of N i s denoted by 2N, i.e.,2N := {S I S c N}
Further, Po(N) denotes the set of all non-empty subsets of N, Po(N) := 2N \ {0}.
The set of real numbers isdenoted by R, and N := {1,2,3,...} denotes the set of
natural numbers. By RN we denote the set of all functions from N to R. The el-
ements of Riv will be identified with INI-dimensional vectors whose coordinates are
indexed by the elements of N ( N denotes the cardinality of N).  If x € RN and
i E N,w e will write zi instead of x(i). If x€ RN, and 0#S C N,w e write xs for
the restriction of z to S, i.e; as := (z,),Es E Rs. es E RN denotes the vector with
e,s  =  l  ifi  €  S,  and  eis  = 0 otherwise. Instead  of e{,} we simply write e'. Further,  we
define z(S) := E,Es xi.
For z, y E RN, we write z 2 yif z, 2 y, for alli € N, and z > y if z, > 9, for all
i E N. Let R  := {z €R N I z k 0}, and R  := {x €R N I z> 0}. For z,A E RN,
we define A * x € RN by (A * x), := Aix, for all i E N. Further, 11:Eli denotes the
Euclidean  norm  of  x  C  Riv.
Let A c R Y and AERN. Define A*A: = {1*a l a€A} . The convex hull of A i s
denoted by conv(A). A i s called comprehensive if z€A and y s x imply y€A. The
comprehensive hull of A is the set comp(A) := {x E R N I z f y for some y€A}
Finally, the set of all permutations of N is denoted by II(N).  For z € RN and
a € II(N), we define a(z) € RY by 0(z), := Z,(,) for all i E N. A C R is called




The subject of this thesis is the study of situations where a group of individuals
with possibly conflicting interests is involved in a joint decision making process.  We
discuss mathematical models that have been developed in the literature to give more
insight in several of these problems.
Part I studies situations where individuals work together in a project and where joint
benefits or costs have to be allocated among the individuals. In the literature several
methods are investigated to divide these joint benefits or costs.  We pay special atten-
tion to so-called compromise solutions, which are based on the intuitively appealing
principle that the amount allocated to each individual is obtained as a compromise
between a pessimistic lower bound and an optimistic upper bound (which need not
be the same for each individual).
In Part II we analyse situations in which there is one good that has to be divided
among the individuals. It is assumed that every individual has single-peaked pref-
erences, i.e., up to a certain point an individual likes to consume more of the good,
beyond this point the opposite holds. Based on well-known results from cooperative
bargaining theory, we provide two new characterizations of the most prominent divi-
sion rule for these problems, the uniform rule.
Finally, Part III studies social choice problems. A central problem in social choice
is, given the individual preferences of the agents over a certain set of alternatives,
how to determine an outcome which is socially acceptable (rellects the individual
preferences in a good way). It is interesting to study the collective power distribution
induced by the possibilities of coalitions to manipulate the outcome which has to be
chosen. A way to model this collective power distribution is by means of the concept
1
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of an effectivity function. In Part III we present several new results on effectivity
functions.
The three parts of this thesis are self-contained, i.e., the thesis is written in such a
way that one can read Part II or III without reading Part I. However, in order to
avoid too much overlap between the three consecutive parts, for some basic notions
we sometimes refer to a previous part where they were introduced.
In the next three sections we will give an introduction and overview of each of the
three different parts. Each section starts with an example to give the reader an idea
of the type of problems that are examined in the corresponding part.
1.1        Introduction  to  Part   I
We  consider a situation where there are three breweries, situated closely together. 1
The three firms conduct the transport to and from their clients themselves. In prac-
tice, it turns out that a truck which has delivered its goods at some of the clients,
comes back to the brewery empty, while it would have been possible to pick up some
retour cargo at another client in the neighbourhood. As a consequence of these inef-
ficient matchings between trucks on the one hand and cargo on the other hand the
transportation costs are much higher than necessary. For this reason one of the three
brewers has developed a system which provides him better matchings between trucks
and cargo. Moreover, by centralizing the transport from a separate depot nearby the
brewery, a better overview over the transportation business is obtained. As a result of
the reorganization of the transport, this brewery has realized a substantial decrease
in the transportation costs.
However, this brewer realizes that still higher cost savings can be obtained if he co-
operates with the other breweries by a joint use of his system. The reason for these
extra savings lies mainly in the fact that better matchings between trucks and cargo
are possible. An important question which arises is how to divide the joint cost sav-
ings among the three breweries if they work together. One way to solve this problem
is to allocate the total savings proportional to the individual kilometre reductions.
Clearly, the brewer who developed the system will not be satisfied with this allocation
method. One obvious reason for him to reject this method is that it does not take into
1This example is derived from Borm, van Os, and Otten (1994)
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account the fact that he has made a substantial investment to develop the system.
This problem would probably not be very difficult to solve, but another reason for
his dissatisfaction is the fact that he is in a stronger, or more powerful, position than
the other two brewers. Without the use of his system no savings can be obtained
or, formulated otherwise, his cooperation is necessary to save transportation costs (it
is assumed that it would take a couple of years for the other breweries to develop
a comparable system). The observation  that the brewer who developed the system
is in a more powerful position than the others indicates that the part of the joint
savings that he will consider to be his 'fair share' will be more than his proportional
share of the individual kilometre reductions. But how should we determine a 'fair'
allocation?
A mathematical framework to analyse this type of problems is provided by coopera-
tive game theory. The basis of cooperative game theory was laid in the fundamental
book "Theory oj Games and Economic Behavior" by von Neumann and Morgenstern
in 1944. Since then, several models of cooperative games have been introduced and
studied. In general, cooperative game theory deals with situations in which several
parties (called players) are involved in a joint project and the (joint) benefits of this
cooperation have to be shared. It is assumed that the players are rational, i.e., each
player wants to maximize his own utility, being independent of the utilities of the
other players (this is a standard assumption in economic theory).
A typical characteristic of game theory is that it does not study a single problem on
its own, but that it embeds a specific problem in a whole class of problems with the
same (mathematical) structure. The advantage of this approach is that, by studying
a whole class of similar problems, solution methods can be developed and compared
on a normative basis by investigating several (desirable) properties. For applications
these comparisons can help to determine which solution method(s) fit(s) best to spe-
cific criteria demanded by concrete situations.
The approach of determining 'good' solution methods by means of required proper-
ties is called 'the axiomatic approach'. Sometimes a list of desirable properties for
solution methods leads to a unique method which satisfies all listed properties.  In
this case we say that this solution method is 'characterized' (or axiomatized) by this
list of properties.
Prominent models in cooperative game theory are transferable utility (TU) games,
non-transferable utility (NTU) games, and bargaining problems. In TU-games it is
4                                                                                                          Introduction
assumed that interpersonal comparisons of utility are possible in the sense that the
players have a common measure of utility (money), which can be freely transferred
between the agents. NTU-games form a larger class of games in which there is not
necessarily such a common measure of utility. Bargaining problems can be regarded
as special NTU-games in which only the opportunities of the individual players and
of the grand coalition are specified.
For each of these models several allocation methods (solution concepts) have been
introduced. Well-known examples are the core and the Shapley value for TU-games
and NTU-games, and the Nash solution for bargaining problems. In Part I of this
thesis we focus attention on a special type of allocation methods, which are called
compromise values. The basic principle behind compromise values is that the amount
allocated to each participant should be determined as a compromise between an (op-
timistic) upper bound and a (pessimistic) lower bound. These bounds are sometimes
interpreted as the utopia outcome and the minimal right of the participants.
In Chapter 2 we present a detailed overview of compromise values in cooperative
game theory. Most attention is paid to the study of the T-value for TU-games, the
Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky (RKS) solution for bargaining problems, and the compro-
mise value for NTU-games. Chapter 2 is concluded with a number of applications
of cooperative game theory, which clearly reflect the significance of the idea behind
compromise values.
An important application of cooperative game theory is the systematic study of cost
allocation problems. In Chapter 3 we study cost allocation problems in a game theo-
retic framework. Most attention is paid to a cost allocation method introduced by the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in the 1930's. This method, called the alternate
cost avoided method or ACA-method, was used by the TVA to solve a cost allocation
problem generated by the building of a dam in the Tennessee river. Although the
principle behind the ACA-method is different from the ideas behind the T-value, it
turns out that there is a strong similarity between both solution concepts. For a
large subclass of cost allocation problems both methods prescribe the same outcome.
Based on results for the T-value we obtain new results for the ACA-method.
Chapters 4 and 5 deal with the study of solution concepts for NTU-games. Chapter 4
discusses the compromise value for NTU-games in more detail. This solution concept
is given this general name because it extends both the T-value for TU-games and the
RKS-solution for bargaining problems to a large class of NTU-games. We extend
V
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known results for the compromise value and moreover, new characterizations of this
solution concept are obtained.
The observation that the Shapley value for TU-games can be regarded as a com-
promise solution, leads to the introduction of a new solution concept in Chapter 5.
The so-called marginal based compromise value, or shortly MC-value, extends the
Shapley value towards a subclass of NTU-games. Surprisingly, it can also be seen as
an extension of the RKS-solution for bargaining problems towards NTU-games. We
study several properties and provide two characterizations of the MC-value.
1.2  Introduction to Part II
Consider a situation where the parents of a little child have an appointment. This
appointment will take a whole day, and they do not want to take the child with
them. Fortunately, they have found four persons who are each willing to baby-sit
for a certain period of the day.  It is assumed that each of the four persons has in
principle the whole day available for the baby, but they all have a preferred length
of time to baby-sit, not necessarily being equal for all of them. The preferences of a
person increase before this preferred length of time, and after this point the opposite
holds. However, the four optimal points need not be compatible. They might add
up to more or less than the total amount of time needed to baby-sit. The problem
of interest is how to determine a 'fair division', or a fair amount of time to baby-sit
for each of the four persons. In the literature this type of problem is called a 'fair
division problem with single-peaked preferences'.
Single-peaked preferences often occur in practice. Everybody can imagine situations
where preferences over a commodity become satiated at a certain point. An example
in exchange economies being discussed by Sprumont (1991) is rationing at disequilib-
rium prices in a two-good economy. If preferences of the agents are strictly convex,
then their restrictions  to the budget lines are single-peaked.
The first one who analysed this fair division problem with single-peaked preferences
in a systematic way is Sprumont (1991). He followed an axiomatic (or game the-
oretic) approach (cf. Section  1.1) to study well-behaved procedures (rules),  that
assign to each problem of this type an unique allocation. His main result establishes
the existence of an unique Pareto optimal, anonymous, and strategy-proof allocation
rule, which he called the uniform rule. The paper by Sprumont started an extensive
V
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analysis of this type of problems. As a result of this analysis the uniform rule is now
considered to be the most important rule for fair division problems with single-peaked
preferences.
In Part II of this thesis we concentrate on the uniform rule. In Chapter 6 we formally
introduce the model and the uniform rule. Further, we present an overview of the
most important results in the literature.
In Chapter 7 we establish relations between the uniform rule, the Nash solution, and
the lexicographic egalitarian solution for bargaining problems. Based on well-known
properties and characterizations of these two solutions we introduce new properties
which are satisfied by the uniform rule. Further, we show that the uniform rule can be
characterized by means of these properties. Chapter 7 concludes with an application
of our results to a cost-sharing model.
1.3  Introduction to Part III
Consider a situation in which the board of directors of a company, consisting of five
persons, has to decide about the firm's long term policy. In the foregoing years this
item has been the subject of a thorough study and several alternatives have been
proposed by advisors of the company. After a careful comparison of the different op-
tions there are three alternatives remaining, and now it is time for the board to make
a final decision among one of these alternatives. The first two alternatives do not
have large consequences for the employees of the company, since it is not necessary to
dismiss employees. However, the third option is more rigorous: A complete division
is disposed of and consequently, several employees have to be dismissed.
The procedure that the board of directors follows to decide which alternative will be
chosen is the following. Each member may state his most preferred option and then
the alternative is chosen which is stated by most persons. However, since the third
option has huge consequences for the company, it is agreed that this option is chosen
only if there are at least four of the five members that favour this alternative.
We are interested in the opportunities that individual members or subgroups of the
board have if they cooperate with other members and make agreements on how to
vote in order to achieve a certain outcome. For this simple example it is not difficult
to specify the power that subgroups (coalitions) have if they cooperate. No member
of the board has the power to force a single alternative to be the outcome. However,
V
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if two members of the board cooperate, then they still cannot force an alternative to
be the outcome, but they do have the power to prevent that the third option is cho-
sen. We say that each 2-person coalition can veto the third option. Analogously, we
see that every subgroup of three members has the power to force the first or second
alternative as the outcome, but it can also veto every option. Moreover, coalitions
consisting of four or five members have the power to veto or to choose every alterna-
live.
As the previous example illustrates a collective decision rule induces a power distribu-
tion in the society. From a theoretical viewpoint it is interesting to study the power
distribution induced by a decision rule because it gives insight in the possibilities that
coalitions have available to manipulate the decision rule in order to obtain a more
preferred alternative. A way to model the power distribution in society has been in-
troduced in Moulin and Peleg (1982), using the concept of an effectivity function.  An
effectivity function specifies for each coalition the collection of subsets of alternatives
for which the coalition is efiective in the sense that it can force the outcome to be an
element of such a subset of alternatives.
In Part III of this thesis we study effectivity functions. Chapter 8 formally defines
the concept of an effectivity function and presents an overview of some of the main
results that have been achieved in this area. Among others we present theorems of
Moulin and Peleg (1982) and Moulin (1983) which illustrate relations between effec-
tivity functions and non-cooperative game forms. Further, we consider three special
classes of effectivity functions that play a prominent role in the literature: effectivity
functions corresponding to monotonic simple games, additive effectivity functions,
and effectivity functions corresponding to veto functions.
In Chapter 9 we introduce a new class of effectivity functions, called decomposable
effectivity functions, which incorporates the three classes mentioned above. We study
relations between properties of a decomposable effectivity function and properties of
the pair of TU-games that generate this effectivity function. Moreover, two charac-
terizations of the class of decomposable effectivity functions are provided.
Chapter 10 studies relations between effectivity functions and game correspondences,
which generalize game forms. Our main results provide counterparts of the theo-
rems of Moulin (1983) and Moulin and Peleg (1982) for larger classes of effectivity
functions.







Compromise values: an overview
Since the introduction of cooperative games by von Neumann and Morgenstern in
1944, the problem most extensively studied in cooperative game theory has been how
to divide the total benefits of the grand coalition if all players cooperate. Many solu-
tion concepts have been proposed to handle this problem. Well-known examples are
the core, the Shapley value and the nucleolus in games with transferable utility (TU-
games), the core, the Shapley NTU-value and the Harsanyi value in non-transferable
utility games (NTU-games), and the Nash bargaining solution in cooperative bar-
gaining theory.
A special class of solution concepts is provided by so-called compromise values. The
idea underlying this type of solution concepts is that the outcorne of a game should
be determined as an efficient compromise between an optimistic upper value and a
pessimistic lower value, sometimes representing the utopia payoffs and the minimal
rights of the players, respectively. Prominent examples of compromise values are the
7--value for TU-games, the compromise value for NTU-games, and the Raiffa-Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution for bargaining problems.
This chapter, which is based on Tijs and Otten (1993), presents an overview of well-
known compromise values for several cooperative models.
In Section 2.1 we recall some basic definitions and solution concepts for TU-games.
Most attention is paid to the T-value introduced by Tijs (1981). The T-value plays a
central role in Section 2.2, where we discuss several properties and characterizations
of the T-value.
In Section 2.3 we consider bargaining problems. Particularly, we are interested in the
Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky solution introduced by Rail'fa (1953) and characterized by
11
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Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975).
Section 2.4 is devoted to compromise values for NTU-games. We discuss two exten-
sions of the T-value to NTU-games introduced by Borm et al. (1992), namely the
compromise value for NTU-games and the NTU 7-value.
In Section 2.5 we consider several applications of cooperative game theory in eco-
nomics and operations research, and compare the outcomes prescribed by compro-
mise values to outcomes of other economic or game theoretic solution concepts. The
following applications are discussed: bankruptcy problems, big boss games, exchange
markets, weighted graph games, and sequencing games. Another important applica-
tion of cooperative game theory is the analysis of cost allocation problems. This is
the subject of Chapter 3.
2.1 TU-games
In this section we examine compromise values for TU-games. We start with some
basic definitions.
A transferable utility game or TU-game (von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)) is
an  ordered  pair  (N, u) where  N  is a finite set of players and u : 2N -1 R is a map
assigning to each coalition S E 2N a real number u(S), called the worth of S, and
where u(0) := 0. Often, a TU-game (N, u) will be identified with the function u.  The
class  of all TU-games with player  set  N is denoted  by  GN,  and  by  G we denote  the
class of all TU-games (with finite player set).
Example 2.1.1 We consider the situation of the three breweries described in Section
1.1. To model this situation as a TU-game, we first have to define the player set.
In   this   case the players   are the three breweries, which   for   the   sake of convenience
are  numbered   1,  2,   and   3   (1   represents the brewery which developed the system).
Hence, N = {1,2,3}. The function v : 2N --+ R assigns to each coalition S the
cost savings v(S) that can be attained when the breweries in S cooperate on the
transportation business. It is assumed that breweries 2 and 3 cannot accomplish
significant cost savings without the presence of 1, because they cannot  make  use  of
his system. Thus, u(S) = 0 if 1 % S. The cost savings of the different coalitions are
summarized in Table  1.1.
2.1 TU-games 13
coalition S
| 0 | {1} | {2} | {1} | {1,2} | {1,3} | {2,3} | {1,2,1 
saving„(S) |0|4|0   0|  6     7  |  0  |   10
Table 1.1. The cost savings of the different coalitions (in $ 1,000,000).
A TU-game v is called convex (Shapley (1971)) if for all coalitions S, T 62N
u(S) + v(T) s v(S U T) + v(S n T).
Equivalently, a game v is convex if and only if for all S,TE 2N, and all :E N such
that S C T C N   {z} we have
v(S U {i}) - v(S) 5 U(T U {i}) - v(T).
So for convex games the marginal contribution of a player to a large coalition is higher
than  to a smaller coalition. Notice  that  the  game in Example  2.1.1 is convex.
One of the main topics dealt with in cooperative game theory is, given a game v, to
divide the amount u(N) between the players if the grand coalition N is formed. A
payolT vector for v is a vector z ERN which is ellicient, i.e., for which E,€N z, = v(N)
Here :r, represents the payoff to player i EN. A payoff vector x E RN is called an
imputation if 4 2 v({i}) for all i E N. The set of all imputations of the game v is
denoted by I(v).  The core of v is the set
C(v) := {z E I(v) 1 X Ii 2 u(S) for all S E 2N}.
iES
So, if z € C(v), then no coalition S has an incentive to split off if z is proposed as a
payoff vector, because the total amount ICS) := E,Es Xi allocated to S is not smaller
than the amount v(S) which they can obtain by forming a subtoalition.
The notion of the core has first been explicitly formulated and named in Gillies
(1953), but the principle behind this concept was already known before (see for
example Ransmeier (1942)). Also von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) considered
this concept, but at that stage they rejected it because the core of a game can be
empty. However, there are large subclasses of TU-games which have a non-empty
core. One example is the class of convex games as shown by Shapley (1971). Games
with a non-empty core are called balanced.
Since the introduction of TU-games many solution concepts have been proposed to
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allocate the amount v(N) among the players. Formally, a solution concept on a class
A C G i s a map which assigns to each TU-game (N, u) €A a vector in Riv or a set
of vectors in RN. The imputation set and the core are examples of (multivalued)
solution concepts. Also many one-point solution concepts, which assign to a game
v a unique vector, have been proposed. A one-point solution concept is also called
a rule or a value. The most well-known values are the Shapley value introduced by
Shapley (1953) and the nucleolus introduced by Schmeidler (1969).
The Shaptey value $(u) E RN of a game u € GN is a weighted average of the marginal
contributions of players to coalitions. Formally, the Shapley value of v is defined by
0,(v):= I (u(S U {i}) - u(S))  for all i E N.ISI!(INI -1- ISI)!
SCN\{0         IN'!
Another way to introduce the Shapley value is based on marginal vectors. We order
the players in a game u E G N with IN =n b y means of a bijectiona: {l,...,n} --+
N. With minor abuse of terminology we identify the class of all such bijections with
the class II(N) of all permutations of N. For i E N and a permutation a f II(N),
we define the set It(i) := { j E N
1
0-1(j) < 0-1(i)} as  the set of predecessors of i
in 0. The malginal vector m'(v) E RN is defined by
mi(,)(u) := v(P,(0(i)) U {a(i)}) - v(P,(0(i)))
for all players 0(i) C N.
The vector m'(u) assigns to each player his marginal contribution in the order a.
It is not difficult to show that the Shapley value of u is the average of all marginal
vectors, i.e.,
(D (u)   = ]7 ii E m„(v)l' o€Il(N)
The nucleolus is a rule for the class of games with non-empty imputation set.  Let
u€GN with I(u) 0 0 and let z € RN and S f 2N. The excess EVCS,Z)  of S  with
respect to x is defined as
Ev(S,z) := v(S) - T(S)
Ev(S, z) measures the complaint of the coalition S against the proposal x.
Let  e(x)  be  the  2'NI-tuple  whose components  are the excesses  EV(S, z), S c N,
arranged in a nonincreasing order, i.e., e,(x) 2 ej(x) whenever 1 5 i<j 52'NI.
e(x) is the ezcess vector (complaint vector) of z.  The nucleolus n(v) of v is the set
of all imputations x E I(v) satisfying
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e(z) St e(y) for all y € I(v),
where 51 denotes the lexicographic order on  I{2'NI:   For a, b E  Ii'INI, a  51  b if and only
if a=bor there exists ak E {1,...,2'NI} such that a, = b, for alli€ {1,...,k-1}
and ak < bk.  So the nucleolus has the property that it minimizes the maximal
complaint. Schmeidler (1969) proved that the nucleolus of a game always consists of
one point.
A third value is the 7--value as introduced by Tijs (1981) for quasi-balanced games.
The r-value of a game is a compromise between an upper and a lower value for the
game. Let v 6 GN be a TU-game. The vector M(v) E RN with coordinates
M,(v):= v(N) - u(N \ {i})
forall i EN is called the upper value  of u.  M,(v) can be regarded as the maximal
payoff player i can expect to get: If he claims more, then it is advantageous for the
other players to exclude him from the grand coalition. Mi(v) is also called the utopia
payo#for player i.
Let i€N and S €2 N with i E S.W e calculate what remains for player i i f S
forms and all other players in S obtain their utopia payoff. The remainder of i ES,
Rv(S, i), is defined by
Rv(S, i):= u(S) -    E   Mj(v).
j€S\{,}
The vector m(u) E RN with coordinates
m,(v)  := max Rv(S, i)S:t€ S
for all i€N i s called the lower value of v.  The amount m,(v) denotes the minimal
right of player z. He can guarantee himself this payoff by offering the members of a
suitable coalition S, for which the maximum is achieved, their utopia payoff and then
m, (v) remains for himself.
A game u € GN is called quasi-balanced if
m(u) 5 M(v) and  E m:(u) 5 u(N) 5 X M.(u)
ON KN
The class of all quasi-balanced games with player set N is denoted by QBN. The
fact that balanced games are quasi-balanced follows from the following theorem by
Tijs and Lipperts (1982).
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Theorem 2.1.2 Let u E GN, with C(v) 0 0. Then for all z € C(v), we have
m(u) 5 Z 5 M(v).
For a game u E QBN the T-value of v, denoted by T(v), is the unique payoff vector
on the line segment with endpoints m(u) and M(v). Thus,
c,le At 1 (v)
T(u) := m(u) + a(M(v) - m(v)), 0,   e.71 ir . '*5                                                  
        
where a is such that E,€NT,(v) = v(N).
Example 2.1.3  Let (N, v) be the 3-person game of Example 2.1.1.
Then M(v) = (10,3,4), mi(v) = max{u({1}), v({1,2}) - MY(v), u({1,3}) - M3(v),
u(N) - M2(v) - M3(u)} = max{4,3,3,3} = 4, m2(v) = 0, and m3(v) - 0.
It follows that
7-(v) = (4,0,0) ta(6,3,4),
where a is such that E,eN T,(v) = 10. Hence, a =A and 7-(v) = A(88,18,24).
Note that for this game $(u)  =   (41,8,11) and  n(v) = (6 ,1  ,2)
One easily verifies that in this case the T-value, the Shapley value and the nucleolus
all belong to the core.
Theorem 2.1.2 illustrates that the T-value of a balanced game v is a compromise
between an upper bound M(v) and lower bound m(v) for the core. Tijs (1981)
mentions several classes of TU-games for which these bounds are sharp, e.g.  the
class of convex games. A value based on sharp bounds for the core is the B-value
introduced in Bondareva (1988) and Bondareva and Driessen (1994). For convex
games the 7--value and the B-value coincide. Another value for TU-games which is
based on lower and upper values is discussed in van Heumen (1984) and Bergantinos
and Masso (1994), who use an upper bound for the core proposed by Milnor (1952).
Also van den Brink (1989) considers values for games which are based on upper and
lower vectors, although these vectors are not necessarily core bounds.
It is worthwhile to note that also the Shapley value can be regarded as a compromise
between a lower  and an upper vectorl:   For  a  game  v  E  GN the Shapley value  of
v is the unique efficient outcome on the line segment between 0 and the sum of the
marginal vectors E,€n(N) m'(u) (this is only true if v(N) 0 0).  The idea of regarding
1This was pointed out by Carles Rafels.
V
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the Shapley value as a compromise value is used in Chapter 5 where we introduce
the marginal based compromise value (MC-value) as a generalization of the Shapley
value to the class of monotonic NTU-games.
Driessen and Tijs (1983) provided an alternative approach of calculating the T-value
of quasi-balanced games by introducing the gap function.
Let  u  E  GN. The gap function gv : 2N -4 R of v is defined by
gv(S) := I M,(v) - v(S) for all S E 2N.
1€S
The gap g'(S) of coalition S is the difference between the sum of the utopia payoffs
of the players in S and the worth of coalition S. The concession vector A(v) E RN is
defined by
A,(u) := min 9'(S)  for all i € N.S:iES
The significance of gv and the vector 1(v) follows from the next theorem.
Theorem 2.1.4 (Driessen and Tijs (1983))
(i) A(v) = M(v) - m(v) for every u EGN
(ii) QBN = {v E GN   gv(S) 2 0 for all S E 2N ,  i€N A,(U) 2 gv(N)}
(iii) If v E QBN and g'(N) = 0, then T(v) = M(v)
(iv) If v C QBN and gv(N) > 0, then 7-(u) = M(u) - gv(N)(Zi€N A,(u))-1. (v).
Using gap functions Driessen and Tijs introduced several interesting classes of quasi-
balanced games for which the T-value is easy to compute. Here we only mention the
class of semi-convex games and the class of 1-convex games. For further classes such
as k-convex games the reader is referred to Driessen (1988).
A game v f QBN is called semi-convex (Driessen and Tijs (1985)) if gv({i}) =
mins.ics 9.'(S) for all i E N.  Note that a game v E QBN is semi-convex if and only
if m,(u) = v({i}) for all i EN. Hence, for semi-convex games the T-value can easily
be determined. It is easy to show that convex games are semi-convex.
Further, a game v € QBN is called 1-convex if 9'(N) = minscN 9'(S). For 1-convex
games we have the following analogy of a result of Shapley (1971) who showed that
for convex games the Shapley value coincides with the barycenter of the core.
18 Compromise values: an overview
Theorem 2.1.5 (Driessen and Tijs (1983))
If v C QBN is 1-convex, then the 7--value and the nucleolus of v both coincide with
the barycenter of the core.
We conclude this section with two further brief remarks regarding the T-value.
Driessen and Tijs (1992) extended the T-value to TU-games with coalition structures.
A coalition structure in a TU-game is defined to be a partition of the player set. In
games with coalition structures it is assumed that instead of the formation of the
grand coalition N, the coalitions in the coalition structure will be formed. Hence,
in these games payoff vectors should describe possible divisions of the worth of each
coalition in the coalition structure between the members of this coalition. Roughly,
the idea behind the T-value for games with coalition structures is simply to compute
separately for each coalition in the coalition structure the T-value in the subgame
induced by this coalition.
Bergantinos and Mendez-Naya (1994) implement the ·r-value by means of a strategic
game in extensive form, i.e., given a TU-game, they define a (non-trivial) strategic
game in extensive form which has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium yielding the
same payoff vector as the T-value of the corresponding TU-game.
2.2    Characterizations of the T-value
In this section we investigate several properties of the 7-value on the class of quasi-
balanced games. We start with some basic properties.
Proposition 2.2.1 The T-value satisfies the following properties on QBN.
(1)  elliciency: E.€N T,(v) = v(N) for all v E QBN.
(2) individual mtionatity: T,(u) 2 u({i}) for all v E QBN and all i e N.
(3) the dummy player property: T,(v) = v({i}) for all v € QBN and all dummy
players i i n v, i.e., players £E N such that v(S U {i}) = v(S) + v({i}) for all
SCN\{i}.
(4) symmetry- T,(v) = Tj(v) for all u E QBN and all symmetric players i and j
in the game u, i.e., players i and j such that v(S U {i}) = u(S U {j}) for all
S c N\ {i,j}.
2.2 Characterizations of the 7--value                                                          19
(5)  covariance:  For all v and all w in QBN with w = kv + a for some k C (0,00)
and a E RN we have T(w) = kT(v) + a. (Here the game kv ta is defined by
(kv + a)(S) := ku(S) + a(S) for all S € 2N).
Shapley (1953) showed that the Shapley value is the unique value on GN which sat-
isfies the properties (1), (3), (4) and, in addition, additivity, which means that the
Shapley value of the sum of two games with the same player set is the sum of the
Shapley values of the two games. The Shapley value also satisfies (5) but, it does not
satisfy (2) on GN. Other characterizations of the Shapley value can be found in e.g.
Young (1985a) and Hart and Mas-Colell (1989).
On the class of games with non-empty imputation set the nucleolus satisfies all prop-
erties mentioned above except additivity. Moreover, the nucleolus is stable,  i.e.,  the
nucleolus of a game belongs to the core, whenever the core is non-empty. The T-value
and the Shapley value in general  do not satisfy stability. However, Theorem  2.1.5
illustrates that the T-value is stable on the class of 1-convex games. Moreover, it is
shown in Driessen and Tijs (1985) that the T-value is stable on QBN if there are
only two or three players in N. Also for semi-convex quasi-balanced games with four
players the T-value belongs to the core. In Driessen and Tijs (1985) necessary and
sufficient conditions for stability of the T-value are given.
Characterizations of the nucleolus are provided by Sobolev (1975), Snijders (1991),
and Potters (1991).
The rest of this section is devoted to characterizations of the T-value. First, Theorem
2.2.2 considers several additional properties of the T-value.
Theorem 2.2.2 The 1--value satisfies the following properties on QBN.
(6) dummy out property: If v E QBN and D C N i s the set of dummy players in u,
then 7-(qN\D) = 7-(U)N\D (Here, uIN\D denotes the restriction of u to N \ D).
(7) complementary monotonicity:  If v, w  € QBN  are such  that v(T)  <  w(T)  for
some T € 2N, T # N, and v(S) = w(S) for all S E 2N, S 0 T, then
T,(u) 2 Ti(w) for all i E N\T.
(8) restricted proportionality: T(v) is proportional to M(v) if m.(u) = 0 for all
i EN.
(9) minimal right property: 7-(v) = m(u) + T(u - m(v)) for all u € QBN.
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The dummy out property and the complementary monotonicity property for the T-
value are proved in Tijs and Driessen (1986) and Driessen (1985). Complementary
monotonicity of the T-value means that if a game v is changed to a game w by
increasing only the worth of one coalition T 0 N then, according to the T-value, no
player outside T does profit from this deviation. The reader can easily verify that also
the Shapley value satisfies the complementary monotonicity property. However, the
nucleolus fails to have this property.  For a detailed survey of monotonicity properties
of the Shapley value, the nucleolus, and the T-value the reader is referred to Driessen
(1985), Otten (1990), and Sagonti (1991).
The minimal right property says that if for a game v E QBN first the minimal rights
are paid to all the players and then the remaining amount U(N)- E,€N m,(u) is
divided according to the 7--value of the (adapted) game u - m(u), this gives the same
allocation as the T-value of the original game v.  Note that the minimal right property
is implied by covariance.
The restricted proportionality property and the minimal right property of the T-value
are used in Tijs (1987) to provide the following characterization of the T-value.
Theorem 2.2.3 (Tijs (1987))
The T-value is the unique value on QBN which satisfies efficiency, restricted propor-
tionality, and the minimal right property.
Another characterization of the T-value on QBN is provided by Calvo et al. (1993).
In this characterization three additional properties of the r-value play a role, namely
bounded aspirations, convexity, and restricted linearity. It turns out that together
with efflciency and covariance these three properties characterize the 7--value on QBN.
For more details on this characterization the reader is referred to Calvo et al. (1993).
The characterizations of Tijs (1987) and Calvo et al. (1993) are characterizations of
the T-value on a fixed player set N. Recently, Driessen provided a characterization of
the T-value on a set of games with a variable number of players, using a consistency
principle. For more details on this characterization the reader is referred to Driessen
(1993).
2.3 Bargaining problems
Also in bargaining theory a well-known compromise solution appears, i.e., the Raiffa-
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, or shortly, RKS-solution (Raiffa (1953), Kalai and Smorodin-
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sky (1975)). This solution concept plays a central role in this section.
We start with some basic definitions.
A bargaining problem for N is a pair (C, d) where 0 0 C c RN, and d E RN are such
that
(i)  C i s closed, convex, and comprehensive, i.e., if z€C and V E R N are such that
y <z,theny EC
(ii) Cd :={xECI=2 d}i s bounded
(iii) there is an zo E C with zo > d.
By Bpiv we denote the class of all bargaining problems for  N.
The interpretation of a bargaining problem (C, d) is as follows.  The players in N try
to reach an agreement on some outcome x in the feasible set C, yielding utility x, for
player i E N. If the players in N do not reach an agreement, then the disagreement
outcome d results with utility d, for player i EN. Condition (iii) implies that the
players will have an incentive to reach an agreement. The problem of interest is on
which outcome should the players in N agree? Many solutions to solve this problem
have been proposed.
A  bargaining solution on BPN is a map f : BPN -+ RN such that f(C, d)  € C for
all (C, d) € BPN. A well-known bargaining solution is the Nash bargaining solution
introduced by Nash (1950). The Nash (bargaining) solution of a bargaining problem
(C, d) E BpN 1 denoted N(C, d), is the unique point in Cd where the function
Z 1.-, H (Z,  -  d.)
i€N
is maximal.
An alternative bargaining solution, first proposed by Raiffa (1953), and characterized
by Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975), is the RKS-solution. This solution is a feasible
compromise between the disagreement point and a utopia point.
Let (C, d) € BPN be a bargaining problem and let i EN.  The utopia point for player
i is the point
u,(C,d) := max{Z; 1 Z € Cd}.
Hence, u,(C, d) is the maximal utility player i can obtain in the set Cd of 'true' bar-
gaining points (a point in C   Cd is not credible as an outcome of the bargaining
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problem, because it can be improved upon by some players who will prefer the dis-
agreement outcome). The point u(C, d) := (u,(C, d)),EN is called the utopia point of
(C, d). The RKS-solution of (C, d), denoted by RKS(C, d), is defined as the unique
weak Pareto optimal point  in C lying  on  the line through  d and  u(C, d).   Here,  a
point z EC is called weak Pareto optimal in C i f there does not exist a point y €  C
with y > r. The set of all weak Pareto optimal points in C is denoted by M/Par(C)
Example  2.3.1   Let N  := {1,2}. Consider the bargaining problem (C, d) on N given
by d := (0,0) and C := {z = (zi,Z2) C R.i  1 Z2 6 4, 2Zl + x2 5 8}. See Figure
2.1. From Figure 2.1 it follows that N(C, d) = (2,4)  and  u(C, d)  = (4,4). Hence,
RKS(C, d) = (8/3,8/3).
2
4                              N(C, d) u(C, d)
RKSiC,d)
2-
0                 •1
d = (0,0)       2                        4
Figure 2.1.
Now we introduce some interesting properties for bargaining solutions.
(i)  A bargaining solution f: BPN -0 RN is called Par·eto optimal if for all (C, d) E
B pN we have f(c, d) E Par(C) := {x €C l y€C,y k z implies y= z}.
(ii) A bargaining solution f : BPN -0 RN is called weakly Pareto optimal if for all
(C,d) e BPN we have f(C, d) E WPar(C)
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(iii)  A bargaining solution f :  BPN  -+  RN is called symmetric if for all  (C, d)  6
BPA,  with  d,  =dj  for  all i,j  E  N  and C  such  that  z  E C implies 0(x) E C for
all permutations a E H(N), we have f.(C, d) = fj(C,d) for all i,j EN.
(iv) A bargaining solution f : BPN -+ RN has the covariance (with a,Oine transfor-
mations) property if for all (C, d) E BPN and all affine functions A : RN -+ RN
with ACT) =a*x+B,x€ RN, for some a E R   and B€ RN, we have
f(A(C),A(d)) = A(f(C, d)).
(v) A bargaining solution f : BPN  + RN satisfies independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) if for all (C, d),  (D, d) 6 BPN with C C D and f(D, d) €C
we have f(c, d)- f(D, d)
(vi) A bargaining solution f : BPN -+ RN has the (restricted) monotonicity prop-
erty if for all (C, d), (D, d) E BPN with C C D and u(C,d) = u(D,d) we have
f(c, d) 5 f(D,d).
Nash (1950) proved that, in case INI = 2, the Nash solution is the unique bargaining
solution which satisfies the properties (i) (or (ii)), (iii), (iv), and (v). Later, this
result was extended to bargaining problems with more than two players.
The main property in this characterization is the IIA property, to which much criti-
cism was raised (see, for example Luce and Raiffa (1957), and Kalai and Smorodin-
sky (1975)). As an alternative for IIA, Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) suggested a
monotonicity property, which is very much related to the (restricted) monotonicity
property (cf. Peters (1992)). The replacement of IIA by the (restricted) monotonicity
property leads to the following result.
Theorem 2.3.2 (cf. Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975))
The RKS-solution is the unique bargaining solution on the class of two player bar-
gaining problems which satisfies the properties (i) (or (ii)), (iii), (iv), and (vi\.
An alternative characterization of the RKS-solution using a consistency principle was
obtained by Peters et al. (1991, 1994). Moreover, in this paper the RKS-solution is
implemented by the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of a non-cooperative game
in extensive form. Another non-cooperative game leading to the RKS-solution was
developed earlier in Moulin (1984).
A variation on the (classical) bargaining problem we consider in this section is the
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bargaining with claims model introduced by Chun and Thomson (1992). In this
problem not only a feasible set and a disagreement outcome play a role, but there is
also an (infeasible) point which represents the claims or expectations of the players.
Also for this type of problems several solutions have been proposed. One of these
solutions is the adjusted proportional solution (Herrero (1993)), which asagns to
each problem a compromise between a lower value based on an endogenous reference
point and the point of claims. The idea behind this solution was derived from Curiel
et al. (1987) where the adjusted proportional solution for bankruptcy problems is
introduced (cf. Section 2.5).
In the next section we will see that, by weakening some of the properties which
characterize the RKS-solution for two player bargaining problems, one can obtain an
extension of Theorem 2.3.2 to a large class of NTU-games.
2.4 NTU-games
In this section we consider the more general class of NTU-games which comprises the
class of TU-games and the class of bargaining problems. NTU-games were introduced
by Aumann and Peleg (1960) and, compared to the above mentioned classes of games
the theory on NTU-games is much less developed.
A non-transferable utility game or NTU-game is a pair (N, V), where N is a finite
set of players and V is a map assigning to each coalition S E 2N \ {0} a subset V(S)
of Its of attainable payof vectors. We assume that for each i E N there exists a real
number v(i) such that V({i}) ={1: E R I z f v(i)}. Further, we assume that for
each S E 2N \ {0} the following properties hold.
(i) V(S) is a non-empty, closed, and comprehensive subset of Its
(ii) V(S) n {r € Its 1 z; 2 v(i) for all i E S} is bounded.
Note that we do not require the sets V(S) to be convex. So this allows for utility
functions which are not necessarily of the von Neumann-Morgenstern type (cf.Kalai
and Samet (1985)).
Similar to TU-games we will often identify an NTU-game (N, V) with V.
The next two examples illustrate that the class of NTU-games comprises the class of
TU-games and the class of bargaining problems.
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Example  2.4.1  Let (N,v) be a TU-game.  (N, v) gives rise to an NTU-game (N,V),
where  for  each  S  €  2N \  { 0}
V(S) := {z € RS 1 :E(S) S v(S)}
The game V defined above is called the NTU-game corresponding to v.
Example  2.4.2 Each bargaining problem (C, d) for N corresponds to an NTU-game
(N,V), where
V(N) := C
V(S) := {= ERS IIi 5 d,Vi € S}  forall S € 2N\ {0,N}.
V is called the NTU-game corresponding to (C, d)
Similar to the TU-case solution concepts (values, rules) have been defined for NTU-
games. Prominent solution concepts for NTU-games are the Harsanyi value (Harsanyi
(1963)) and the Shapley NTU-value (Shapley (1969)). These solution concepts are
characterized in Hart (1985) and Aumann (1985a), respectively. Other well-known
solutions for NTU-games are the egalitarian solution (Kalai and Samet (1985)) and
the consistent Shapley value (Maschler and Owen (1989), (1992)). These four solution
concepts are extensions of the Shapley value for TU-games to the class of NTU-
games. In this section we will not discuss the above mentioned solution concepts in
detail, but instead we concentrate on an extension of the 7-value to (a subclass of)
NTU-games, which is called the compromise value for NTU-games (when there is no
confusion about the class of games under consideration, we will simply talk about
the compromise value and omit the addition 'for NTU-games'). The compromise
value has been introduced in Borm et al.  (1992) and, similar to the T-value for
quasi-balanced TU-games, it is based on upper and lower bounds for the core of an
NTU-game.
Let (N, V) be an NTU-game. For each S E 2N \ {0}, let
dom(V(S)) := {x E Rs 1 3 < y for some y € V(S)}
The elements of dom(V(S)) are elements which are dominated by coalition S.
The core of (N, V), denoted C(V), consists of all payoff vectors attainable for the
grand coalition N which are not dominated by any coalition S, i.e.,
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C(V) := {z € V(N) I xs I dom(V(S)) for all S € 2N \ {0}}.
Let i € N. The utopia payoffor player i, K,(V), is defined by
K,(V):= sup{t €R 1 3a€RN\(,} (a,t) E V(N),a 0 dom(V(N \ {i})),
a 2 5(j))KN\{i} ·
By assumption (ii) in the definition of an NTU-game it follows that K.(V) < 00.
However, it might happen that K,(V) = -00. We restrict ourselves to NTU-games
(N, V) for which K,(V) e R for all i E N. The vector K(V):= (Ki(V)),EN is called
the upper value of V.
Let i€N and let S €2 N with i E S.  The remainder of i€S i s given by
pv(S'i) i= sup{t €R I BaERs,(,3: (a,t) E V(S),a > Ks\{i}(V)}
The minimal right of player i is denoted by
k,(V):= max FVCS'i)'S:1€S
and the vector k(V) := (k,(V)),EN is called the lower value for V. Again, we restrict
ourselves to NTU-games (N, V) for which k(V) C RN.
Analogously to Theorem 2.1.2 we have the next result.
Theorem 2.4.3 (Borm et al. (1992))
If (N, V) is an NTU-game with C(V) 0 0, then
k(V) S I S K(V)  for all z E C(V).
Moreover, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2.4.4 (Borm et al. (1992))
(i)  Let (N, u) be a TU-game with v(N\{i})  2  Ej€N\{i  v({j}) for all i  E N
and let (N, V) be the corresponding NTU-game. Then K(V) = M(u) and
k(V) = m(v).
(ii)  Let (C, d) be a bargaining problem for N, and let  (N, V)  be the corresponding
NTU-game. Then K(V) = u(C, d) and k(V) = d.
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The compromise value is defined on the class of compromise admissible NTU-games.
An NTU-game (N, V) is called compromise admissible if
k(V) S K(V), k(V) C V(N), and K(V) 0 dom(V(N)).
By CN we denote the class of all compromise admissible NTU-games with player set
N. 'From Theorem 2.4.3 it immediately follows that V c CN if C(V) 0 0. Further-
more, from Theorem 2.4.4 it follows that NTU-games corresponding to bargaining
problems are compromise admissible, and that for a quasi-balanced TU-game ( N,v)
with v(N \ {i})  2 EjeN\{V v({j}) for all i € N, the corresponding NTU-game is
compromise admissible.
For a compromise admissible NTU-game (N, V) the compromise value T(V)  is   de-
fined as the unique vector on the line segment between k(V) and K(V) which belongs
to V(N) and is nearest to the utopia value K(V), i.e.,
T(V):- k(V) + av(K(V) - k(V)),
where
av := max{a E [0,111 k(V) + a(I<(V) - k(V)) E V(N)}
The following corollary immediately follows from Theorem 2.4.4.
Corollary 2.4.5 ((Borm et al. (1992))
(i)  If u is a quasi-balanced TU-game satisfying v(N \ {i}) 2 EjEN\{:1 v({j}) for all
i EN, and (N,V) is the corresponding NTU-game, then T(u) = T(V).
(ii)  If (C, d) is a bargaining problem for N, and (N, V) is the corresponding NTU-
game, then RKS(C, d) = T(V).
So the compromise value definitionally extends the 7--value and the RKS-solution to
NTU-games. As Theorem 2.4.6 and Theorem 2.4.7 (or 2.4.9) below show, both the
characterization of the T-value by Tijs (1987) (Theorem 2.2.3) and the characteri-
zation of the two player RKS-solution by Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) (Theorem
2.3.2) can be extended in order to provide characterizations of the compromise value.
For this we introduce the following properties of values for NTU-games which are ex-
tensions of properties for values for TU-games and solutions for bargaining problems.
Let f : CN -+ RN be a value on the set of compromise admissible games with player
set  N.  Then
28 Compromise values: an overview
(i) f satisfies weak Pareto optimality if f(V) € V(N) \ dom(V(N)) for all v eCN
(ii) f satisfies couariance if for all V E CN, all a C R  and all B € RN we have
f(a* V +F) = a* f(V)+F. (Thegame a*V+Fis defined by (a*V+B)(S) :=
as * V(S) + {Bs} for all S € 2N \ {0}.)
(iiii)  f is monotonic if for all K w E  CN with k(V)  = k(W),K(V) = K(W) and
V(N) C W(N) we have f(v) S f(w)
(iv) f is called bounds-symmetric if for all V € C.v and all i,j E N with k,(V) =
kj(V),K,(V) = K,(V), we have f, (v)= fj(v)
(v) f satisfies symmetry if f,(v) = f,(V) for all V E AN and all i, j E N which are
symmetric in  V. Here, players i, j E  N are called symmetric in  V  if
(1) for all SCNj{i,j}, all z E V(S U {i}) it holds that y e V(S U {j}),
where y E Rsu{J} is defined by yj = I,· and ys - Is,
(2) forall S C N, i, j E S, and all z E V(S), we have y e V(S), wherey ERS
is  defined  by y.  =  tj,  yj  =  I,  and  ys\{,j} = S S\1"i} ·
(vi)  f satisfies restricted proportionality if f(V) is proportional to I<(V) for all V €
CN with k(V)= 0
(vii) f satisfies the minimum right property if f(V) = k(V) + f(V - k(V)) for all
veCN
Clearly, the compromise value satisfies all properties mentioned above.
It turns out that (i), (vi) and (vii) characterize the compromise value on the class of
all compromise admissible games (N, V) for which the boundary of the set V'(N).-
{z e V(N) I z 2 k(V)} contains no segments parallel to a coordinate hyperplane,
i.e.,
V'(N) is non-level: z, y E V'(N)   dom(V(N)) and x 2 y, implies x = y.(2.1)
Let ON denote the class  of all compromise admissible games satisfying  (2.1).   The
non-levelness condition is a standard condition often used in characterizations of
solution concepts for NTU-games (cf. Aumann (1985a)). Analogously to Theorem
2.2.3, we now have the following result.
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Theorem 2.4.6 (Borm et al. (1992))
The compromise value is the unique value on CN which satisfies weak Pareto opti-
mality, restricted proportionality, and the minimum right property.
Borm et al.  (1992) show that the properties (i)-(iv) characterize the compromise
value on the smaller subclass ON c CA' of compromise admissible games (N, V)
satisfying
k(V) < K(V) (2.2)
(kN\{i}(V), K,(V)) C V(N) for all i€N (2.3)
V(N) is convex. (2.4)
Theorem 2.4.7 (Borm et al. (1992))
The compromise value is the unique value on ON which satisfies weak Pareto opti-
mality, bounds-symmetry, monotonicity, and covariance.
It turns out that this theorem can be strengthened, since in this characterization the
monotonicity property is superfluous. Asa consequence of this observation we obtain
a new characterization of the compromise value.
Theorem 2.4.8 (Otten, Borm and Tijs (1994))
The compromise value is the unique value on ON which satisfies
(i) weak Pareto optimality,
(ii) bounds-symmetry,
(iii) covariance.
proof We already know that the compromise value satisfies the three properties on
°N.  Let  f :ON  _¥ RN satisfy the three properties, and let V € ON. We show that
f(v) = T(V)
Let V' := V - k(V). Clearly, V' € ON and k(V') = 0. Moreover by (2.2), K(V') =
K(V) - k(V) > 0. Define A c RN by A, := (K,(V'))-1 for all i E N. Then A > 0.
Let W: =A* V'. Then W E ON, k(W) =A* k(V') =0, and K(W) =1* K(V') =
eN.  Bounds-symmetry of f and T implies f,(w) = fj(W) for all i,j EN and
T,(W) = Tj(W) for all i, j E N. From weak Pareto optimality of f and T it follows
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that f(w) = T(W). Since V= K(V') *W+ k(V), covariance of f and T implies
f(v)- T(V).                                                                             0
Theorem 2.4.8 is similar to one of the characterizations of the MC-value discussed
in Chapter 5 (Theorem 5.4.2).  Note that in the proof of Theorem 2.4.8 we did not
use the conditions (2.1), (2.3), and (2.4). So Theorem 2.4.8 can be adjusted to a
characterization on the larger class of compromise admissible NTU-games satisfying
only (2.2).
The original proof of Theorem 2.4.7 provided by Borm et al. (1992) actually shows
the following characterization of the compromise value on ON in which the bounds-
symmetry property is replaced by the weaker and more natural symmetry property.
Theorem 2.4.9 The compromise value is the unique value on ON which satisfies




The following four examples show that in Theorem 2.4.9 the properties are indepen-
dent.
(1) The value f : ON -+ RN defined by f(v) := K(V) for all V E ON satisfies
symmetry, monotonicity and covariance, but not Pareto optimality.
(II) In Section 4.2 we introduce values corresponding to monotonic curves. These
solution concepts satisfy Pareto optimality, monotonicity, and covariance, but
not necessarily symmetry.
(III) The MC-value defined in Chapter 5 satisfies Pareto optimality, symmetry, and
covariance, but not monotonicity.
(IV) Let f : ON -+ RN be defined as follows: If V E eN is such that K(V) > 0 and
V(N)nR  0 0, then f(V) is the unique element of V(N)\wdom(V(N)) which
belongs to the line segment between 0 and K(V). Otherwise, f(v):= T(V).
The value f satisfies Pareto optimality, symmetry, and monotonicity, but not
covariance.
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Besides the properties mentioned above, the compromise value also satisfies other
standard properties, such as individual rationality and the dummy player property.
Additional properties of the compromise value such as the dummy out property and
a complementary monotonicity property which is slightly different from the com-
plementary monotonicity property of the T-value are studied in Otten (1990).  An
extension of the compromise value to NTU-games with coalition structures can also
be found in Otten (1990).
Borm et al. (1992) provided another extension of the T-value to NTU-games, namely
the NTU T-value. The NTU 7--value is based on the same ideas as the Shapley NTU-
value (Shapley (1969)). Given an NTU-game, Shapley considered so-called A-transfer
TU-games associated with this game. The Shapley NTU-value is obtained from the
Shapley values of these TU-games. Similarly, the NTU 7--value is obtained from the
T-values of quasi-balanced A-transfer games.
Let (N, V) be an NTU-game and let A€A N: = {z€R N I T, 0,E,€N xi=1}.The
vector A is called V-feasible if for all S € 2'v \ {0}
ux(S) := sup{E Aixi I Z E V(S)} < 00.
1€S
So, a V-feasible A generates a TU-game (N, v,). This TU-game is called a A-transfer
game corresponding to (N, V).   If for all V-feasible A  c  AN the corresponding  A-
transfer games are quasi-balanced,  the game  (N, V) is called 7.-admissible.   For a
T-admissible NTU-game (N, V) the NTU 7--value, denoted by 7-(V), is defined by
7-(V) := {z e V(N)  there is a V-feasible  A C A N  such  that  7-(ux) =A* I}
Note that the NTU w-value of an NTU-game not necessarily consists of one point, so
the name value is rather misleading here (the same problem occurs with the Shapley
NTU-value which is not single-valued either). The NTU T-value can even be empty
for T-admissible games. In Borm et al. (1992) a class of 7.-admissible NTU-games is
given for which the NTU 7--value is non-empty.
If (N, v)  is a quasi-balanced TU-game,  then the corresponding NTU-game  is  T-
admissible and the NTU 7-value of this NTU-game coincides with the T-value of
u. Moreover, for two player bargaining situations the NTU T-value coincides with
the Nash bargaining solution.
An extension of the NTU T-value to NTU-games with coalition structures can be
found in Otten (1990).
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2.5 Applications
This section discusses several applications of cooperative game theory to problems in
economics and operations research. We pay special attention to compromise values
and compare the outcomes prescribed by compromise values to the outcomes of other
game theoretic solution concepts. It should be mentioned that the list of applications
we present in this section is certainly not complete. An important application of
cooperative game theory is the analysis of cost allocation problems. The study of
cost allocation problems in a game theoretical framework is the subject of Chapter 3
where we, in particular, investigate the so-called ACA-method, a compromise value
that was proposed by engineers of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).
It turns out that for some classes of garnes we discuss in this section the T-value coin-
cides with the Shapley value or the nucleolus. This raises the interesting question to
find necessary and sufficient conditions for coincidence of the T-value, Shapley value,
and the nucleolus.
Two classes of so-called combinatorial optimization games (weighted graph games and
sequencing games) are discussed. For these classes the T-value is easy to compute.
However, for other combinatorial optimization games such as flow games (Kalai and
Zemel (1982), Curiel et al. (1989)), traveling salesman games (Fishburn and Pollak
(1983), Tamir (1989), Potters et al. (1992)), and minimum cost spanning tree games
(Granot and Huberman (1981)) no explicit formulas for the T-value are known. Al-
though for a special type of minimum cost spanning tree games, called minimal chain
games, the 7--value yields attractive outcomes (cf. Aarts (1994)), the above-mentioned
classes of combinatorial optimization games are not discussed in this section. A re-
cent survey on combinatorial optimization games is provided by Tijs (1992).
Bankruptcy problems
A bankruptcy problem is a pair (E, d)  E  R x RN, where d,  2 0 for all i e  N and
O  s  E  S  E,€N di.   Here,  Eis the estate which  has  to be divided among the claimants
in N, and d, is the claim of claimant i EN. Several allocation rules for bankruptcy
problems have been proposed. An allocation rule is a function f which assigns to
every bankruptcy problem (E, d) a vector f(E, d) E RN such that
(i) 0 5 f(E,d) S d i for all L E N
(ii)  E, ,v f.(E, d) = E.
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Some examples of allocation rules are the proportional rule, which divides the estate
proportional to the claims of the creditors and the constrained equal award rule. We
concentrate on the adjusted proportional rule as introduced and characterized by
Curiel et al. (1987).
The adjusted proportional rule, or AP-rule, starts by giving each claimant i€N his
minimal right m„ which is the maximum of zero and the amount not claimed by
the other claimants, i.e., mi := max{E - E jEN\{,} dj,0}. Next, the amount E'ofthe
estate which is left, i.e., E' := E - EiEN mi, has to be divided. Because each claimant
already received a part of his claim the claims are lowered. The claim of claimant
i  E  N  on E' becomes  d'  .-  min{d,  -  m„ E'} (claims higher  than  E' are considered
irrational). Now the remaining estate E' is divided proportionally to the new claims
(1),EN·
Example 2.5.1 Consider the bankruptcy problem  (E, d)  with  E  =  400,  and  d =
(100,200,300). To determine AP(E, d) we first compute the minimal rights of the
players:
mi = max{400 - 200 - 300,0} = 0,
m2 = max{400 - 100 - 300,0} = 0,
m3 = max{400 - 100 - 200,0} = 100.
The remaining estate E' =E- E,€N m, = 300 and the vector of new claims becomes
d' = (100,200,200). Hence,
300
AP(E, d) = (0,0,100) + -(100.200,200) = (60,120,220).500    '
The AP-rule satisfies several nice properties. Some of them are listed below.
(i) The AP-rule satisfies the minimal right property, which states that it makes no
difference whether the rule is directly applied to a given bankruptcy situation,
or that first the minimal rights are allocated to the players and then the AP-rule
is applied on the remaining estate and the adjusted claims.
(ii) The AP-rule is symmetric, which means that if two claimants have the same
claims, they are also allocated the same part of the estate.
(iii) The AP-rule satisfies the truncated claim property, which means that, given
a bankruptcy problem, it does not matter for the final allocation whether all
claims higher than the estate are replaced by claims equal to the estate.
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(iv) The AP-rule satisfies the additivity of claims property. This property states
that,  given  a  bankruptcy  problem  (E, d)  satisfying  m,  =  0  for  all  i E N,if
one of the claimants dies leaving behind parts of his claim to different heirs,
which become new claimants, this does not affect the allocation to the other
claimants.
It turns out that the four properties listed above are sufficient to characterize the
AP-rule.
Theorem 2.5.2 (Curiel et al. (1987))
The AP-rule is the unique allocation rule for bankruptcy problems which satisfies the
minimal right property, symmetry, the truncated claim property, and additivity of
claims.
For a bankruptcy problem  (E, d)  c  R x Id, the corresponding bankruptcy  game
(N, vE.d) is defined by  (cf.  O'Neill (1982))
VE.d(S) := max{E -   X  d.,0}   for all S E 2N.
,€N\S
In Curiel et al. (1987) it is shown that bankruptcy games are convex games, and
hence, the 7-value can easily be computed.
Example 2.5.3 Consider the bankruptcy problem  (E, d) of Example  2.5.1.   The
corresponding bankruptcy game v := vE.d is given by
u({1}) = v({2}) =0, u({3}) = v({1,2}) = 100,
v({1,3}) = 200, v({2,3}) = 300, v(N) = 400.
If we compute the 7·-value of this TU-game, we find that ·r(v) = (60, 120,220) E C(u).
Hence, the T-value of this bankruptcy game belongs to the core of the game and it
coincides with the AP-solution of the bankruptcy problem. This is no coincidence as
is shown in the next theorem.
Theorem 2.5.4 (Curiel et al. (1987))
Let (E, d) be a bankruptcy problem and let (N, vE.d) be the corresponding bankruptcy
game. Then
(i) AP(E, d) = T(VE.d)
(ii) 1-(VE.d) € C(VE.d ·
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In O'Neill (1982) and Aumann and Maschler (1985) the Shapley value and the nu-
cleolus for bankruptcy games are studied.
An alternative game theoretic approach to bankruptcy problems is introduced by
Dagan and Volij (1993). Given a bankruptcy problem  (E, d),  one can construct  a
bargaining problem (CCE,d), b(E,d)) in the following way. A natural choice for the set
C(E,d) of feasible outcomes is to define
CCE,d) := {x €R N'Z f d,E x i s E}.
i€N
Dagan and Volij (1993) proposed two possible alternatives for the disagreement out-
come,  namely  b(E,d)   -  0  and  b(E,d)  .-  m(E, d), where  m(E, d) denotes the vector
consisting of the minimal rights of the players.  In case b(E,d) = m(E, d) we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 2.5.5 (Dagan and Volij (1993))
Let  (E, d)  be a bankruptcy problem and  let  (CCE,d),m(E, d))  be the corresponding
bargaining problem. Then
RKS(CCE,d), m(E, d)) = AP(E,d) = T(vE.dh
Exchange markets
Many economic situations can be modelled using cooperative game theory. Sometimes
it is more natural to use NTU-games than to use TU-games. This is the case for
example if one wants to model exchange markets as cooperative games.
An exchange market E is a tuple < N, RT, (f'),EN, (ubi€N >· Here, N is the set
of agents, RT is the commodity space, f, C RT is the initial commodity bundle of
agent i EN, and u, : RT   R is the utility function of agent i EN. An admissible
reallocation of coalition S is a collection of commodity bundles (z'),Es such that
2, €R T for each i€S and E,Es z, = E,Es f'.  The set of admissible reallocations of
coalition S is denoted by A(S).
An exchange market E gives rise to an NTU-game (N, 14) as follows.   For each
S €2N\{0} define
14(S) := {t € RS 1 3(..).Es€ACS)[u,(zi) 2 4 for all i E Sl}
The following well-known example of Shafer (1980) has led to an interesting debate
on the interpretation of the Shapley NTU-value (cf. Aumann (1985b, 1986), Roth
(1986)).
36 Compromise values: an overview
Example 2.5.6 Consider the following exchange market  E with three agents  and
two commodities. The initial commodity bundles and the utility functions of the
agents  1,  2,  and  3 are given  by
fi  - (1 - 6,0),  P = (0,1 - €),  fa = (E, E),
ul(Zi, x2) = t12(Zi,Z2) = min{xii x2 , and  t43(xi, Zy) ;  (xi + x2)
for all (zi,z2) E R , where O S E< .
The corresponding NTU-game (N, 14) is given by
14({i})={t€RltfO},i= 1,2
14({3}) = {t E R I t s E},
14({1,2})= {(ti, 12) ER{1.2} 1 11 + 12 61-E, ti 51-4 t2 51-€},
14({1,3})-{(46) € R{1,3} 1 4+1 3 5& + &4 4 54  6 5& + #E},
14({2,3}) = {(t2,13) E R{2,3} 1 12 + 1 3 f    E, 12 5 4 t 3 5  +  € i
14({1,2,3}) = {(tl,t2,t3) E R.  Itl + t2 + t3 5 1, 11 5 1, 12 5 1, t3 5 1}
Easy computations yield that in this case the compromise value and the NTU 7-value
give the same solution, namely (& -14t- &44.
The Shapley NTU-value yields the outcome (i  - &E, & -  €, 6 + 66). We see that
the Shapley NTU-value always assigns a positive payoff to agent 3 of at least   even
ifc= 0.  Butifc= 0, agents 1 and 2 together can achieve a utility of 1 by forming the
subcoalition {1,2}, leaving 0 for agent 3.  This was the reason that Shafer (1980) (and
Roth (1986)) claimed that in this case the Shapley NTU-value is not a reasonable
outcome. However, using arguments from non-cooperative game theory, Aumann
(1985b, 1986) argues that it can be reasonable that player 3 gets a positive utility.
Obviously, the compromise value and the NTU T-value (and also the Harsanyi value)
give a utility of 0 to agent 3 if E = 0.
Big boss games
A TU-game (N, v) is called a big boss game (with player i as big boss) (cf.  Muto et
al. (1988)) if the following three conditions hold:
(i) u i s monotonic, i.e., if S C T C N, then u(S) 5 u(T)
(ii) u(S) =O i f i §f S
(iii) u(N) - u(S) 2 Ej€N\S Mj(u) if i E S.
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Condition (i) implies that v(S) 2 0 for all S € 2N and that M(v) 20, and (ii) states
that player i is very powerful, i.e., coalitions not containing i cannot get anything.
Condition (iii), which Muto et al. (1988) call the 'union property', implies that for
a coalition without the big boss the marginal contribution to the grand coalition is
at least as large as the sum of the marginal contributions of each of its members. It
turns out that there are many economic situations which give rise to big boss games.
We mention:
(1) bankruptcy problems with one big claimant, i.e., a claimant who claims at least
the estate
(2) one-seller/many buyers situations of a certain type
(3) information market games as introduced in Muto et al. (1989).
For  these  and more applications the reader is referred  to  Muto et  al. (1988) Gener-
alizations of big boss games were studied in Potters et al. (1989) (clan games) and
Nagarajan (1992) (games with leading coalitions).
In the next theorem some results for big boss games are collected.
Theorem 2.5.7 (Muto et al. (1988))
Let (N, v) be a big boss game with player i as the big boss.  Then
(i) the core of v is a paralellotope, consisting of all the vectors z E RN with
Zi€N xi = v(N) and 0 5 z j 5 Mj(u) for all j E N j {i}
(ii) the 7--value and the nucleolus of v both coincide with the center of the core,
i.e.,
t,(N)-   Ek€N\{j} MA(v) if j =i
Ts(v) = n,(u) = <  i M (u)                              if j#i
(iii) for the Shapley value *(u) we have *,(v) 5 T,(u)
(iv)  $(u) = T(u) = n(v) if and only if v is convex.
Weighted graph games
Brown and Housman (1988) introduced weighted graph games as a class of games
where the value of a coalition with more than two players only depends on the values
of the two player subcoalitions. Formally, a weighted graph game is a TU-game (N, v)
where
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U:= E aTUT
T:ITI=2
with al' 2 0 for all T € 2N, ITI = 2.  Here, uT denotes the T-unanimity game defined
by
uT(S) := <    if T C Sotherwise.
A weighted graph game corresponds to a weighted complete graph in which the
players are the vertices and the weight on an edge {i,j} C N, i 0 j, is given by
a<i,j .  For a coalition S € 2N, u(S) can be seen as the sum of the weights on the
edges of the subgraph induced by S.
Weighted graph games form a subclass of the class of convex games. The following
theorem illustrates that on this subclass the Shapley value, the nucleolus, and the
T-value coincide.
Theorem 2.5.8 (Brown and Housman (1988))
Let (N, v) be a weighted graph game.  Then for all E E N
0,(v) = T,(v) = n,(u) =  (the sum of the weights of
all edges adjacent to i)
As a corollary of Theorem 2.5.8 it follows that the T-value and the nucleolus are
additive on the cone
K  := cone{uT I T€ 2N, ITI = 2}.
In van den Nouweland et al. (1994) it is shown that the T-value is additive on each
of the cones K ' := cone{uT I T E 2N, ITI =1} with 2 5 1 5 INI.
Theorem 2.5.9 (van den Nouweland et al. (1994))
Let (N, u) E KA (2 S t s IND. Then *(U) = T(U).
It is not difficult to show that the nucleolus does not coincide with the T-value and
the Shapley value on K v if t > 2.
Sequencing games
In a sequencing situation there is a queue, consisting of n customers waiting to be
served at a counter. The original order of the customers is given by a permutation 0
of N: = {1,..., n}.  In the sequel we assume without loss of generality that 0(i) =i
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for all iE N.For every i EN, 8, ER+ denotes the service time of i and 4 : R+ -* R
is the cost function of i (c, (t) denotes the costs of customer i if his completion time
is t). We assume that c, is increasing and affine, i.e., c,(t) = a,1 + 13, for all t E R+,
where a, > 0.
Given a sequencing situation one can construct a TU-game in the following way (cf.
Curiel et al. (1989)). The set of players is N, and define the sequencing game (N,v)
in such a way that the worth of a coalition S is equal to the maximal cost savings the
coalition can obtain by rearranging their positions in the queue. Hereby, we allow two
customers in S to change positions only if there is no customer outside S standing
between them in the original order. The cost savings that two neighbours i and j
in the queue can obtain by switching are g,j := max{ajs, - a.sj,0}.  To see this,
note that if i and j change positions, then i's completion time increases with sj (we
assume i < j).  So his extra costs are a,sj. Analogously, the cost savings of j are ais'.
So, the joint cost savings are ajs, - aisj.  If this is negative, then it is not favourable
for i and j to change positions. Notice that to compute the cost savings one does not
have to know the numbers Bi, i E N.
Example 2.5.10 Consider the following sequencing situation, in which there are
three customers  in the queue, numbered  1,2,  and  3.   So,  N= {1,2,3} . The service
times of the customers are given by 31 = 7, 52 - 3, and 33 - 5. Further, ai = 10,
a2 = 20, and a3 = 30. If customers 1 and 2 change their positions in the queue then
the cost savings that can be obtained are 7 x 2 0-3 x 1 0= 110, so 912 = 110. Easy
calculations yield that  913 = 160, 932 = 10, and g,j = 0 otherwise.
A coalition T € 2N is called connected if for all i,j €T and all k EN, with
i<k<j,w e havek€T. Curiel et al. (1989) proved that for a connected coalition
T the maximal cost savings are
u(T) =      E     g.j.
i,JET:t<j
For a non-connected coalition S, we say that T C S i s a component of S i f T i s
connected and T U {i} is not connected for every I C S\T. The components of S
form a partition of S which we denote by P(S). Now it follows
u(S) =  E  UCT).
T€P(S)
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In   Curiel  et   al.     ( 1989)   it is shown that sequencing games are convex games,   and
therefore, the T-value can easily be computed. For player i€N the utopia payoff
M,(v) is equal to
Mi(v) =    I   gik -    9jk -      9jk 4 9jk.
j,k€N: j<k j,k€N: j<k<t J,k€N 1<j<k j,kEN: 3*k, j fisk
This last expression resembles precisely the cost savings that cannot be obtained
if player i does not cooperate. Since sequencing games are zero-normalized, i.e.,
v({i})=0  for  all  i   E N,i t   follows   that  the  T-value  is  proportional  to the upper
value.
Example 2.5.11 Consider again the sequencing situation of Example 2.5.10. The
corresponding sequencing game (N, u) is defined by
v({1}) = v({2}) =u({3}) = 0,
u({1,2}) = 110, v({1,3}) = v({2,3}) =0, u(N) = 270.
The T-value of v is given by T(U) =  (270,270,160)
Chapter 3
Cost allocation problems
Cost allocation problems occur in many real life situations, where individuals work
together in a joint project. In these cases the problem arises of allocating the joint
costs to the participants in the project in a «fair" way. Cooperative game theory
provides a mathematical tool to analyse this type of problems.
Examples of cost allocation problems studied in a game theoretical context are the
setting of fees for common facilities like communication networks, canals, airports,
etc. Other examples are the allocation of joint overhead costs of a firm among its
different divisions (e.g. Shubik (1962), Jensen (1977), Hamlen et al. (1977)), and
the apportioning of costs of multipurpose water projects. (e.g. Ransmeier (1942),
Suzuki and Nakayama (1976), Loughlin (1977), Straffin and Heaney (1981), Young
et al. (1982)).
Especially the last type of cost allocation problems has a rich history dating back to
the 1930's in which the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was established to improve
the economic situation in the Tennessee Valley region. Among the projects initiated
by the TVA were several multipurpose water projects in the Tennessee River. The
problem TVA engineers were confronted with was that the TVA Act of 1933 required
that the costs of a project had to be apportioned among the different 'purposes' to be
served by the project. The TVA developed several methods to allocate the costs of
projects to the purposes.  One of these methods is the alternate cost avoided method,
or shortly, the ACA-method, which was proposed by Martin Glaeser, an engineer of
the TVA in 1938.
A game theoretical basis for the ACA-method was established by Gately (1974).
Gately proposed a new solution concept for cooperative games based on a player's
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.propensity to disrupt" the solution. This solution concept has been further gener-
alized by Fischer and Gately (1975), Littlechild and Vaidya (1976), and Charnes et
al. (1978). It was shown by Straffin and Heaney (1981) that the allocation method
proposed by Gately corresponds precisely to the ACA-method.
The purpose of this chapter, which is based on Otten (1993), is to provide a charac-
terization of the ACA-method on a certain class of cost games with a fixed player set
as well as on a class of cost games with a variable player set, using a reduced game
property. This is the subject of Section 3.3. First, in section 3.1 we formulate cost
allocation problems in a game theoretic framework and in section 3.2 we recall some
of the cost allocation methods proposed by the TVA.
: . ,.5\. '' +  0.1        - i./.
3.1 Cost allocation problems and game theory
To formulate a cost allocation problem in terms of cooperative game theory, it is
modelled as a Cost
game  (N, c).   Here  N  represents  the  set  of participants  among
which the joint costs should be divided. N can be a set of potential customers of a
public facility, the divisions of a firm, municipalities which share a joint water system,
etc. The function c : 2N -' R is the so-called (joint) Cost function.  For each coalition
S 6 2N, C(S) denotes the minimal costs of designing a project only to serve the
purposes of the members of S. Particularly, c(0) = 0. By CGN we denote the class
of all cost games with player set N.
Given  a cost game (N, c), the cost allocation problem becomes how to allocate the
joint costs in a fair way. For games corresponding to reward situations (cf. Section
2.1) notions like payoff vector, imputation set, core and so on are important. For cost
games these notions should be modified in an appropriate way.
A cost allocation for (N, c) is a vector z € RN such that  ,EN Z, = c(N).  Here, xi
is the cost allocated to player E € N. (Note that we have included efficiency in the
definition of a cost allocation.)  If AN is a subset of CGN, then a (cost) allocation
method on AN is a map f : AN --+ RN, which assigns to every cost game (N, c) c AN
a cost allocation f(c) e RN. The coiv of a cost game (N, c) is defined by
Ccg(c) := {z E RN I =(N) = c(N),z(S) 5 c(S) for all S E 2N}.
Here, the superscript cg indicates that we consider cost games. Further, we say that
a cost game (N, c) is concaue if and only if the (reward) game (N, -c) is convex.  The
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reader will have little difficulties in defining the Shapley value and the nucleolus for
cost games. Also the T-value can be defined for cost games. For a cost game (N, c),
the 7--value is the efficient compromise between the two vectors SC(c) and m 9(c)
defined by
SCi(c)   :=  c(N) - c(N \ {i}) for all i E N
m7(c)  :=  #,%(c(S) -  E  SC,(c)) for all i EN.
j€s\{i}
SC, (c)   denotes the separable Cost of player i in c (This name will be explained in
Section 3.2). Note that SC(c) corresponds to the vector M(c) which is introduced in
Section 2.1. Contrary to the reward case, however, in the context of cost allocation
problems SC(c) will play the role of the lower bound. Similarly, the vector mog(c) is
the cost game analogue of the lower value for reward games.  In the context of cost
allocation problems it plays the role of the upper value. Of course, the 7--value for
cost games is, similar to the reward case, only defined when the vectors SC(c) and
m°9(c) constitute real lower and upper bounds, respectively. It is'easy to check that
in case (N, c) is concave, we have m7(c) = c({i}) for all i € N, so the T-value can
easily be computed. Aoki (1989) analyses the T-value for concave cost games.
In Tijs and Driessen (1986) the T-value for cost games is introduced using gap func-
tions and, instead of the name T-value, the name cost gap method is used. See also
Driessen (1988).
We conclude this section with an example of a special class of cost allocation prob-
lems. As in Section 2.5 we concentrate on the 7-value.
Example 3.1.1 (Airport games (Littlechild and Owen (1973))
A special type of cost allocation situations is related to the aircraft landing fee prob-
lem of an airport with one runway. Suppose that the planes which are to land are
classified into m types. Let Nj be the set of landings by planes of type j over a fixed
period of time.  Then N := U;li Nj is the set of all landings.  Let nj := INjl and
n:= EZ=1 n'.
The cost of building a runway depends on the largest plane for which the runway is
designed. Let tj be the cost to make the runway suitable for landings by planes of
type j. We assume  that
0= :t o<1 1<t 2< · · · < im.
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To formulate this problem in a game theoretic framework we define the cost function
C: 2N -+ R by 40) := 0 and for S E 2N\{0}
c(S):= max{tj 1 1<j s m,S n N i t 0}.
For the T-value of this airport game we have (cf. Tijs and Driessen (1986)) in case
nm 22
m
·r,(c) = tmtj(I nktk)-1  if i E Nj.
k=l
So the T-value assigns cost allocations proportional to the cost of a shortest runway
needed by a player. The proof of this statement is based on the fact that airport
games are concave, and that since n= 2 2, we have that the separable cost SC,(c) of
each player E E N equals zero. Hence, 7-(c) is proportional to (c({i})LEN· It can be
shown that not necessarily T (c) E cc,(c). Driessen (1988) gives an explicit formula
for the T-value in case n™ = 1.
In Littlechild and Owen (1973) and Dubey (1982) the Shapley value of airport games
is discussed and characterized.  For the nucleolus of airport games the reader is
referred to Littlechild (1974), Littlechild and Owen (1976), and Owen (1982).
3.2   The TVA and cost allocation problems
TVA engineers developed several methods to allocate the costs of water projects to
the purposes to be served. Almost all these methods begin by charging every player
(purpose) a minimal cost, called separable cost, which are the additional cost of
including the player in the project already designed for the other players. Thus, for
a cost game (N,c), the separable Cost SC, (C) of player i € N are defined by
SC,(C) := c(N) - c(N \ {i}).
To use methods based on the idea above it is reasonable to make the following two
assumptions on the underlying cost game:
Sci(c) 5 c({i}) for all i E N, (3.1)
E sc,(c) 5 c(N) 5 I c({i}). (3.2)
i€N 1€N
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Conditions (3.1) and (3.2) are well-known balancedness conditions for cost games. If
SC,(c) > c({i}) for some iE N, then it is not favourable to include player i in the
joint project. Condition (3.2) implies that after each player is charged his minimal
costs there is still a nonnegative amount of cost remaining which should be allocated.
These remaining cost are called the nonseparable cost and are given by
NSC(c) := c(N) - E Sci(c).
EN
An easy way to allocate the nonseparable cost is to divide these cost equally among
the players. This method is called the egalitarian nonseparable cost (ENSC) method,
and it is one of the first allocation methods being proposed by the TVA. Thus, for a
cost game (N, c) the cost allocated to player :E N by the ENSC-method are
1
ENSC;(c) = SC.(c) + -N SC(c).
INI
An alternative allocation method is the alternate cost  avoided  (A CA) method. This
method allocates the nonseparable  cost in proportion  to c({i}) - SC,(c), which  rep-
resents the alternate cost avoided by including player i in the joint project. Hence,
ACA (c) := SCi(C) + _ NSC(c)   for all i € N.C({i}) - SC, (C)15€N(C({j}) - SCj(C))
If the denominator in this formula equals 0, then NSC(c) = 0. So, in this case
ACA(c) := SC(c).
A modification of the ACA-method is the separable Cost remaining benejit (SCRB)
method. This method has become the principal method used by civil engineers to
allocate the costs of multipurpose water projects  (see e.g. Inter- Agency Committee
on Water Resources (1958)). If b(i) is the benefit of the project to player i, then i
would not be willing to pay more than min{b(i),c({i})}. The remaining benejit to
player i is defined by min{b(i),c({i})} - SC,(c). The SCRB-method allocates the
nonseparable cost proportional to the remaining benefits. Since in many situations
the benefits will exceed the alternate costs, the SCRB-method often coincides with
the ACA-method.
The major drawback of the cost allocation methods mentioned above is that they
only take into account the values of the coalitions with 1, INI - 1, and  N players.  In
particular, there is no guarantee that the corresponding allocations of these methods
are core elements of the cost game, which means that there might be subcoalitions
that have an incentive to split off from the grand coalition.
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From a practical viewpoint however, the advantage of these methods is that in general
they are much easier to compute than game theoretical solution concepts as the
Shapley value, the nucleolus, or the T-value, which in principle take into account the
values of all coalitions.
Moreover, as is shown in e.g. Suzuki and Nakayama (1976), Legros (1982), and
Driessen and Tijs (1985) there are (large) classes of cost games for which some of
the solution concepts mentioned above coincide with one (or more) of the game
theoretical solution concepts. Particularly, for concave cost games the T-value and
the ACA-method coincide.
Example 3.2.1 An example of a cost allocation problem to be solved by TVA engi-
neers was the apportioning of the costs of the Wilson Dam to the purposes navigation,
flood control, and the provision of hydro-electric power (there were also two other, less
important purposes). Here the purposes navigation, flood control and hydro-electric
power are denoted as the players  1,2,  and 3, respectively. Table 3.1 is adapted from
Ransmeier (1942, p. 329).
coalition S|0 1   {1}   |   {2}   I   {3}   |  {1,2}     {1,3}  I  {2,3}  | {1,2,3}
cost c(S) |0| 163,520 | 140,826 | 250,096 | 301,607 | 378,821 | 367,370 | 412,584
Table 3.1.  The cost game for the Wilson Dam (costs in $ 1,000).
For this cost game the cost allocations of the ENSC- and ACA-method are given in
Table 3.2 together with the cost allocations corresponding to the game theoretical
solutions mentioned above. Note that, since c is concave, the cost allocations by the
ACA-method and the T-value coincide.
1 2 3
ENSC-method 119,424 107,973 185,187
ACA-method 117,476 99,157 195,951
Shapley value 117,829 100,756 193,999
Nucleolus 116,234 93,540 202,810
T-value 117,476 99,157 195,951
Table 3.2. Cost allocations for the cost game of Table 3.1 (costs in $ 1,000).
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3.3 Characterizations of the ACA-method
This section further investigates the ACA-method. Attention is restricted to the class
of cost games (N, c) for which  (3.1)  and  (3.2) hold. This class is denoted by  FN and
F™ denotes the class of cost games with m or more players and satisfying (3.1) and
(3.2).
Geometrically, for a cost game (N, c) C FN the cost allocation ACA(c) is the unique
element in the hyperplane {z € Riv| Ii€N zi = c(N)} which lies on the line segment
with endpoints (SC,(c)),EN and (c({i} ))1€N (see Figure 3.1).
A (((9})),EN
X
  ACA(c)  
(SC,(C)),EN          '   {z € RN | Ii€N zi = c(N)}
Figure 3.1.
In order to provide characterizations of the ACA-method we investigate several prop-
erties of the ACA-method which are the cost game analogies of properties introduced
in Section 2.2 for values for TU-games.
Let A C Fi. Clearly, the ACA-method satisfies individual rationality on A, i.e.,
ACA,(C)  5 c({i}) for all i E N and all (N,c)  E A.
Furthermore, the ACA-method satisfies symmetry on A, i.e., for all (N, c) E A and
all players i and j that are symmetric in (N, c), i.e., c(S U {i}) = c(S U {j}) for all
S C N\ {i,j}, it holds that ACA,(c) = ACAj(c).
The ACA-method also satisfies covariance on A, i.e., for all (N, c) E A, allk>Oand
all a € RN, such that (N, kc + a) c A, we have that ACA(kc + a) = kACA(c) + a.
Another property of the ACA-method on A is weak proportionality which says that
if (N, c) €  A is such that SC,(c) = 0 for all i E N, then ACA(c) is proportional to
the vector (c({i})),EN of individual costs.
This weak proportionality property shows great resemblance to the restricted pro-
portionally property of the T-value (see Theorem 2.2.2). Cost games for which each
player's separable cost are zero arise when the increase in the total costs of adding an
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extra player can be neglected compared to the total cost of the project. An example
is the airport game of Example 3.1.1 if there are at least two planes of the largest
type  (nm  22)
Similar to the characterization of the T-value in Theorem 2.2.3 one can prove the
following characterization of the ACA-method.
Theorem 3.3.1 The ACA-method is the unique cost allocation method on FN
which satisfies covariance and weak proportionality.
proof· Suppose that f : FN -+ RY satisfies the two mentioned properties. Let
(N, c) C FN. It suffices to show that f(c) = ACA(c).
Define  he game (N, c) E FN by
2(S):= c(S) - E Sci(c)    for all  S C N.
i€S
Then SC,(c) = 0 for all i E N. From the weak proportionality property it follows
that there exists an a E R such that for all i E N
ji(2) = ac({i}) = a(c({i}) - SCi(c)).
From covariance it follows that for all i E N
f,(c) = SC.(c) + f;(2) = SC,(c) + a(c({i}) - SCI(c)).
Using the fact that E,eiv f.(c) = c(N), it easily follows that f(c) = ACA(c). 0
The last part of this section provides a characterization of the ACA-method on the
class Fi using a reduced game property. In the literature several types of reduced
games have been considered to provide a foundation of game theoretic solution con-
cepts based on the consistency principle. We mention Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) for
the Shapley value, Sobolev (1975), and Snijders (1991) for the (pre)nucleolus, Peleg
(1986) for the core, and recently, Driessen (1993) for the T-value. Also the ENSC-
method has been characterized by means of a reduced game property (Moulin (1985),
Driessen and Funaki (1993)). For detailed surveys on consistency see e.g. Thomson
(1990) and Driessen (1991).
The idea behind consistency is the following. Given a cost game, and a cost allocation
for this game, determined by a cost allocation method, imagine that a subcoalition
decides to renegotiate the allocation within their subgroup. The new situation is de-
scribed by a reduced game. A cost allocation method is called consistent with respect
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to this reduced game if the method proposes in the reduced game the same outcome
as in the original game for all members of this subgroup.
Let  (N, c) be a cost game, k E N and  x E RN a cost allocation. The reduced game
(N \ {k}, ck,x) corresponding to (N, c) is defined as follows.  For S C N j {k}
ck,%(S):=  
C(S) if IS' s 1
c(SU {k}) - zk    if 2 5 ISI S INI - 1.
It should be noted that the reduced game introduced here coincides with the reduced
game of Moulin (1985) except for the 1-person coalitions.
The interpretation of this reduced game is as follows. In the reduced situation the
cost of a 1-person coalition is the same as in the original game. However, if in the
reduced situation the players want to cooperate in a coalition S, then player k should
be involved in this cooperation, and therefore, the cost of coalition S in the reduced
game  is  the  cost of coalition S U{k}i n the original game minus the original  cost  zk
allocated to player k.
Let A C Fi and let m(A) := min{INI I FINInA 0 0}. A cost allocation method f
on A satisfies the reduced game property on A if for all (N, c) E A with  N  > m(A)
and all k€N i t holds that
(i) (N \{k}, c"·'(c)) € A, and
(ii)  f (ck./(0)) = f,(c)   for all  i€N\ {k}.
The ACA-method satisfies the reduced game property on the class iIi'3. This is shown
in the next lemma.
Lemma 3.3.2 The ACA-method satisfies the reduced game property on 6.
proof  Let (N, c) E F3 with INI 24, and let k € N. We first show that the reduced
game (N \ {k}, ck•ACACC)) is an element of 6. For this note that for all :EN\{k}
ck•ACACC)({i}) = C({i}) (3.3)
and since I N I   2  4  also
SCi(Ck,ACA(c)) = c(N) - ACAk(c) - (c(N \ {i})- ACAk(c)) = SC,(c). (3.4)
Since (N, c) E 6, it follows that SC,(ck,ACA(c)) S ck,ACACI)({i}) for all i€N\ {k}
It remains to show that
50 Cost allocation problems
    SC,(Ck'ACA(c)) S Ck,ACA(c)(N \ {k}) S   E Ck,ACA(c) {i}) (3.5)
iff N\{k } ,€N\{k}
Note that fori€Nj{k}
SC,(c) 5 ACA(c) 5 c({z})
Then, using (3.3), (3.4), and the fact that ck,ACA(c)(N \ {k}) = E,EN\{k  ACA,(c) the
required inequalities (3.5) are easily obtained.
Now we show that ACAi(Ck.ACA(c) = ACA,(c) for all I E N J {k}.
Recall that ACA,(c) = SCi(c) + a(c({i}) - SCi(c)) for all i E N, where a is such
that
c(N) = E SC,(c) + a I(c({i}) - SCE(c)). (3.6)
i€N EEN
Using (3.3) and (3.4), we obtain that ACA,(ck,ACA(c)  = Sci(C) + #(C({i}) - Sci(c))
for all i€Nj{k}, where B i s such that
c(N) - ACA,(c) =   E   SCI(c) +B X (c({i}) - SC,·(C)). (3.7)
i€N\{k} ,€N\{k}
Subtracting (3.7) from (3.6) we obtain
ACAk(C) - SCk(c) + a((({k}) - SCk(c)) + (0 - 0)   E  (C({i}) - Sci(C)).
i€N\{k}
Hence,
(a - B) E (c({i}) - SC,(C)) = 0. (3.8)
,€N\{k}
We now distinguish two cases.
If E,€N\{k}(c({i}) - SC,(c)) =0, then c({i}) - SC,(c) =0 for all i E N   {k} and
hence, ACA,(c) = SC,(c) = ACA,(ck.ACA(4) for all i€N\ {k}
If E,€N\{k}(c({i}) - SC,(c)) 96 0, then by (3.8) a- # =0. Hence, ACAi(Ck.ACA(o)  -
ACA,(c) for all i€N   {k}.                                                                       0
Example 3.3.3 illustrates that the ACA-method does not satisfy the reduced game
property on the set F2. This is due to the fact that by reducing a 3-person game to
a 2-person game the separable costs of the players may change.
Example  3.3.3  Let N :=  {1,2,3}  and define (N, c) as follows. For SCN
c(S) =   2   if {2,3} ¢ S4   if {2,3 C .
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Clearly, (N, c)  E F, and ACA(c) = (0,2,2). The reduced game ({1,2},2 ACA(c)) e Fl
is given by ca,ACA(.)({1}) = c·3.ACA(c)({2}) = 2 and c3.ACA(c)({1,2}) = 2.
Hence, ACA(2,ACACI) = (1,1) 0 (0,2) = (ACAl(c), ACA2(C)).
The following lemma provides a relation between the reduced game property and
weak proportionality.
Lemma 3.3.4 Let f be a cost allocation method on ,16 which satisfies weak propor-
tionality on F3 \ 174 and the reduced game property on 6.  Then f satisfies weak
proportionality on I'3.
proof The proof proceeds by induction on the number of players.
Let (N, c) € F3 with INI 2 4 b e such that SC,(c) -0 for all i€N and suppose that
f satisfies weak proportionality on 6 \ FiNI.
Let k E N and let (N   {k},ck.,(C)) be the (INI - 1)-person reduced game of ( N, c).
Then (N \ {k}, ck./(c)) c Fa jFINI· Since SC,(ck.1(I) ) =0 for all z E N {k} (cf. (3.4)),
it follows from the induction hypothesis that there exists an a(= ak) E R such that
fi (ck.J(C)) = ack./(C)({i}) = ac({i})   for all  i€Nj{k}.
Since f satisfies the reduced game property on 6 it follows that
f.(c) = f. (Ck·,(I)) = ac( {i} )        for  all    i  €N\{k}
If we vary k EN, it follows that a does not depend on k. Hence, we obtain
f(c) = a(c({1}),...,c({n})),
and  so f satisfies weak proportionality on  6 \ FINI+1 ·                                                             0
Now we can formulate the main theorem of this chapter which characterizes the
ACA-method  on  Fi.
Theorem 3.3.5 The ACA-method is the unique cost allocation method on Fi which
satisfies
(i)   symmetry on  Fi,
(ii) covariance on Fi,
(iii) weak proportionality on F3 \ F4,
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(iv) the reduced game property on 6.
proof. Clearly, the ACA-method satisfies (i)-(iv).
Let f be a cost allocation method, defined on Fi, satisfying (i)-(iv).  Let (N, c) € Fi.
To show that f(c) = ACA(c) we distinguish three cases.
If INI = 1, then f(c) = c({1}) = ACA(c).
If INI = 2, then (i) and (ii) imply that f,(c) = c({i})+ (c(N)-c({i})-c(N\{i})) =
ACA,(c) for i =  1,2
If IN' 23, then Theorem 3.3.1 and Lemma 3.3.4 imply f(c) = ACA(c).          0
It may be noted that also the ENSC-method satisfies symmetry, covariance, and the
reduced game property on the set F3. However, this cost allocation method does not
satisfy weak proportionality.
For  a  cost  game  (N, c)  E  Fi,  the  center  of imputation set (CIS) value (cf. Driessen
and Funaki (1993)) is defined by
1
CIS, (c) := c({i}) + -(c(N) - I c({j}))   for all i € N.
INI          j<N
If in Theorem 3.3.5 condition (iii) is omitted and condition (iv) is replaced by the
reduced game property on F2 then a characterization of the CIS-value on Fi is ob-
tained. It is left to the reader to show that the CIS-value is indeed the unique cost
allocation method on Fi which satisfies symmetry and covariance Fi and the reduced
game property on FF
Chapter 4
The compromise value for
NTU-games
In Section 2.4 we defined the compromise value for NTU-games and showed that the
compromise value by definition extends the T-value for TU-games and the Raiffa-
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (RKS-solution) for bargaining problems to NTU-games
(Corollary 2.4.5). We have also seen that the characterizations of the T-value and the
RKS-solution can be generalized to NTU-games to obtain characterizations of the
compromise value (Theorem 2.4.6 and Theorem 2.4.7 (or 2.4.9)).
In this chapter, based on Otten, Borm and Tijs (1994), we reconsider the compro-
mise value. In (most of) the characterizations of the compromise value discussed in
Section 2.4 a non-levelness condition plays a crucial role. Section 4.1 illustrates that
this condition can be weakened in order to obtain a characterization on a larger class
of NTU-gaines. We use a similar technique as Peters and Tijs (1984) who extended
Thomson's (1980) characterization of the RKS-solution to a larger class of bargaining
problems by weakening the non-levelness condition.
Further, Section 4.2 characterizes the set of all monotonic, Pareto optimal, and covari-
ant values on this class of NTU-games using monotonic curve solutions as introduced
by Peters and Tijs (1984).
4.1    Characterizations of the compromise value
In Section 2.4 we have seen that the compromise value satisfies weak Pareto optimality
on the class CN of compromise admissible NTU-games.  In this chapter we focus
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attention on subclasses of CN for which this property can be strengthened. First, we
introduce some notation.
Let (N, V) be an NTU-game.  For each S € 2N \ {0}, let wdom(V(S)) denote the set
of elements which are weakly dominated by coalition S, i.e.,
wdom(V(S)) := {x €R s I Z S y for some y€ V(S), 7 4 z}.
Clearly, dom(V(S)) C wdom(V(S)).
For what follows the following additional property for values for NTU-games is im-
portant.
Let AN C CN, and let f : AN -1 RN be a value on AN.
f is called Pareto optimaton AN if f(V) E V(N)\wdom(V(N)) for all V E Aiv.
Clearly, Pareto optimality is a strengthening of the weak Pareto optimality condition
introduced in Section 2.4.  On the class CN of compromise admissible NTU-games the
compromise value does not satisfy Pareto optimality. This is shown in the following
example.
Example 4.1.1 Let N := {1,2,3} and define V by
V(S) := {x €R s I t s o} for all S €2 N\ {0,N}, and
V(N):= comp(conv{(4,0,0), (4,3,0), (2,4,0), (0,4,0), (2,3,2), (0,3,2), (0,0,4)})
The reader easily verifies that K(V) = (4, 4, 4) and k(V)  =  (0, 0, 0). SO, veCN
and T(V) = (2,2,2). But (2,2,2) e wdom(V(N)) since (2,3,2) E V(N). Hence, the
compromise value is not Pareto optimal on CN.
Of course, in the characterizations of the compromise value in Section 2.4 weak Pareto
optimality can be replaced by Pareto optimality since, by (2.1), for a game V ECN
Cor   N) all weakly Pareto optimal points  in  the set V*(N) are Pareto optimal.
In this section we will show that by modifying the non-levelness assumption one can
obtain a characterization of the compromise value on a larger class of compromise
admissible NTU-games. This modification is based on Peters and Tijs (1984), who
extended Thomson's (1980) characterization of the RKS-solution to a larger class of
bargaining problems by weakening the assumption of non-levelness.
We restrict attention to the class ON of all compromise admissible NTU-games V
with player set N satisfying (2.2)-(2.4) and, in addition,
for all x E V'(N) and all i€N w e have: If z€ wdom(V(N)) and z. < K.(V),
then there exists an c>0 such that z + ce' € V(N). (4.1)
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Clearly,  if  V'(N) is non-level, then V'(N) also satisfies (4.1).
Note that the NTU-game provided in Example 4.1.1 does not satisfy (4.1). This is
an immediate consequence of the following lemma which shows that the compromise
value is Pareto optimal on the class ON.
Lemma 4.1.2 Let V € ON. Then T(V) C V(N) \ wdom(V(N)).
Proof. Because of covariance of T attention can be restricted to V € ON with
k(V) = 0 and K(V) = eN (see the proof of Theorem 2.4.8).  So, let V € Civ with
k(V) = 0 and K(V) = eN. Then T(V) is an element of the line segment through 0
and eN. To prove that T(V) E V(N) j wdom (V(N)) we distinguish two cases.
Obviously, if T(V) = eN, then T(V) 6 V(N) \ wdom(V(N)). Now suppose that
T(V) 0 eN and that T(V) f wdom(V(N)). Then T(V) < eN = K(V), and so
by (4.1), it follows that for each i€N there exists an 4>0 such that T(V) +
€te' E V(N). Take c: = min{€, l i E N}. By comprehensiveness of V(N) it follows
that T(V) + ce' C V(N) for all iEN. Using convexity of V(N) we obtain that
T(V) + IkleN C V(N). Hence, T(V) f dom(V(N)), which contradicts the weak
Pareto optimality of T. Hence, T(V) E V(N) \ wdom(V(N)).                             0
The following theorem extends Theorem 2.4.9 to the class ON.





Proof. (The proof of this theorem follows the same line as the proof of Theorem 2.4.7
by Borm et al. (1992).) Clearly, the compromise value satisfies the four properties
mentioned above on ON. Now let f : C" -4 RN satisfy the four properties. We
prove that f (V) = T(V) for all V € ON.
Because of covariance of f and T it is sufficient to prove that f(v) = T(V) for all
ve°N with k(V) = 0 and K(V) = eN (see the proof of Theorem 2.4.8).  So, let
V f  N with k(V) = 0 and K(V) = eN.  Then T(V) is an element of the line
segment through 0 and eN. Using the assumptions (2.3) and (2.4) we have that
conv{e'   i€N}C V(N), so T(V) 2 ihieN.
Now consider the NTU-game (N, W) defined by
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Ii/(S).- {ZERS'zso}
if S€ 2N \ {0, N}
comp(conu({e' l i E N}U {T(V)}))  if S=N.
Obviously, K(W) = eN, and k(W) = 0. Hence, W f CN and assumptions (2.2)-(2.4)
are  satisfied. If T(V) = eN, then W(N) = comp{eN}. Otherwise, if T(V) < eN, then
W(N) is non-level. In both cases (4.1) is satisfied, so W € ON. Clearly, T(W) =
T(V). Using symmetry of f it follows that L(w) = fj(W) for all i,j€N. So, by
Pareto optimality of f and T it follows that f(w) = T(W). Hence, T(V) = f(w).
Since, M/(N) C V(N), k(V) = k(W), and K(V) = K(W), it follows by monotonicity
of f that f(w) 5 f(v). Hence, T(V) 5 f(V). But then Pareto optimality of T
implies that T(V) = f(V).                                                                    O
4.2 Monotonic, Pareto optimal, and covariant val-
ues
Theorem 4.1.3 characterizes the compromise value as the unique value on ON which
satisfies Pareto optimality, monotonicity, covariance and symmetry. In this section
we drop the symmetry property and characterize all Pareto optimal, monotonic and
covariant solutions on the class CN. For this, we use similar techniques as Peters and
Tijs (1984) who characterized all Pareto optimal, monotonic, and covariant bargain-
ing solutions on a large class of bargaining problems, using monotonic curve solutions.
As we consider covariant values on ON attention can be restricted to the class ONi
of NTU-games V € ON which satisfy K(V) = eN and k(V) = 0 (cf. the proof of
Theorem 4.1.3).
Using monotonic curves one can define monotonic and Pareto optimal values on the
class  471.
A monotonic curve (Peters and Tijs (1984)) is a map 7 : Il, INI} -I [0,11N with
(i)  7 is increasing, i.e., 7(s) 2 7(t) if s 2 t, and
(ii) E.EN 7,(t) = 1 for all t € [l, INI].
Note that (ii) implies that 7(1) E conu{e' l i E N}, and 7(INI) = eN. Moreover, it
can be checked that each monotonic curve is continuous.
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Let 7 be a monotonic curve. Then 7 gives rise to a value f-' on OA in the following
way:  For V €CA define f-'(V) as the unique Pareto optimal point of V(N) lying on
the curve {7(t) 1 1 5 1 5 INI}. It can easily be verified that f, is well-defined on (?A
(cf. Peters and Tijs (1984)). f-' is called the value corresponding to the monotonic
curve 7. Clearly, f, is monotonic and Pareto optimal on CA and f, can be extended
to a monotonic, Pareto optimal and covariant value on CN in a unique way.
We now have the following characterization.
Theorem 4.2.1 Let f : ON -* RN be a value on ON.  Then f satisfies Pareto
optimality, monotonicity and covariance if and only if f = f-' for some monotonic
curve 7 : [l, IN11 -4 [O, 1]N.
Proof. Clearly, if f = f-' for some monotonic curve 7, then f satisfies the required
properties. Conversely, let f satisfy Pareto optimality, monotonicity and covariance.
We construct 7 : [l, INI] -0 [0,1]N as follows.
For t € Il, INI],let 7(t) := f(14), where 14 is the NTU-game defined by
11(S):= {ZERS'ZSO}
if S E ZN \ {0, N}
comp({z €R N l o s x s e N, E,€Nxi 5 t})   if S=N.
The reader easily verifies that K(14) = eN, k(14) = 0, and 14 E ON for every
t E [l, INII. Further, by Pareto optimality and monotonicity of f it follows that 7
satisfies (i) and (ii). So 7 is a monotonic curve. By definition, one has
f(v:) = f'(14)  for all t E [l, INI]. (4.2)
We want to prove that f = f¥. In view of covariance of f and f' it is sufficient to
prove that f(V) = r(V) for all V € ON with K(V) = eN and k(V) = 0.
Let V € ON satisfy K(V) = eN and k(V) = 0.  Let 1 := E,e„ f(V), and let W be
the NTU-game defined by
W(S):= <  {Z E R S' =5 0}   ifS€2N\{0, N}V(N) n Vt(N) if S = N.
Then W € ON and K(W) = eN and k(W) = 0. Clearly, f.'(W) = f'(V) = f.7(4).
Hence, by (4.2)
97(v) = f(14) (4.3)
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Using monotonicity of f, we have f(w) 5 /(14), and f(w) S f(V), and by Pareto
optimality of f it follows that
f(w) = f(K) =f(v). (4.4)
Combining (4.3) and (4.4) we can conclude that f(v) = f7(v).                      0
From the proof of Theorem 4.2.1 it follows that there exists a unique monotonic curve
7' : Il, INII -+ 10,1}N such that f" is symmetric, namely,
'yo(t) := _.L-eN   for all t E [1, INIj.
INI
Clearly, f7' = T, so Theorem 4.2.1 provides an alternative proof of Theorem 4.1.3.
Chapter 5
The MC-value for monotonic
NTU-games
In Chapters 2 and 4 we studied the compromise value for NTU-games which is based
on ideas underlying the T-value for TU-games. We showed that the compromise value
can be considered as an extension of the T-value for TU-games and the RKS-solution
for bargaining problems.
The idea of generalizing a solution concept for TU-games to the class of NTU-games
is not new. In fact, most solution concepts for NTU-games are based on well-known
solutions for TU-games. For example, the Shapley NTU-value is an extension of the
Shapley value for TU-games and the Nash bargaining solution to NTU-games. Based
on this fact Aumann (1985a) developed a characterization of the Shapley NTU-value
having in mind the characterizations of the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) and the
Nash solution (Nash (1950)). For the Harsanyi value (Harsanyi (1963)) a similar
reasoning can be followed.
An alternative way to extend the Shapley value to NTU-games was introduced in
Maschler and Owen (1989, 1992). Their consistent Shapley value is a solution con-
cept based on the following idea: First, the notion of the Shapley value is extended in
a straightforward way to so-called hyperplane games, and, based on this extension, a
value for general NTU-games is defined by associating hyperplane games to a general
NTU-game.
In this chapter, which is based on Otten, Borm, Peleg and Tijs (1994), we introduce
a new single-valued solution concept for monotonic 0-normalized NTU-games, the
marginal based compromise value, or shortly, the MC-value. The idea behind the
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MC-value lies in the fact that the Shapley value for TU-games call be considered as
the efficient compromise between 0 and the sum of the marginal vectors (cf. Section
2.1).   We  extend the notion of marginal vectors to monotonic NTU-games  and  then
define the MC-value as a straightforward generalization of the Shapley value. Con-
sequently, the MC-value by definition extends the Shapley value, but it turns out
that the MC-value also extends the RKS-solution for bargaining problems. Further,
we provide two characterizations of the MC-value. The second one illustrates that
the characterization of the RKS-solution by Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) can be
adjusted to provide a characterization of the MC-value. It remains an open prob-
lem, however, whether a characterization of the MC-value can be developed based on
characterizations of the Shapley value (cf. Shapley (1953), Young (1985)).
The characterizations of the MC-value reflect the similarity between the MC-value
and the compromise value, but another candidate for a comparison with the MC-value
is the egalitarian solution introduced by Kalai and Samet (1985). Both solution con-
cepts are defined and characterized for NTU-games which are not necessarily convex
valued, and both solution concepts extend the Shapley value to NTU-games. Fur-
ther, for both solution concepts the outcome is determined by 0 as a starting point
and a vector which indicates the direction to move in order to obtain a weak Pareto
optimal outcome. A major difference, however, is that for the egalitarian solution
this direction is fixed, whereas for the MC-value the direction depends on the game,
which seems to be much more natural.
This chapter is organized as follows.
In Section 5.1 we start with some basic definitions. Marginal vectors for monotonic
NTU-games are defined as an extension of the marginals for TU- and hyperplane
games.
In Section 5.2 we examine relations between the core of NTU-games and the marginal
vectors in the spirit of the well-known relations for TU-games. It is shown that also
in the NTU-case there are relations between the marginals and the core, but not all
results for the TU-case can be extended to the NTU-case.
In Section 5.3 the MC-value is introduced, and it is shown that the MC-value extends
the Shapley value for TU-games, the consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games,
and the RKS-solution for bargaining problems to the general class of NTU-games.
Section 5.4 discusses several properties of the MC-value and yields two characteriza-
tions of the MC-value on large subclasses of NTU-games.  Also a comparison between
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the MC-value, the compromise value, and the egalitarian solution is provided.
5.1   NTU-games and marginal vectors
In Section 2.4 we defined an NTU-game to be a pair (N, V). Throughout this chapter
we will assume  that the players are indexed  by the natural numbers 1, . . . ,n, where
n= INI. So N= {1,...,n}. Moreover, we will assume that V satisfies
(i) 0-normalization: V({i}) = {z E R'   x 50} for all i E N,
(ii) monotonicity: For all S, T € 2N, with 0 4 S C T, and all z € V(S), there
exists a y E V(T) such that Ys 2 z (i.e., the projection of V(T) on Its contains
the set V(S)).
These conditions are not very restrictive.  (i) is imposed only for the sake of conve-
nience. Condition (ii) implies that larger coalitions can obtain at least as much as
smaller coalitions. Note that (i) and (ii) imply that the set Vo(S) := {x E V(S) 1
x 2 0} is non-empty for each S E 21' \ {0}. The class of monotonic 0-normalized
NTU-games with player set N = {1,...,n} is denoted by rN
Let V € rN bean NTU-game and let a E Il(N). The marginal vector m'(V) is
defined by
mi(i)(V) := max{t €R I (mi(1), ···,m:(1-1),t) E V({0(1),...,a(i)})}
for all i EN. If there is no confusion about the game V we write m" instead of
m"(V).
Note that the marginal vectors are well-defined, because of the definition of NTU-
games and monotonicity. It is also clear that ma E V(N) \ dom(V(N)) and m' 2 0
for all a E II(N).
This definition of marginal vectors is a straightforward extension of the notion of
marginal vectors for TU-games (cf. Section 2.1).  Also in the field of NTU-games
marginal vectors are known: Maschler and Owen (1989) introduced marginal vectors
for hyperplane games (NTU-games where for each coalition S the boundary of the
set V(S) is a hyperplane) to define the consistent Shapley value on this subclass of
NTU-games. Our definition also extends Maschler and Owen's definition.
For the sake of completeness  we give the interpretation  of the marginal vector m:
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If 0(1),...,a(n) is a certain order on the players, then m' assigns to player 0(1) the
maximum he can obtain in V({a(1)}). mi(2) is the maximum player 0(2) can get in
V({0(1),0(2)}) given that he should guarantee player 0(1) a payoff of mi(1), etc.  So
the marginal vector ma assigns to each player the maximum he can get if he should
guarantee his predecessors the payoffs already given to them.
5.2 Marginal vectors and the core
It is well-known that for TU-games the core is contained in the convex hull of the
marginal vectors (Weber (1988), cf. Derks (1992)). Hence, for TU-games this so-
called 'Weber set' is a 'core catcher'. Shapley (1971) proved that for convex TU-
games the core coincides with the convex hull of the marginal vectors.  In this section
we will examine relations between the marginal vectors and the core for monotonic
NTU-games.
In the context of NTU-games there are at least two notions of convexity, ordinal
convexity (Vilkov (1977)) and cardinal convexity (Sharkey (1982)). Both ordinal and
cardinal convexity are extensions of the notion of convexity for TU-games. Although
for convex TU-games all marginal vectors are core elements, this result can not be
extended to the NTU case: There are counterexamples both for ordinal and cardinal
convex NTU-games.1
To examine possible relations between marginal vectors and the core for the general
class of monotonic NTU-games, we will consider a simple class of NTU-games, the
so-called 1-corner games.
An NTU-game V e PN is called a 1-corner game if for all S E 2N \ {0} there exists
an element us E Its such that
V(S) = comp(us) = {z E R S I Z E us}.
Clearly, a 1-corner game V i s monotonic if and only if for all 0 0 S C T and all i E S,
u; 5 u;. The reader easily verifies that uN E C(V) for monotonic 1-corner games.
The following proposition shows that for monotonic, 0-normalized 1-corner games all
marginal vectors are core elements.
1 A counterexample for ordinal convex NTU-games has been provided by Sjaak Hurkens (private
communication).
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Proposition  5.2.1   Let  V €  P   be a  1 -corner game.  Then
C(V) =  U  {z € V(N) I x k m,}.
a€Il(N)
Proof Let x€ C(V). We construct a a€ II(N) with z 2 m'. Since I E C(V),
there exists an in E N such that xi„ = uc Define a(n) := in. Since zN\{,„} 0
dom(V(N \ {in})), there exists an i,_1 E N   {in} such that I,„-1 2 us{1'„} Define
0(n - 1) := in-1· By proceeding in this way we obtain a permutation a defined by
0(1) = ii,0(2) = ii, ···,0(n) =i n such that
m   = utli S zi„... ,mil-1  - u:IM'„  S Zi._„ m;i =u:I= I...
Hence,  x 2  ma.
To prove the converse inclusion it is sufficient to show that m" E C(V) for all a E
II(N).  Let a € II(N). Without loss of generality we assume that a is the identical
permutation, i.e., 0·(i) = i for all i EN. Trivially, m' 5 UN, and m: = u: by
definition  of m". Monotonicity  of V implies  that  m&  2  uf  for  all  S  C  N  with  nE  S.
Hence, m; 0 dom(V(S)) for all S C N with n e S.S o the only coalitions for which
mi E dom(V(S)) is possible are coalitions S c Ni{n}. Since, m -1 - U:3 } 2 UT-1
for all T C N\{n} with n-1 E T, it follows that there are no coalitions T CN\{n}
with n-l E T such that mf E dom(V(T)). Repeating this argument leads to the
conclusion that mi 0 dom(V(S)) for all S C N, S 0 0. Hence, m' C C(V).       0
Proposition 5.2.1 gives rise to the following definition of a possible 'core catcher' for
monotonic NTU-games, which can be considered as a generalization of the 'Weber
set' to the class of NTU-games.
Let V E I' . The Weber set of V is the set
W(V) = {z € V(N) \ dom(V(N)) 1 there exists a y€ conv({m' l a€ II(N)})
with  z  2  y}
Clearly, this definition extends the Weber set for TU-games to the NTU-case.  As
Proposition 5.2.1 shows W(V) is a core catcher for 1-corner games. However, for
monotonic NTU-games where V(N) is not convex the Weber set need not be a core
catcher. Consider for example, the 2-person NTU-game defined by
V({i}) := {z E R' 1=5 0}, i = 1,2,
V({1,2}):=comp({(1,0),(0,1)}).
64 The MC-value for monotonic NTU-games
Then (0,0) E C(V), but (0,0) 0 W(V) = {(1,0),(0,1)}.
It is an open problem whether C(V) c W(V) for all NTU-games V E I for which
V(N) is a convex set. Obviously, this holds for bargaining problems.
5.3 The MC-value
In this section we will introduce a new single-valued solution concept for monotonic
NTU-games based on the marginal vectors, the MC-value. Before we introduce the
MC-value, we first recall that for TU-games the Shapley value can be viewed as a
compromise value: For a game v € GN it is the efficient combination of OERM
and the sum of the marginal vectors (if v(N) #0). This observation leads us to the
following definition.
Let VEl' bea monotonic and 0-normalized NTU-game. Denote
b(V):=  E  m'(V).
a€11(N)
The marginal based compromise value of V, or shortly, the MC-value of V is the largest
combination of 0 and b(V) which is an element of V(N) \ dom(V(N)). Formally,
MC(V) := avb(V),
where
av:- max{a 6 11+ I ab(V) C V(N)}.
The MC-value is well-defined since 16(N) is non-empty and compact and the vec-
tor b(V) is nonnegative (note that b(V) = 0 if and only if 1'6(S) = {0} for all
SCN, S 76 0). The vector b(V) can be regarded as an upper value for V.2
Clearly, the MC-value is a generalization of the Shapley value to the class of mono-
tonic, 0-normalized NTU-games. The following theorem shows that the MC-value not
only extends the Shapley value but also the consistent Shapley value for hyperplane
games and the RKS-solution for bargaining problems.
2The 0-normalization we imposed is not very restrictive: The MC-value can be extended to a
covariant value on the class of all monotonic games in the following way: 'Itanslate an arbitrary
monotonic game into a 0-normalized game, compute the MC-value for this game, and then translate
it back to obtain a solution for the original game.
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Theorem 5.3.1
(i)  On the class of monotonic, 0-normalized TU-games the MC-value coincides with
the Shapley value.
(ii)  On the class of monotonic, 0-normalized hyperplane games the MC-value coin-
cides with the consistent Shapley value.
(iii)  On the class of bargaining problems with disagreement outcome 0 the MC-value
coincides with the RKS-solution.
proof The proofs of (i) and (ii) are straightforward consequences of the definition
and  therefore  we only prove  (iii).
Let  V  €  I'   be the NTU-game corresponding to the bargaining problem  (C, 0)  and
let a € II(N) be a permutation. Then the marginal vector m" satisfies
,   _ < u,(n)(C, 0),  if 2 - n,ma(,) -
C 0, ifi 0 n.
As a consequence it follows that b(V) = (n - 1)!u(V), and hence MC<V) = RKS(V).
0
We conclude this section with an example.
Example 5.3.2 Consider the NTU-game ({1,2,3},14) corresponding  to   the  ex-
change market discussed in Example 2.5.6. Note that 14 is not 0-normalized if c 916 0.
If we compute the MC-value of this game by following the approach described in
footnote 2 on the previous page, we obtain
555 5 1 5,
MC(14) = (i-§
-
 4 T5 -  4 6 + 6€L
In Example 2.5.6 we have seen that this outcome is also prescribed by the Shapley
NTU-value.
5.4 Characterizations of the MC-value
In this section we investigate several properties of the MC-value and moreover, two
characterizations of the MC-value are provided. We conclude this section with a
comparison between the MC-value  and the egalitarian solution.
Some properties of the MC-value are summarized in Proposition 5.4.1.
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Proposition  5.4.1  On the class I' of monotonic NTU-games the MC-value satisfies
the following properties.
(i) weak Pareto optimality: MC(V) E V(N) \ dom(V(N)) for all V E I. I.
(ii) scale covariance: MC(A *V)= A * MC(V) for all A € Rs and all V € It(.
(iii) symmetry. MC,(V) = MCj(V) for all V E I'& and all i, j C N which are
symmetric in V (cf. Section 2.4).
(iv) b-symmetry: MC,(V) = MCj(V) for all i,j E N with b,(V) = bj(V), and all
v E rmN
(v)  conditional monotonicity:  MC(V) 5 MC(W) for all NTU-games K W E F;k
with V(N) C W(N), 6(W) > 0, and .6.(Kl - h(Kl for all i,j EN.b.(W) - 5,(W)
Proof. we will only prove (11).  The other properties are obvious.  Let V E I'mN,
A < 111 and a € H(N). The reader easily verifies that m'(A * V) = A * m'(V), and
so b(A* V) = 1*b(V). From this it immediately follows that MC(A* V) = A* MC(V).
0
Besides the properties(i)-(iii) the MC-value satisfies also other standard properties as
individual rationality and the null player (or dummy player) property. Property (iv)
is a stronger version of symmetry. It is introduced to characterize the MC-value and
states that if for two players in a game the sum of all their marginal contributions is
equal, then they should get the same payoff. Property (v) strengthens the (restricted)
monotonicity which is used to characterize the RKS-solution for bargaining problems.
The interpretation is that if the set of attainable payoffs for the grand coalition
becomes larger and the direction of the upper value does not change, then no player
will be worse off in the new situation.
Now we will provide two characterizations of the MC-value on subclasses of monotonic
NTU-games. Attention will be restricted to the class rmN of monotonic NTU-games
v E r satisfying 6(V) > 0. This is a weak condition which means that every
player has a positive marginal contribution to at least one coalition. Particularly,
games with null players (i.e., players who contribute nothing to each coalition) are
excluded.
We have the following characterization of the MC-value on the class r which is
similar to Theorem 2.4.8.
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Theorem 5.4.2 The MC-value is the unique value on I' which satisfies
(i) (weak) Pareto optimality,
(ii) scale covariance,
(iii) b-symmetry.
Proof. From Proposition 5.4.1 it follows that the MC-value satisfies (i)-(iii). Let
F:C -0 R N satisfy the three properties,   and   let   V    €    rN.      We   show   that
F(V) = MC(V).
Since b(V) >0, the vector A E R. with coordinates A, := ri\7) for all i E N i s well-
defined. Considerthegame A *V.  Clearly, A*V E C, and b(A *V) = A *b(V) = eN.
6-symmetry of F and the MC-value implies F,(1 * V) = 6 (1* V) for all i,j € N and
MCi(A * V) = MCj(A * V) for all i, j € N. From weak Pareto optimality of F and
the MC-value it follows that F(A * V) = MC(A * V) Scale covariance now yields
F(V) = MC(V).                                                                          0
Finally, we present a characterization of the MC-value which is comparable to The-
orem 2.4.9 (or 4.1.3). For this, we have to impose the extra condition that the set
1/6(N) is non-level (cf.  (2.1)).  Let I' denote the class of all V f I'N for which Vo(N)
is non-level. Then we have the following analogue of Theorem 2.4.9.
Theorem 5.4.3 The MC-value is the unique value on rN which satisfies




Proof Let F: I'N -+ RN satisfy the properties (i)-(iv).  From the proof of Theorem
5.4.2 it follows that it is sufiicient to show that F(V) = MC(V) for games V € rN
with b(V) = eN. Let V be such a game. Since b(V) > 0, it follows that MC(V) > 0.
Moreover, 5-symmetry of the MC-value implies MC,(V) = MCj (V) for all i,j € N.
Consider the following NTU-game W.3
3The construction of W(N) is due to Henk Norde (private communication).
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11/(S):= < {x E R s'x s
O}, MS+N,
{z C V(N)  a(x) E V(N) for all a € II(N)},  if S = N.
Note that M/(N) is the largest symmetric subset of V(N). Since MCi(V) = MCj(V)
for all i,j EN,it follows that MC(V) E W(N), and because MC(V) c V(N) \
dom(V(N)) it also follows that MC(V) € W(N) j dom(W(N)). Hence, b(W) > 0,
and since W(N) is symmetric, it easily follows that b,(W) = bj(W) for all id EN·
So the origin 0,6(V) and b(W) are lying on one line.
Claim: W € I' .
proof of the claim.  It is sufficient to show that Wo(N) is non-level. Let x E
Wo(N) \ dom(W(N)), and suppose there exists a y E Wo(N) \ dom(W(N)) with
Y 2  :r, y t Z. Since x,y E Wo(N), we have 0(x), a(y) E Vo(N) for all a E II(N).
Moreover, 0(y) 2 0(z),0(y) 0 0(z) for all a. Non-levelness of 1/6(N) implies
that 0(:r) e dom(1/8(N)) for all 0. Hence, for each 0 € II(N) there exists an
€„ E R++ such that 8(0(x),ce) := {z E RN I liz - 0(x)II < €,} C 1''o(N).  Take
6: = min{c„ 1 0 € H(N)}. Then B(a(z),€) C 1/6(N) for all a E II(N), and since
8(0(x), E) = 0(B(z, 6)), it follows that B(z, c) C Wo(N). Hence, z € dom(Wo(N)),
which yields a contradiction. So the claim is proved.
Symmetry and weak Pareto optimality of F and the MC-value imply F(W) =
MC(W).4 Since MC(V) C W(N) \ dom(W(N)), and 0, 6(V) and b(W) are lying
on one line, it follows that MC(W) = MC(V). Further, conditional monotonicity
of F yields that F(V) 2 F(W) = MC(V). Since MC(V) € Vo(N) \ dom(V(N)),
non-levelness of Vo(N) implies F(V) = MC(V).                                         0
We leave it to the reader to verify that in Theorems 5.4.2 and 5.4.3 the characteriz-
ing properties are independent. Theorem 5.4.3 illustrates that the characterization of
the RKS-solution by Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) (Theorem 2.3.2) can be extended
in order to obtain a characterization of the MC-value. It remains an open problem,
however, whether a characterization of the MC-value can be developed based on char-
acterizations of the Shapley value (cf. Shapley (1953) , Young (1985)).
We conclude this section with a comparison between the MC-value on the one hand
and the compromise value and the egalitarian solution on the other hand.
4 Note  that  we  only  use  an even weaker version of symmetry, which states  that  if all players  in  a
game are symmetric, then they will all receive the same payoff.
5.4 Characterizations of the MC-value 69
Theorems 5.4.2 and 5.4.3 clearly reflect the similarity between the MC-value and the
compromise value. By appropriately modifying the (bounds-) symmetry  and  mono-
tonicity property which characterize the compromise value, one can obtain charac-
terizing properties for the MC-value. Whereas Theorem 2.4.8 is almost identical to
Theorem 5.4.2, there is a difference between Theorem 2.4.9 (or 4.1.3) and Theorem
5.4.3. In the latter we do not have to require a convexity condition on the sets V(N),
while in the first this seems a necessary condition. However, it is not difficult to
show that by weakening the monotonicity property in Theorem 2.4.9 (or 4.1.3) in the
spirit of conditional monotonicity, we can drop the convexity condition. It should be
noted that Theorems 5.4.2 and 5.4.3 also hold if convexity conditions are imposed
on the NTU-games (this is trivial for Theorem 5.4.2, and in Theorem 5.4.3 one only
has to show that the NTU-game W, which is defned in the proof, is convex valued
whenever V is convex valued).
Of course, also from a definitional viewpoint there is a clear similarity between the
compromise value and the MC-value. Both values generalize the RKS-solution to
NTU-games and both values can be considered as a compromise solution. An impor-
tant difference between both solutions lies in the fact that for the compromise value
the lower vector depends on the game, whereas for the MC-value this vector always
equals the zero vector.
Another candidate for a comparison with the MC-value is the egalitarian solution
introduced by Kalai and Samet (1985). Not only are both solution concepts defined
and characterized for not necessarily convex valued NTU-games, but both extend the
Shapley value to the class of NTU-games. Moreover, both solutions concepts yield a
payoff vector which can be obtained by moving from 0 as a starting point in a certain
direction in order to obtain a weak Pareto optimal outcome. However, for the egali-
tarian solution this direction is independent of the game under consideration, while
for the MC-value the direction is determined by the game. (It should be said that
the fixed direction for the egalitarian solution is computed in a recursive way with
respect  to the inclusion relation between coalitions.)   As a consequence of the fixed
direction the egalitarian solution does not satisfy the covariance property. Hence, the
egalitarian solution depends on the utility representation of the preferences of the
players.
The main difference in the domain of the characterizations of the egalitarian solu-
tion and the MC-value is that the egalitarian solution is characterized on a class
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of NTU-games for which no monotonicity and non-levelness condition are required.
If we compare Theorem 5.4.3 with the characterization of the egalitarian solution
as  given in Kalai and Samet  (1985),  it is striking that  in both characterizations  a
monotonicity property plays a crucial role. It should be remarked that the MC-value
does not satisfy the monotonicity property which is used to characterize the egali-







The uniform rule: an overview
We consider the problem of fairly distributing a non-negative amount of a perfectly
divisible good among a finite set of agents who have single-peaked preferences, i.e., up
to a certain amount an agent likes to consume more of the good, beyond this amount
the opposite holds. Since in general the sum of the preferred consumptions will not
be equal to the amount which has to be allocated among the agents, the problem of
interest is how to achieve a fair division (free disposal of the good is assumed not to
be allowed).
A possible interpretation of this model is the 'baby-sitting problem' as discussed in
Section 1.2. Another interpretation given by Sprumont  (1991)  is  that  of a group  of
workers who have to contribute a certain quantity of labour in order to perform a cer-
tain job.  If the total amount of work is fixed and each agent receives an hourly wage,
then preferences over the participation levels are rather naturally single-peaked.
This problem has been studied extensively in the literature. Sprumont (1991) initi-
ated the axiomatic analysis, by showing that there is a unique rule which satisfies
Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness and either envy-freeness or anonymity. This
rule, which he called the uniform rule, is an adaptation of the uniform rationing
scheme introduced by Benassy (1982) in the fixed-price literature. The uniform rule
allocates to each agent his preferred amount as long as it obeys a certain lower and
upper bound which are the same for all agents and chosen such that feasibility is
attained.
Ching (1994) shows that in Sprumont's characterization the anonymity property can
be replaced by the weaker property of equal treatment of equals and he provides an
alternative proof. Other characterizations of the uniform rule are given in Thomson
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(1994a) using the well-known principles of consistency and converse consistency.
As a result of this extensive analysis, the uniform rule is now considered to be the
most interesting rule for this type of problems. Thomson (1994a) formulated this as
follows:
"On the basis of what we now know, the uniform rule can wholeheartedly be
advocated as the best solution to the problem of fair division in economies with
single-peaked preferences".
This chapter presents an overview of the most important results in this framework.
In Section 6.1 we formally describe the model and introduce some basic notions and
solution concepts, among others we define the uniform rule. Section 6.2 discusses
several properties of rules which are all satisfied by the uniform rule. Finally, in
Section 6.3 we recall some of the characterizations of the uniform rule provided by
Sprumont (1991), Ching (1994), and Thomson (1991, 1994a,b).
6.1 The model
Let  M  be some fixed positive number. Given any preference relation  R over  [O, M],
which we assume is a complete and transitive binary relation, we denote =R y i f
(z,y) € R, x Pyif z Ry and not y Rz, and z Iy if x Ry andy Rz. Riscalled
single-peaked if there exists a number p(R) €  [O, M]  such  that for all z, y €  [O, M],
with x<y i p(R) or p(R) 5 1<x, we have y P z. p(R) is called the peak of
the relation R.  By 72 we denote the set of all single-peaked preferences over [0, M].
The introduction of M is just for notational convenience: It allows us to define
peaks as a function only of the preferences, i.e., independently of the amount to be
divided. An alternative way would  be to define preferences over  [0,00),  but then
monotonic increasing preferences would be excluded from the definition of single-
peaked preferences unless we say that in this case the peak is infinity.
An economy is a tuple E - <M, (Ri),€N >, where 0 5 M S M,N C N i s a finite,
non-empty set of agents, and for each i € N, R, E R. Denote p(E) := (p(Ri)) teN·
The class of all economies (with variable set of agents) is denoted by E.
An economy represents the problem of allocating a positive amount of a perfectly
divisible good, which cannot be disposed of, among a group of agents who have
single-peaked preferences  over  [0, M].
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Given an economy E =< M, (IL ),EN > the problem of interest is to determine an
allocation iii a fair way. An allocation for E is a vector z € R  such that z(N) = M.
By  X'(E) we denote  the  set  of all allocations  for  E.   An  allocation  z  E  X'(E)  is
called eficient if there is no y€ X'(E) such that y, R, z, for all i E N and y, P,  I ,
for some i EN. XCE) denotes the set of all efficient allocations for E.
Sprumont (1991) showed that an allocation for an economy is efficient if and only if
there are no two agents such that one gets more than his peak and the other gets less
than his peak. This means that an allocation is efficient if and only if all agents are
on the "same side" of their peaks. Formally, for an economy E =< M, (R,),EN >C E
and z E X'(E),
I € X(E) **   ISP(E)  if MS
E ,€N P(R,)
r k p( i  2 X 'GNP(R,)
A  rule  0  is a function which assigns  to each economy  E  €  E an allocation  0( E)  E
X-(E), which can be interpreted as a recommendation for the economy E.  Simple
examples of rules are the egalitarian rule, which distributes the amount equally among
the agents, and the proportional rule which allocates the amount in proportion to
the peaks of the agents. Other simple examples are the equal distance rule, which
selects an efficient allocation such that the distance between the allocated amount
and the peak is the same for each agent (as long as it does not conflict feasibility)
(see Thomson (1991)), and the queueing rule (see Sprumont (1991)). To apply the
queueing rule the agents are numbered  1, . . . , 131  in a random way and, in case there
is too much of the good, every agent 1 S i s INI -1 i s assigned his peak.  The
remaining  part is allocated to agent     N .    In  case the amount  of  the  good   is  less
than the sum of the peaks, we start giving (in the order 1, . . . ,  N j) to the agents the
amount that corresponds to their peak. If at some point there is not sufficient left
for some agent i, he obtains the remaining part. All remaining agents obtain 0.
A rule which plays a central role in the literature of economies with single-peaked
preferences is the uniform rule. The uniform rule, U, is defined as follows. Let
E =< M, (Ri),EN>E E be an economy and let i EN. Then
U (E) :=    min{p(R,),A}    if M f E,€N P(114)max{p(R,), A}   if M 2 E,EN P(R,),
where A is such that U(E) € X'(E).
For the case in which there is too little to divide, i.e., M < E,EN P(14), the uniform
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rule chooses appropriately an amount A and allocates it to every agent with peak
above this amount while all other agents obtain their peak. Here, appropriately
means that the resulting division is indeed an allocation.
Note that the uniform rule as well as the other rules discussed above only depend
on the amount to be divided and the peaks of the players.  So from a normative
perspective these rules may be criticized. From an informational viewpoint however,
these so-called 'peak-only' rules are very appealing because it is not necessary to
know the exact preference structure of the agents.
Example  6.1.1 To illustrate the uniform rule let us reconsider the baby-sitting prob-
lem from Section  1.2 in which there are four people who have to baby-sit for sixteen
hours. The preferred points  of the four persons, numbered  1,  2,  3,  and  4,  are  1,  3,
4,5 (hours), respectively. In this case the sum of the peaks is less than the amount
to be divided, which implies that in order to obtain an efficient outcome every agent
has to baby-sit at least his preferred time. The uniform rule yields the outcome
(32,32,4,5), which one might say favours persons 3 and 4 above the two others.
6.2    Properties of the uniform rule
Although Example 6.1.1 might suggest  that the uniform rule cannot be considered  as
a 'fair' allocation rule, one of the reasons why the uniform rule is interesting, is that
it is the only rule which satisfies many desirable properties. This section summarizes
several properties of the uniform rule.
Several standard properties of the uniform rule are listed in Proposition 6.2.1.
Proposition 6.2.1 The uniform rule satisfies the following properties.
(i) Pareto optimality: U(E) C X(E) for all E E E.
(ii) Anonymity: U,(E') = U,(,)(E) for all E =< M,(Ri),EN >E E, all i E N, and
all a E I[(N), where E' :=< M, (Re(,)),eN >·
(iii)  Equal treatment (of equals): U,(E) I, Uj(E) for all E =< M, (14),eiv >6 E and
all i,j € N with R, = Rj.
(iv) Peak only: UCE) = UCE') for all E =< M, (R,),EN >, E' =< M, (R;),EN >E E
with p(E) = p(E').
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(v) M-continuity: U is continuous with respect to the amount to be divided.
(vi) Envy-freeness: U,(E) 4 Uj(E) for all E €E and all i, j E  N.
(vii) Strategy-proofness:  U,(E) /4 U,(E;) for all E =< M, (R,),EN >, all i € N. and
all g 6 72, where E; :=< M, (g, (Rj)j€N\{,}) >·
(viii)  individually mtional from equal division:  U,(E) R; i  for all i EN and all
E e E.
Properties (i)-(iii) and (v) are standard and need no further explanation. Peak only
requires from a rule to take into consideration only the peaks of the preference pro-
file when dividing a certain amount M. Peak only is a natural property for rules
which satisfy Pareto optimality. To see this recall that a Pareto optimal rule selects
allocations which are characterized by the fact that either all agents get more than
their peaks or all agents get less than their peaks. Once restricted to the relevant
side of the peak all preferences with this peak are identical. Hence, the peak contains
all the 'relevant' information. Envy-freeness is also well-known and was first intro-
duced by Foley (1967). It states that no agent prefers someone else's amount to his
own share. Strategy-proofness states that if the outcome is applied on the basis of
declared preferences, it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for each player to reveal his
true preferences. This is also a desirable property, since it implies that every agent
only needs to know his own preferences to determine his best choice. Property (viii)
implies that every agent prefers the amount allocated to him to the equal division
outcome. This property is meaningful in fair division problems since often the equal
division outcome is considered as a starting point which represents the natural right
or ownership of each agent.
This list of properties of the uniform rule is certainly not complete. Other proper-
ties satisfied by the uniform rule are several monotonicity properties (among others
one-sided resource monotonicity and one-sided population monotonicity). We will
not discuss these properties here in detail, but refer the reader to Thomson (1991,
1994b).
Thomson (1994a) investigates several consistency properties of the uniform rule. In
order to introduce them, we need the following notation.
Let E =<  M, (4),€N  >c E be an economy, z e X'(E), and S c  N, S 16 0.  The
reduced economy with respect to S and x is
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Es,x :-< 1,(S),(R,),fs >
Remark 6.2.2  Note that  Es; E E. Further, if 0 0 T C  S, then  ET.* =  [Es.*]T.'s.
A rule 0 is called consistent if for all economies E =< M, (14),EN >€ E and all
S C N,S#0 w e have that z= 0(E) implies xs = 0(Es.=).
Roughly speaking, consistency of a rule means that, if a subgroup of agents would
decide to pool their parts of the allocation prescribed by the rule and apply the
same rule to redistribute this total, then the agents in that group would end up each
with the same amount as before. Thomson (1994a) proved that the uniform rule is
consistent.
A rule 0 i s called converse consistent if for all economies E E E w e have that
x E X'(E) and Is = 0(Es=) for all S C N with ISI =2, implies z= 0(E).
Converse consistency means that, given a certain allocation x for an economy, if the
restriction of x is recommended for every reduced economy with respect to a sub-
group of two agents and x, then the allocation z is recommended in the large econ-
omy. Thomson (1994a) noted that the uniform rule satisfies this property. Converse
consistency of the uniform rule also follows from the next lemma which establishes
a relation between consistency and converse consistency for this model. Before we
formulate this relation we need the following additional property for rules.
M-Monotonicity:  A rule 0 is M-monotonic if for all E =< M, (R,)„N >E E,
and E' =< M',(Ri),EN >E E, with M S M', we have 0(E) S 0(E').
M-monotonicity is different from the 1-sided resource monotonicity introduced in
Thomson (1994b). However, if Pareto optimality is imposed both properties are
equivalent. Clearly, the uniform rule satisfies M-monotonicity.
The following lemma illustrates that for M-monotonic rules converse consistency is
implied by consistency.
Lemma 6.2.3 Let 0 be an M-monotonic rule. Then 4 is consistent if and only if (i)
for every economy E e E there exists an x C X'(E) such that xs =0( Es$1 for all
S C N with IS  = 2, and (ii) 0 is converse consistent.
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proof    ( = * )   Let   E   E E. Take I := 0(E). Consistency of 0 yields that :rs = 0( Es; 
for all S C N with IS1 =2.I n order to prove that 0 i s converse consistent, it suffices
' to show that there is no allocation y E X'(E), y 96 z, such that ys = 0(Esy) for all
S C N with ISI =2. Suppose that there exists such a y. Since r(N) = y(N) = M,
it follows that there are i,JEN such that z, < y, and zj> yj. Take S := {i,j}.
Without loss of generality we assume that ICS) 2 1(S). M-Monotonicity of 0 yields
that 0(Es,x) 2 0(ES,V). Hence, Is 2 ys, which yields a contradiction.
(*) Let E f E. Let 0#T E N and x = 0(E). We have to prove that IT = 0(ET,*)
By assumption there exists a y E X-(E) such that YS = 0(Es,V) for all S C N with
ISI = 2. Converse consistency of 0 yields that y = 0(E) = x. Hence, Is = 0(Ess)
for all S C N with ISI =2.B y Remark 6.2.2, xs = 0([ET.*IS. T) for all S C T,
with ISI = 2. Clearly, :rT E X'(ET.F). Hence, converse consistency of 0 yields
IT  -   (ET.x ) .                                                                                                                                                                        0
6.3   Characterizations of the uniform rule
In this section we recall several characterizations of the uniform rule, which are based
on the properties discussed in the previous section.
The first characterizations of the uniform rule are provided by Sprumont (1991) who
proved the following two results.
Theorem 6.3.1 The uniform rule is the unique rule which satisfies Pareto optimal-
ity, strategy-proofness, and anonymity.
If anonymity is replaced by envy-freeness, another characterization of the uniform
rule is obtained.
Theorem 6.3.2 The uniform rule is the unique rule which satisfies Pareto optimal-
ity, strategy-proofness, and envy-freeness.
Theorems 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 are strengthened in Ching (1994), who showed that in these
characterizations anonymity and envy-freeness can be replaced by the weaker equal
treatment property. Moreover, Ching provides an alternative proof of this result.
Thomson (1994a) provides several characterizations of the uniform rule using con-
sistency and converse consistency. We will not discuss all these characterizations in
detail, but mention two of his results.
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Theorem 6.3.3 The uniform rule is the unique rule which satisfies Pareto optimal-
ity, envy-freeness, consistency, and M-continuity.
It turns out that in this characterization envy-freeness can be replaced by individually
rationality from equal division. Another characterization using this property together
with converse consistency is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 6.3.4 The uniform rule is the unique rule which satisfies Pareto optimal-
ity, anonymity, converse consistency, and individually rationality from equal division.
Other characterizations of the uniform rule that use monotonicity properties (popu-
lation monotonicity and resource monotonicity) are given in Thomson (1991, 1994b).
In the following chapter we establish a relation between the uniform rule and two
well-known solutions for bargaining problems. These relations give rise to two new




This chapter, which is based on Otten, Peters and Volij (1994), provides two new
characterizations of the uniform rule, both of which are inspired by the characteriza-
tions of two different bargaining solutions.
In Section 7.2 we associate with each economy an auxiliary bargaining problem in
such a way that the set of Pareto optimal allocations of the bargaining problem coin-
cides with the set of efficient divisions in the original economy.  Next we show that for
each economy the division recommended by the uniform rule, coincides with the allo-
cation recommended by both the Nash and the lexicographic egalitarian bargaining
solutions to the associated bargaining problem. The proofs of these statements are
interesting because they use the principles of consistency and converse consistency
in different contexts, namely in the context of bargaining problems on the one hand,
and of the allocation of a commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences on
the other hand. Moreover, they illustrate that consistency and converse consistency,
which have been employed in several characterizations of game theoretic solution con-
cepts (cf. Sobolev (1975), Peleg (1985, 1986), Lensberg (1988), Hart and Mas-Colell
(1989), Peleg and Tijs (1992), and Chapter 3), can be helpful for other purposes as
well.
Both statements suggest that the uniform rule might be characterized by means of
some suitably adapted set of properties that characterize the bargaining solutions
mentioned above. Section 7.3 discusses properties of the uniform rule reminiscent of
the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property used by Nash (1950) to
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characterize the Nash bargaining solution and the restricted monotonicity property
introduced by Chun and Peters (1988) to characterize the lexicographic egalitarian
bargaining solution.
Section 7.4 presents two characterizations of the uniform rule which are based on the
properties introduced in Section 7.3.
Finally, Section 7.5 translates our results on the uniform rule to a classical cost-
sharing model and obtains a characterization of the head tax mechanism.
Since our results in Sections 7.2-7.4 are proved and inspired by well-known results
from cooperative bargaining theory, we first recall some basic notions of bargaining
theory in Section 7.1.
7.1 Bargaining problems
Recall that N O N denotes a finite, non-empty set of agents. A bargaining problem
for N is a subset B of RN which satisfies the following properties:
(i) B is compact and convex.
(ii) There exists a y€B with y>0.
(iii) B is comprehensive, i.e., if z E B, and y E R , with y S z, then y E B.1
Let  B  denote  the  set  of all bargaining problems (with variable  set of agents).2
A (bargaining) solution is a function F which assigns to each B E B a n element F(B)
of B.
A prominent solution is the Nash bargaining solution introduced by Nash (1950). Let
Be B be a bargaining problem for N.  The Nash bargaining solution is defined by
A/(B) := argmax{ Il z, I z e B}.
,€N
Another bargaining solution is the lexicographic egalitarian solution. To define it we
need some notation.
Let a : RN -0 RN be a function such that for each :r E rd the vector a(:r) is a
reordering of the coordinates of z in a non-decreasing order.  So if i, j  E N with i<j,
1 Note that attention is restricted to R (cf Section 2.3).
2ln Section 2.3 we defined a bargaining problem by a set B and a disagreement outcome d E B.
For our analysis in this chapter the disagreement outcome does not play an explicit role: The reader
may think of the disagreement point as being d = 0.
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then a,(r) 5 aj(z). The lexicographic maximin ordering 21"* on RN is defined by
Z 2'm y if a(z) 2' a(y), where 21 denotes the lexicographic order on RN (cf. Section
2.1).
The lezicographic egalitarian solution, C:B- +R N assigns to each bargaining prob-
lem B E B the unique point which is maximal with respect to the lexicographic
maximin ordering kim.
It is well-known that both N and £ satisfy the properties listed below.
A solution F is Pareto optimal if for all B E B and all y€B w e have, if
112 F(B), then y = F(B).
A solution F satisfies strict individual rationality if F(B) > 0 for all B E B.
Lensberg (1988) and Thomson and Lensberg (1989) characterized the lexicographic
egalitarian solution and the Nash bargaining solution respectively, by means of a
consistency property. In order to introduce it we need the following definition.
Let B E B b e a bargaining problem for N, let z E B, and let S C N,S 0 0. The
reduced bargaining problem with respect to S and z is
Bs,= := (ys E R  | (ys, xMs) E B}.
Note that not necessarily for every x C Bit holds that Bs'* E B. However, if
x = A/(B) or if x = £(B), then Bs, E B.  This is a consequence of the fact that both
N and C satisfy strict individual rationality.
The consistency property is now defined as follows.
A solution F is consistent if for all bargaining problems B€B for N, and all
SCN,S+0 with Bs,= € B where z = $(B) we have that xs = F(Bs.=).
For the results in the next section we make use of the fact that both N and £ satisfy
the consistency property. The results in Section 7.3 are based on the characterization
of Al' by Nash (1950) (cf. Section 2.3), and the characterization of C by Chun and
Peters (1988) in which a restricted monotonicity property plays a central role.
7.2 New formulations of the uniform rule
We start with some notation.  Let E =< M, (R,),eN >E E be an economy. Let p(E)
denote the set of agents i E N for which there is an z E X(E) such that x. > 0. Note
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that p(E) 9,6 0 if and only if M > O.  If one is interested in Pareto optimal rules, it
is clear that the problem is, how to divide the total amount M among the agents in
p(E), for all efficient allocations give zero to the agents not in p(E). In other words,
the set of agents which are relevant for economy E is p(E).
The following two theorems present alternative formulations of the uniform rule and
reflect the similarity between the uniform rule on the one hand and the Nash and
lexicographic egalitarian solution on the other hand.
Theorem 7.2.1  Let E =<  M, (R,),EN  >E E be an economy. Then U(E) is the
unique element of argmax {Il,Ep(E) xi  I x E XCE)} if p(E) 4 0, and U(E) - 0,
otherwise.
Theorem 7.2.2 Let E =<  M, (RhiEN >e E be an economy. Then U(E) is the
unique efficient allocation for E which is maximal with respect to 21™
Instead of giving a direct proof of both theorems, we will give an indirect one based
on some properties of the uniform rule and the consistency property of both the Nash
solution and the lexicographic egalitarian solution.
Proof of Theor€ms 7.2.1 and 7.2.2.
Clearly, both theorems hold if the economy consists of only one agent or if M = 0.  So
from now on attention is restricted to economies with at least two agents and M > 0.
For any such economy E =< M, (R,),EN > we define
B(E) := comp(X(E)) = {z C R,  I z 5 y for some y E X(E)} (see Figure 7.1.)
-                                            -
11 1\'XCE) \  - - - 0,(E)
LMfox                                              (EK
11(E):: . B<E)
Figure 7.1. The set B(E) in case E is an economy with two agents.
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Case  1: All agents are relevant.
Let E =< M, (Ri),€N > be an economy with p(E) = N and IN| 22. Since, p(E) =
N, and X(E) is a convex set, there exists a point y E X(E) with y > 0. Hence,
B(E) is a bargaining problem. B(E) is called the bargaining problem associated with
E. (It should be noted that B(E) represents a set of physical allocations, whereas a
bargaining problem in the usual sense represents a set of utility n-tuples.)
The following lemma shows that the operation of reducing an economy commutes
with the operation of reducing an associated bargaining problem.  It also implies
that, within this context, the consistency requirements for bargaining problems and
economies coincide.
Lemma 7.2.3 Let E =< M, (Ri),EN > be an economy with INI 22 and PiE)=  N.
Let S C N, S 0 0, and z E X(E). Then
B(Es,7 = Bs,=(E).
Proof. we only prove the statement for E,€N P(RJ S M.  The other case is easier.
Since z € X(E), it follows that E,cs P(Ri)  5 Z(S). Hence,
X(Es,=) = {y E Rs+ 1 7(S) = =(S),y, 2 p(R,) Vi € S}.
Let y E B(Es,x) = comp(X(Es.x)). Then there exists a z E X(Es,x) with z k y
This means that z(S) = x(S), and zi 2 p(R,) for all i E S, which implies (z, ZN\S) E
X(E) c B(E). Hence, by definition of the reduced bargaining problem, it follows
that z E Bs,*(E) Since Bs,=(E) is comprehensive, we have y E Bs.*(El.
Now take y E Bs,=(E) = {y  E  lis  I  (y, IN\S) E comp(X(E))}. Then there exists
at E XCE) with t 2 (Ys,EN\S) and t, 2 p(Ri) for all i € S. Since iN\S 2 ZN\S
and t(N) = z(N), it follows that t(S) 5 2(S) Hence, ts E comp({z e R  I z(S) =
I(S), Z, 2 P(Ri) for all i E S }) = B(Es,F). Since ts 2 ys, comprehensiveness of
B(Es.*) implies that ys E B(Es,=).                                               0
In order to prove Theorems 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 for Case 1 it is sufficient to show that
U(E)= A/(B(E))= £(B(E)). (7.1)
First note that in case INI = 2, it is clear that U(E) = £(B(E)). Furthermore, it is
also straightforward to show that A/(B(E)) = £(B(E))
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Hence, it remains  to  show  that (7.1) holds  if  INI  >  2.   This will follow from Lemma
7.2.4 below.
Let E' c E be the family of economies E =< M, (R,),EN > with plE) = N.
Lemma 7.2.4  Let F be a bargaining solution which satisfies Pareto optimality, strict
individual rationality, and consistency. If F(B(E)) = U(E) for all
E =< M, (R,),EN>E E' with INI = 2, then F(B(E)) = U(E) for all ECE:
proof Let E E E' be an economy and define x := F(B(E)). From strict individual
rationality we know that x > 0 and therefore, Bs,*CE) EB. Moreover, by consistency
of F
Is = 3(Bs.F(E))  for all S C N,  SI= 2.
Furthermore, from Pareto optimality of Y and the definition of B(E), it follows that
I C XCE). So by Lemma 7.2.3, B(ES,x) = Bs,x(E). Hence,
IS = LF(B(Es.=))  for all SCN, ISI = 2.
Since B(Es.g) C B, it follows that there exists an y E X(Es..) with y> 0. So
P(Es ) = S for all SCN, ISI = 2. Hence, by assumption
IS = U(Es.*)   for all SCN,  ISI = 2.
Converse consistency of the uniform rule now yields
x = UCE).
0
Since both N and £ are consistent, strict individually rational, and Pareto optimal
bargaining solutions, which satisfy (7.1) in case E is an economy with two agents, it
immediately follows from Lemma 7.2.4 that (7.1) holds for all E E E'. This finishes
the proof of Case  1.
Case 2: Not all agents are relevant.
To complete the proof of Theorems 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 we consider an economy
E =< M, (R,),€N> with p(E) 0 N.
Let x: = U(E) and S := p(E).S00 since M > 0. Pareto optimality of U implies
that IN\S = ON\S.  Consistency of U implies that xs = U (Es..) Clearly, PiEs.*) =  S.
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So by Case 1, we have xs = argmax{Ilies y; I y E X(Es.*)}, and moreover, we have
that xs is maximal with respect to 21™ in XCES'.) Since XCE) = X(Es,=) x {ON\S ,
it follows that UCE) = (TS, ON\S) = argmax{Il,esy,  l y€ X(E)}, and that z i s max-
imal with respect to 21"' in X(E).                                                  0
A similar kind of proof can be found in Aumann and Maschler (1985), who showed
that a bankruptcy rule, the contested garment consistent rule, can be defined as
the nucleolus of an appropriately chosen TU-game. Theorem 7.2.1 can be seen as
a generalization of Dagan and Volij (1993) who showed that the constrained equal
award rule for bankruptcy problems corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution of
an appropriately chosen bargaining problem.
Remark 7.2.5 Another way to obtain the uniform rule, which was formulated by
Thomson, is the following: To an economy E the uniform rule assigns the unique effi-
cient allocation at which the difference between the smallest and largest consumption
is the smallest. Formally, U(E) = argmin{max,EN{z,} - min,EN{zi} I z e X(E)}.
7.3 Additional properties of the uniform rule
It is clear from the previous section that, at least formally, there is a relation between
the uniform rule on the one hand, and the Nash and the lexicographic egalitarian
bargaining solutions on the other hand. This suggests that the uniform rule might be
characterized by means of a suitable adaptation of some properties that characterize
these bargaining solutions. Before we go into characterizations of the uniform rule,
we discuss in this section some properties inspired by the results of Section 7.2.
The following property, though different, is reminiscent of the one used by Nash
(1950) in his characterization of the Nash bargaining solution.
Let 0 be a rule.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA): 4 satisfies IIA if for all economies
E  =<  M, (RE),EN  >,E' =<  M, (g),EN  >€ E with X(E) C X(E') we have
that 0(E') E X(E) implies 0(E) = 0(E')
The IIA axiom makes sense only if 0 is Pareto optimal. The idea behind this axiom is
the following. If some efficient allocations which were not selected by the rule become
inefficient, then this should not result in a change of the recommended outcome if
this outcome is still efficient.
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Lemma 7.3.1 The uniform rule satisfies IIA.
The proof follows directly from Theorem 7.2.1.
For our results we only need a weaker version of IIA which requires independence of
irrelevant alternatives only in cases where in both economies either there is too much
to divide or there is too little to divide.
One-sided independence of irrelevant alternatives: 0 satisfies one-sided IIA if
for all E =< M, (R,),EN >,  E' =< M, (R;),EN >E E with X(E) c X(E') such
that  maxlE,EN P(R,),  E,EN P(Ri)}  <  M or min<Zi€N P(Ri),  E,€N P(R;)}  2
M the following condition holds: if 0(E') E X(E), then 0(E) = 0(E').
Clearly, one-sided IIA is a weakening of IIA, so the uniform rule satisfies one-sided
IIA.
Before we discuss a monotonicity property for the uniform rule which is based on
the restricted monotonicity property introduced in Chun and Peters (1988), we first
consider the following property.
Monotonicity: 0 satisfies monotonicity if for all economies E =< M, (R,),EN >
and E' =< M',(g),EN >, such that for each z E X(E) there exists an x' E
X(E') with z; R; z, for all i€N w e have 0,(E') R; 0,(E) for all i€N.
Monotonicity states that if for every efficient allocation x in E we can find an efficient
allocation z' in E' such that x' is weakly preferred to x by all agents in E', then the
same must be true for the recommendations 0(E') and 0(E), namely 0(E') must
be weakly preferred to 0(E) by all agents in E'. This property is similar in spirit
to the monotonicity property in bargaining theory, and, like in bargaining theory,
monotonicity is incompatible with Pareto optimality, as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 7.3.2 There is no Pareto optimal rule 0 that satisfies monotonicity.
proof  Let E, E' and E" be three 2-agent economies in which there are 3 units to
be divided. The peaks of the preference relations are p = (1,2), p' = (2,1), and
p" = (3,3), respectively. By Pareto optimality of 0 we have that 0(E) = (1,2). It is
clear that X(E) C X(E") so E and E" trivially satisfy the condition in the mono-
tonicity property. Hence by monotonicity, we must have 0(E") = C 1,2). A similar
argument shows that 0(E")= (2,1), which is a contradiction.                               0
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Lemma 7.3.2 shows that if we want to keep Pareto optimality, we must, as in bar-
gaining theory, weaken the monotonicity requirement.  We are going to weaken mono-
tonicity in two different ways. First, we are going to allow for non-monotonicity only
if one of the agents that got his peak in the economy E, strictly prefers the recom-
mendation for the economy E'. Second, we are going to require this restricted form
of monotonicity only when comparing some very specific economies.
One-sided restricted monotonicity: 0 satisfies one-sided restricted monotonic-
ity if for all economies  E  =<  M, (R,),EN  >,E'  =<  M, (R;),€N  >C  E,  sat-
isfying X(E) C X(E') and either max{E,EN P(R,), E,ENP(g)} < Mor
min{E,ENP(R,),    E,€NP(R;)} 2 M the following condition holds: If
0.(E) g 0,(E') for all i€N such that 0,(E) = P(Ri), then 0,(E') R; 0,(E) for
all ieN.
In order to understand this axiom, note that 0,(E) = p(R,) means that it is physically
impossible  to make agent i better  off in economy  E.     In   this   case  we  say   that   i's
peak is binding at 0(E). One-sided restricted monotonicity says that given two
economies E and E' satisfying the conditions in the definition of this property, if
0 does not behave monotonically, i.e., there is some agent in E' who strictly prefers
0(E) to 0(E'), then there must be some other agent in E', whose peak was binding at
0(E),who strictly prefers 0(E') to 0(E). In other words, if the peaks of the agents'
preferences change in the same direction, then no agent's award should follow the
opposite direction unless there is an agent whose peak was binding in the original
situation and whose award followed the direction of his peak in the transition to
the new situation. The motivation for this axiom is the same as the one for the
restricted monotonicity satisfied by the lexicographic egalitarian bargaining solution
(Chun and Peters   (1988)):    In some situations an agent may benefit  from  the  fact
that it is physically impossible to make other agents better off. If this impossibility
disappears due to the fact that the peaks change, it may be bad news for those who
benefitted from the previous situation, i.e., their awards may go farther away from
their peaks.  It is only this kind of non-monotonic behavior that is allowed by the
restricted monotonicity axiom.
Lemma 7.3.3 The uniform rule satisfies one-sided restricted monotonicity.
proof   Let  E  =<  M, (R,),EN  >  and E'  =<  M, (g),EN  >E  E be two economies
satisfying max{E,EN P(Ri), E.EN P(R:)} < M (the other case is similar) and assume
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X(E) c X(E'). Then p(E) 2 p(E').  For all iEN, let U,(E) = max {p(R,), A}
and U,(E') = max{p(R;), A'} Define K  := {i  E  N     U,(E) >  p(Ri)} and assume
U,(E) R; U,(E'), for all i€N\K, i.e.,
U,(E) 5 U,(E'),   for all i E N j K. (7.2)
We need to show that U,(E') R; U,(E) for all i EN. Since
M= E max{p(g), A'} = X max {p(14),A} 2 E max {p(R:), A},
i€N ieN WN
it  follows  that  A'  2  1
Take i E K. It follows from the definition of K that p(R:) 5 p(R,) S A S A: Hence,
U,(E) 5 U,(E') (7.3)
This together with assumption (7.2) implies that (7.3) holds for all i € N. But since
E,EN U,(E) - E,€N U,(E'), we have U,(E) = U,(E') for all i EN, which in turn
implies that U,(E') R; U,(E) for all i EN.                                             O
The following lemma shows that there is a relation between the one-sided monotonic-
ity and one-sided IIA.
Lemma 7.3.4 Let 0 be a Pareto optimal rule.  If 0 satisfies one-sided restricted
monotonicity, then 0 satisfies one-sided IIA.
proof   Let  E  =<  M, (R,),EN  >  and  E'  =<  M, (g),EN  >E  E be two economies
satisfying X(E) C X(E'). We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: min{E,EN P(Ri), E,€NP(Ri)} 2 M.
Assume 0(E') C X(E). Then by Pareto optimality of 0, we have
nnax {0,(E),0,(E')} 5 min{p(14),p(g)} for all i EN. (7.4)
Since X(E) c X(E'), it follows that
min{M,p(Ri)} 5 P(g)  for all i E N. (7.5)
Let i€N b e such that 0,(E) = p(R,). Then it follows from (7.4) and (7.5) that
0,(E') 5 p(R,) = 0,(E) 5 p(R;). This implies that 0,(E) 4 0,(E') for all i€N
with 0,(E) = p(Ri)
Since 0 satisfies one-sided restricted monotonicity, it follows that 0,(E') R; 0,(E) for
all  i  € N Since 0(E) e X(E'), we rnust have 0,(E')   I'  0,(E)   for  all  i   € N. Since
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both 0(E) and 0(E') are efficient in E', it follows that 0(E) = 0(E').
Case 2: mME,€NP(14), E.€N P(RI)} 5 M.
In this case X(E) C X(E') implies that p(E') 5 p(E). Let i E N b e such that
0,(E) =p(RJ. Then, since 0(E') E X(E), it follows from Pareto optimality of 0
that 0,(E') 2 p(Ri) = 0,(E) 2 p(K). This implies that 0,(E) g *(E') for all i E N
with 0,·(E) = p(R,)
Since 0 satisfies one-sided restricted monotonicity, it follows that 0,(E') g 0,(E) for
alli E N Since both 0(E) and 0(E') are efficient in E', it follows that 0(E) = 0(E').
0
Lemma 7.3.5 will allow us to considerably simplify notation.
Lemma 7.3.5 Let 0 be a Pareto optimal rule. If 0 satisfies one-sided IIA, then 0
satisfies peak only.
proof   Let  E  =<  M, (R,),EN  >  and E'  =<  M, (g),EN  >€  E be two economies
with p(E) = p(E'). Then X(E) = X(E') and since 0 is Pareto optimal, we have
0(E') 6 X(E) = X(E'). Hence, by one-sided IIA, 0(E) = 0(E').                   O
Lemmas 7.3.4 and 7.3.5 imply the following corollary.
Corollary 7.3.6 Let 0 be a Pareto optimal rule. If 0 satisfies one-sided restricted
monotonicity, it also satisfies peak only.
It will follow from Theorem 7.4.1 and from Example (III) in the next section that
the converses of Lemmas 7.3.4,7.3.5 and Corollary 7.3.6 are not true.
We conclude this section with the following property which imposes a restriction only
when the solution satisfies peak only.
Conditional p-continuity: A solution 0 is conditional p-continuous if the follow-
ing holds: If 0 is peak only, then it is continuous with respect to the peaks.
Clearly, the uniform rule satisfies conditional p-continuity, which is weaker than the
continuity with respect to preferences introduced in Sprumont (1991).
7.4 Two characterizations of the uniform rule
We are now ready to state the two main results of this chapter, which are charac-
terizations of the uniform rule, based on the properties introduced in the previous
section.
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proof It is clear that the uniform rule satisfies (i)-(iv).
For each M E [0, M}, let E(M) be the class of economies in which M is the amount
to be divided. Furthermore, let &(M) := {z € RiC I =(N) = M}. For p € R  let
S(p) := {x € 8(M) I z Sp or I 2 p}.
Now let 0 be a rule satisfying the foregoing properties. By Lemma 7.3.5 0 is peak
only.   Let  M€  [0, M],  and let N C N b e a finite set of agents. Define the function
f : R+ 1 6(M) by
f(p) = 0(E) for some E E E(M) with p(E) = p.
Since 0 is peak only, f is well-defined.
Since 0 satisfies (i)-(iv), the reader can easily verify that f satisfies the following
properties:
(A.1) f(p)  €  S(p)  for all p € R .
(A.2) f,(p) = fj(p) for all p € Rj with p, = pj.
(A.3) For all p, q E R  such that either max{p(N),q(N)} < M or min{p(N),q(N)} 2
M, we have, if f(q) € S(p) C S(q), then f(p) = f(q)·
(A.4) f is continuous in p.
To conclude the proof of Theorem 7.4.1 it suffices to show that for all p E R 
f.(p) = <  min{pi,A}    if p(N) 2 M                                                           (7.6)rnax {p„ A} if p(N) S M,
where A is such that f(p) € 8(M).
Let  p  E  R . Assume PIN) < M (the case p(N) > M is similar, and the case
p(N) = M is trivial). (A.1) implies f(p) 2 p
Define the following set of agents:
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K: = {i€N I f,(P) > p,}
Since p(N) <M, K 0 0.
The proof of (7.6) follows from the following four lemmas.
Lemma A: Let i€K and let 0 S q,5 p; Define q€R   b y
 pj ifj€N\{i}qj = il  qi   if j = i.
Then f(q) = f(P).
Proof Let
a:=  inf{z,  E  [qi, p,] 1 f(zi,p-,) = f(p)}.
Here, p_, denotes the vector PN\{,}·
By (A.4), it follows that f(a,p-,) = f(p). We prove that a = 0. Suppose, on the
contrary,  that  a  > q,. Since f,(a,p_ ) = f,(p) > pi, it follows from (A.4) that there
exists an qi <a<a close enough to a, such that f,(a, p-,) > p'. By (A.1), we have
fj(a,p-i)  2 p j for all j E N\ {i} Hence, f(a, p_i) € S(p) Clearly, S(p) C S(a, p_,).
Therefore, by  (A.3)  we have  f (a, p-,) = f(P), contradicting the definition of a. We
conclude that a = qi, and so it follows that f(q) = f(q, p-.) = f(p).                 0
Lemma  B:  for  all  z, j  E  X  we have f, (p) = fj(p)
Proof Let i,j E K, and let O s v= min{p,·,pj}. Define q C R   b y
qk =   P k  if k E N\ {i,j}v   ifk=i,j
(A.2) yields that f, (q) = fj(q)· From Lemma A it now follows that f,(p) = fj(p).  0
Lemma C: For all i, j E N we have, if p, 5 pj, then f,·(p) 5 fj(p).
proof· Suppose that there exist i,j E N, with p; 5 pj and f, (p)  >  fj (p). Define
q ERNby
qk= Pk  if kEN\{i}
pj      if  k  =  i.
From (A.1) and the definition of q i t follows that qk =P k S fk (P) for kEN\{i}.
Moreover, from the assumption it follows that q, = p, 5 Ij(p) < f,(p). Hence, f(p) 2
q, and EkEN qk < Ek€Nfk(P) = M. Therefore, f(p) E S(q) C S(p).  (A.3) now yields
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that f(p) = f(q). Hence using (A.2), we obtain f, (p) = f, (q) = fj(q) = fj(p), which
contradicts the assumption f,(p)> fj(p).                                            0
According to Lemma B all agents in K obtain the same amount. Denote this amount
by A, i.e., f, (p)  =  A  for  all  i  E  K.
Lemma D: p, 2 X for all i€N\K.
Proof. Suppose that there exists an E E N\K, with p, <A.  Take j E K.  By
definition of It: and A we have f,(p) =p, <A- fj(p). Hence by Lemma C, we have
pi  <  pj.   Define q  e  R   by
q k=  <  Pk   i f k E N\ {1}p,   if k = j.
By Lemma A it follows that f(q) = f(p) (A.2) yields fj(p) = fj(q) = f, (q) = f, (p) =
p, < pj, which contradicts (A.1).                                                      0
Now we show that (7.6) holds.
From Lemma B and the definitions of K and A it follows that
f,(p) = max{pi, A}    for all i E K.
From Lemma D and the definition of K we obtain
f, (p) = Inax {pi, A}   for all i€N j K.
Since f(p) C &(M),(7.6) holds. This completes the proof of Theorem 7.4.1.        0
The following examples show that the properties (i)-(iv) in Theorem 7.4.1 are inde-
pendent.
(I) The egalitarian rule satisfies equal treatment, (one-sided) IIA, and conditional
p-continuity, but not Pareto optimality.
(II)  Let 01 be defined as follows:  For each E =< M, (R,),civ >€ E
078):=  
U(E) if IN' 96 2
argmax{4/4=53/4 I x€ XCE)}  if N - {i,j}, i<j.
01 satisfies Pareto optimality, (one sided) IIA, and conditional p-continuity, but
not equal treatment.
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(III)  Let 02 be defined as follows: For each E= <M, (Ri),EN >€ E and £E N
02(E) := <
(4(E) if  EKNP(Rj) 2 M
p(Ri) + 14(M - Ej€N P(Rj)) otherwise.
02 satisfies Pareto optimality, equal treatment, and conditional p-continuity,
but not (one-sided) IIA.
(IV)  Let 03 be defined as follows: For each E =< M, (R,),EN>€ E
'
U(E) if IN 1 0 2
03(E):= , argmin{zixj I r E XCE)}   if N= {i,j} and (¥, ¥) 0 XCE)
C M   M)
,   (2'  21
otherwise.
03 satisfies Pareto optimality, equal treatment, and (one-sided) IIA, but not
conditional p-continuity.
Theorem 7.4.2 shows that if one-sided IIA is replaced by one-sided restricted mono-
tonicity in Theorem 7.4.1, then we can drop conditional p-continuity.
Theorem 7.4.2 The uniform rule is the unique rule on E which satisfies
(i) Pareto optimality
(ii) equal treatment
(iii) one-sided restricted monotonicity.
proof It is clear that the uniform rule satisfies (i)-(iii). Now let 0 be a rule satisfying
(i)-(iii). By Corollary 7.3.6 0 i s peak only.   Let M  €  10, M], and let N  c  N be
finite set of agents. Analogously to the proof of Theorem 7.4.1, define the function
f: R  -+ 6(M) by
f(p) = 0(E) for some E E E(M) with p(E) = p.
Since 0 is peak only, f is well-defined.
The reader can easily verify that (i)-(iii) together with Lemma 7.3.4 imply that f sat-
isfies, besides (A.1), (A.2), and (A.3) (see the proof of Theorem 7.4.1), the following
property.
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(A.5)  For all p, q E R , with S(p) C S(q), and such that either max{p(N), q(N)} <
M or min{p(N),q(N)} 2 M, we have, if If,(p) - 01 S If,(q) - *1 for all i E N
such that f, (P) = P„ then If,(q) - qil 5 lf,(p) - *1 for all i E N.
To conclude the proof of Theorem 7.4.2 it suffices to show that for all p E R 
f.(p) -  <  min{Pi, A}    if  E,€N P, 2 Mmax{p„ A } if E,€NP, 5 M,
where A is such that f(p) E &(M)
Let   p   E   R . Assume PIN) < M (the case p(N) > M is similar, and the case
p(N) = M is trivial). (A.1) implies f(p) 2 p
Define the following set of agents:
K: = {i€N I f,(p)> P,}·
Since E,EN Pi < M,  K 0 0
Analogously to the proof of Theorem 7.4.1 we now have the following lemma.
Lemma A': Let i E K and let 0 5*5 p,· Define q€ R  by
qk =   P k  if k€N\{i}q, ifk=i.
Then f(q) = f(P).
Proof. From  the  definition  of  q  it  follows  that  S(p)  C   S(q). Suppose f(p) 0 f(q)·
Since p, q  E  &(M), it  is not true that f(q) 5 fCp)· Hence by (A.5), it follows that
there exists a j€N such that fj(p) = pj and fj(p) > fj(q)· Since j 0 K, it follows
that j 0 i. Hence, qj = pj = fj(p) > fj(q) 2 qi which is a contradiction.              0
The proof of Theorem 7.4.2 now follows from the remark that in the proofs of Lem-
mas B,C,D above only (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) are used.  So the proof of Theorem
7.4.2 can proceed in the same way as that of Theorem 7.4.1.                               0
The Examples (I) (II) and (III) above show that in Theorem 7.4.2 the characterizing
properties are independent.
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7.5   An application to a cost-sharing model
In this section we show that the results of Section 7.4 can also be applied in other
models. As an example we discuss a classical cost-sharing model in which the costs
of an indivisible public good (for example a bridge) have to be allocated among the
agents. The only available data are the costs c>O o f the public facility and the
benefit b, 2 0 of each agent i € {1,. . ., n}.It isassumed that itisefficient tobuild
the facility, so El,1 6, 2 c. The problem is how to share the costs.
Formally, the cost-sharing problem is described  by  a pair  (c, b), where  c>0  and
6 E IC; is such that El, b. 2 c.  An allocation for (c, b) is a vector z € R" such that
r--1/Li=l xt- c.
For this model many different allocation methods, which in this framework are called
mechanisms, have been investigated (cf. Moulin (1988)). One of these mechanisms
is the so-called head taz. The name head tax is introduced in Young (1987), who
interprets the amount c as the total amount of tax needed to finance the public
facility which is provided by the tax collector.  For a problem  (c, 6) the head tax  is
defined by
h,(c,  b):=  min {A, 6,} for a l l i=1, . . . ,n
where  1  20  is  such  that  Elt  hi (c,b)  =  c.
Although the cost-sharing model is conceptually different from the previously dis-
cussed fair division problems with single-peaked preferences, there is a clear resem-
blance between both problems.   If we associate to a cost-sharing problem (c, 6) an
economy E =< M, (R,)1-i > with M := c and (R,);=i are such that p(E) = 6, then
U(E) = h(c, b).
As a consequence of this similarity Theorem 7.4.1 can be reformulated for the cost-
sharing model.  If we translate the Pareto optimality condition for economies, we
obtain a property which is known as the core property (cf. Moulin (1988)).
Core property: A mechanism f satisfies the core property if 0 5 f(c, b) S b for
all cost sharing problems (c, b).
The reason why Moulin (1988) called this property the core property is that, if to
each cost-sharing problem a natural 'surplus sharing' TU-game is associated, then a
payoff vector belongs to the core of this TU-game if and only if the corresponding
cost allocation assigns to each agent a nonnegative cost which is smaller than his
benefit.  For a cost-sharing problem (c, 6), we define the core of (c, b) as the set
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n
C(c, b) := {x €R n' Ex, =c, 0 S x s b}.
t=1
The independence of irrelevant alternatives property can now be formulated as fol-
lows.
IIA: A mechanism f satisfies IIA if for all cost-sharing problems (c, b) and (c, b')
with C(c, b) C C(c, b'), we have, if f(c, u) c C(c, b), then f(c, b) = f(c, b').
Without proof we state the following analogue of Theorem 7.4.1.
Theorem 7.5.1 The head tax is the unique mechanism for cost-sharing problems
which satisfies the core property, anonymity, IIA, and continuity with respect to the
benefits.
In the context of bankruptcy problems (cf. Section 2.5) the uniform rule or head tax
analogue is the so-called constraint equal award rule. Theorem 7.5.1 can easily be





Effectivity functions and game
fornls
A central topic in social choice theory is the analysis of collective decision rules called
social choice correspondences or social choice functions. These decision rules reflect
in some way or another the preferences of the individual agents over a certain set of
alternatives.
The basis for social choice theory was laid more than two-hundred years ago by Borda
(1781) and Condorcet (1785) who studied voting procedures for elections. The start-
ing point for modern social choice theory is the contribution of Arrow (1951).
It has already been noted by Borda that in voting situations strategic aspects play
an important role. By manipulating or misrepresenting preferences individuals or
coalitions can influence society's choice. The famous Gibbard-Satterthwaite theo-
rem (Gibbard (1973), Satterthwaite (1975)) shows that, when there are more than
two alternatives, there are no non-dictatorial social choice functions which are non-
manipulable (strategy-proof).
Given the fact that strategic aspects play an important role in social choice, it is
interesting to study the power distribution in society, induced by the possibilities
for individuals or coalitions to manipulate a given collective decision rule. A way to
model this power distribution was introduced in Moulin and Peleg (1982) using the
concept of an effectivity function. Formally an effectivity function associates to each
coalition a collection of subsets of alternatives for which the coalition is efective. If
a coalition is effective for a certain subset of alternatives this means that it can force
the final outcome which has to be chosen to be an element of this set, or formulated
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otherwise, it can veto all alternatives outside this set of alternatives.
The study of effectivity functions is the topic of Part III of this thesis.  We will focus
attention on the mathematical aspects of effectivity functions and do not go into a
detailed description of the relation between effectivity functions and social choice the-
ory. The reader is referred to Moulin and Peleg (1982), Moulin (1983), Peleg (1984a),
and Abdou and Keiding (1992) for comprehensive studies on this subject.
This chapter presents an overview of some important results in the framework of ei
fectivity functions. First, in Section 8.1 we present some basic notions and introduce
effectivity functions associated with game forms. In Section 8.2 we formally define
the concept of an effectivity function and discuss some basic properties of elTectivity
functions. Furthermore, we present some preliminary results which will be used in
later chapters. In Section 8.3 the notion of the core of an effectivity function (at a
certain preference profile) is defined, and the problem of non-emptiness of the core
is addressed. Section 8.4 considers some special classes of effectivity functions which
play an important role in the literature. Particularly, we discuss additive effectivity
functions, effectivity functions corresponding to veto functions and effectivity func-
tions corresponding to simple games. Finally, Section 8.5 describes relations between
effectivity functions and game forms.
8.1 Social choice and effectivity functions
Let  A  be a finite set of alternatives  and  let  N  be the set  {1, . . . ,n}  (n  €  N).   N  is
called a society, members of N are called agents or voters, and non-empty subsets of
N are called coalitions.  Although we assume that A is finite, many of our results also
hold in case A is infinite.
A central problem in social choice theory is how the society should make a choice
from the given set of alternatives.  The main idea is that society's choice should
reflect the individual preferences of the agents. We assume that each agent :E N
has preferences over the set of alternatives which can be described by a complete and
transitive preference relation 4 (cf. Section 6.1).  As in Part II of this monograph we
use the notation a R. b if (a, b) E R., and a P. b if a R, b and not b R. a. Here a R. b
is to be interpreted as 'alternative a is at least as good as alternative b according to
agent i. By R we denote the set of all preference relations over A. Furthermore, we
denote Rs := (R,),Es, Ps := (P,),Es (S € Po(N)). RN is called a (preference) projile
8.1 Social choice and effectivity functions 103
on A. The set of all profiles on A is denoted by RN·
A social choice function is a surjective function 0 : RN -+ A (i.e., 0(RN)= A). A
social choice correspondence is a map 0 which associates with each profile RN E RN
a non-empty subset 0(RN) of A. Similar to surjectiveness of a social choice function
we assume that a social choice correspondence is non-imposed, i.e., for each a€A
there exists a profile RN € RN such that 0(RN) = {a}. This assumption is not very
restrictive, since alternatives that cannot be chosen even if all agents cooperate can
be viewed as not really available to society.
A well-known example of a social choice correspondence is the majority rule, which
selects the alternatives that are preferred by most agents. We do not give the formal
definition of this social choice correspondence but we illustrate the majority rule by
means of the following example.
Example 8.1.1  Let  N =  {1,2,3,4,5}  and  A =  {a, 6, c, d}. Suppose the preferences






Here there are no indifferences and the preferences of the players are denoted in
decreasing order, i.e. player 1 likes a the most, then c, then 4 and then d, and so on.
We see that there is only one agent who has a as his best alternative (agent 1), there
is no agent who has b as his most preferred alternative, there are two agents who
prefer alternative c above all other alternatives (agents 2 and 3), and there are also
two agents who prefer d (agents 4 and 5). The majority rule chooses the alternatives
which have most first places. Since c and d are most preferred by two agents, while a
and b are most preferred by less agents, the majority rule yields {c, d}. This example
illustrates that in general the majority rule does not select a single alternative as
an outcome. So the majority rule is a social choice correspondence and not a social
choice function.
It is interesting to notice that a social choice correspondence (or function) induces a
power distribution in society. Given a fixed social choice correspondence, agents or
coalitions have the possibility to influence the outcome prescribed by the social choice
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correspondence by manipulating, i.e., reporting other than their true preferences. We
illustrate this phenomenon in the following example.
Example 8.1.2 Consider the situation described in Example 8.1.1. We have seen
that the majority rule does not necessarily select a single alternative as an outcome.
In order to overcome this difficulty we adopt a tie-breaking rule.  If the majority
rule does not select a single alternative, then alternative d is chosen as the outcome.
In  Example 8.1.1 the majority rule yields  {c, d}, so application of the tie-breaking
rule  implies that alternative  d  will be selected. Agent  1, for example, would  have
preferred alternative c, since d is his worst alternative.  He can achieve this goal
by misrepresenting his preferences.  If he reports RE =c a b d instead of his (true)
preferences  Rl,  then the majority rule selects the single alternative  {c}  as an outcome,
so the tie-breaking rule need not be applied.
Example 8.1.2 shows that by reporting preferences strategically, agents have the
power to affect society's choice. This undesirable property of manipulability is not a
specific drawback of the (adopted) majority rule. The classical theorem of Gibbard-
Satterthwaite illustrates that essentially there are no non-dictatorial social choice
functions which are non-manipulable.
Since we are interested in the power of coalitions rather than the power that individ-
ual agents may have, it will be clear that if groups of agents coordinate their actions,
there are even more possibilities for manipulation.
A natural framework to further investigate the strategic aspects of the problem of
collective choice is provided by non-cooperative game theory. First, we introduce
some additional notation.
Let S E Po(N) and for all i E S, let X, be a non-empty set. We denote the Cartesian
product Ilies X,  by Xs·  If ai E X, for all i € S, then we write os instead of (a,hes·
A game form (Gibbard (1973)) is an (n + 2)-tuple G - (Xi, · · · , Xn, A, lr), where X,
is a non-empty set of strategies for each i E N, A is a finite set of alternatives, and
A:XN + Aisa surjective outcome function (i.e., T(XN) = A).
The interpretation of G is as follows: Given the choice 0, E X, of each player iEN,
the outcome function ir determines an alternative T(aN) € A. Note the difference be-
tween a game form and a game in strategic form as studied already by von Neumann
and  Morgenstern   (1944)  and  Nash   (1951).    Each  game form gives  rise  to  a  game  in
normal form by adding to the game form the preferences of the agents. (Usually in
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the definition of a game in strategic form it is assumed that the preferences of the
agents are represented by utility functions.)
A social choice function 0: RN -+ A gives rise to a game form in the following way:
The strategy set of each agent is R, and the outcome function is 0. This means that
we have embedded the problem of collective power distribution in society induced by
a social choice function in the more general framework of collective power distribution
induced by a game form.
In the literature several ways to measure collective power induced by a game form
have been proposed. Hurwicz and Schmeidler (1978) introduced a simple game which
specifies all winning coalitions, i.e., coalitions which have the power to enforce every
single alternative as an outcome, independent of what the other agents do. Ishikawa
and Nakamura (1980) considered a kind of game in characteristic function form, which
can be regarded as a generalization of the simple game of Hurwicz and Schmeidler.
However, these two approaches only give a partial description of the power distribu-
tion.
A more general way to describe coalitional power induced by a game form is intro-
duced in Moulin and Peleg (1982) using the notion of an effectivity function.  An
effectivity function specifies for each coalition the collection of subsets of alternatives
for which that coalition is e#ective.  If a coalition is effective for a certain subset
of alternatives this means that it can guarantee the final outcome to be within this
subset.
Several effectivity functions can be associated with a given game form. We restrict
attention to the two possibilities that received most attention in the literature.
Let  G  =  (Xl · · · , Xn, A, lr)  be a game  form,  let  S  €  Po(N)  be a coalition  and  let
B E Po(A) be a non-empty subset of alternatives. S is called a-efective for B if
there exists as E Xs such that ir(as, 7-N\S) f  B for all TN\S E XN\s·  S is called B-
e,(Tective for B if for all TN,s E XN\S there exists as E Xs such that ir(crs, 1-N\S) E B.
By Ef(S) (EBGCS)) we denote the set of all subsets of alternatives for which S is
a-effective (B-effective). The functions EG, Ef : Po(N) -+ 290(A) are called the a-
efectivity function and the B-efectivity function associated with the game form G.
Summarizing we have that for S E Po(N)
Ef(S) := {B E Po(A) 13as E Xs VTNjs € XN\S    r(as, TN\S) E B} and
EG(S) := {B E Po(A) 1 VTN\S € XN\S 305 E Xs :  T(as, TN\s) E B}.
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From these definitions it is immediately clear that
(i) Ef(N) = E (N) = Po(A), and
(ii) A E Ef(S), A E EBG(S) for all S € Po(N),
where (i) follows from the fact that the outcome function x is surjective.
The a- and B-effectivity function associated with a game form are introduced in
Moulin and Peleg  (1982),  but  the  idea  of  a- and B-effectiveness of coalitions  goes
back to the fifties (cf. Aumann (1961)).  Note that E2 specifies all possibilities
of pessimistic cooperative behavior of the agents, while E corresponds to a more
optimistic view. It is clear that E (S) c Ef(S) for all S E Po(N) and all game
forms G. The converse inclusion however need not be satisfied. A game form G is
called tight if Ef = Ef.
We conclude this section with an example which can be found in Moulin (1983).
Example  8.1.3   A  way to determine a collective choice  is the method of voting  by
veto. In this decision mechanism every agent i E N i a equipped with a veto power
m, €N U {0},and every alternative a€A has a veto resistance r. E N. These




Let A(r) be the set made up by r= replicas of alternative a for all a E A. Formally,
A(r):= {(a,k) l a€A,k€N,  k s r.}.
Further, let E(m) be the set of all orderings in which every agenti€N appears
exactly m, times. So,
E(m) := {a : {1, . . . ,I mi} -4 NIla-1(i)1 =m i for all i E N}.
KN
Given an ordering a E E(m), we define a game form (in extensive form) G, as follows.
In step 1 agent 0(1) vetoes one element of A(r),  say  (al, ki)·
In  step 2 agent a(2) vetoes one element of A(r)   {(al, ki)},  say  (a2, k2)·
In step t agent a(t) vetoes one element of A(r)\ {(al, ki), ···,Cat-1, kt-1)}, say (at, kt)
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After step E:€N ms, there is exactly one element of A(r) which is not vetoed, say
(a, k). The alternative a is the selected outcome.
Note that the above procedure corresponds to an extensive game form. However, in
the standard way a strategic game form can be derived. Since every alternative can
occur as the final outcome, it follows that the outcome function is surjective.
Moulin (1983) shows that this game form is tight and that its associated effectivity
function Em,r := Ega = EBG, is (independently of the order a) given as follows. For
S E Po(N) and B E Po(A),
BEE™,„(S) if and only if Em, 2  Z  r..
ies a€A\B
Or equivalently,
B E Em,r(S) if and only if X mi + E re 2 Z ro.
t€S a€B a€A
Em,, is called the efectivity function associated with the voting by veto method where
m := (mi),€N and r := (ra)a€A are the veto power and veto resistance, respectively.
8.2 The structure of efrectivity functions
In the previous section we introduced effectivity functions corresponding to a game
form as a way to measure the collective power distribution in a society induced by the
game form. In this section we study effectivity functions on their own and present
some preliminary results which will be used later on.
Based on the definition of effectivity functions associated with game forms in Section
8.1 we define the general notion of an effectivity function as follows.
An efectivity function is a map E : Po(N) - 2"o(A) such that
(i) E(N) = Po(A)
(ii) A E E(S) for all S e Po(N)
The interpretation of E is as follows: If B € E(S), then S can force the final decision
within the subset B of alternatives. By definition the society N can force the outcome
to belong to every (non-empty) subset of alternatives.
There are alternative ways to represent an effectivity function. We mention two of
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them.
An effectivity function E can be represented by means of a {0,1 }-matrix IE of size
2" - 1 by 21/11 - 1, where for S € Po(N) and B € Po(A),
IE(S, B) = 1 if and only if B E E(S).
Alternatively, an effectivity function   E  can  be  seen  as a collection   {vB }BEp0(A)  of
simple TU-games, where for each B E Po(A) the game v  : 2N -4 {0,1} is defined
by
UB(S) = 1 if and only if B € E(S).
We will now consider several properties that effectivity functions might satisfy. We
will use these properties later on, but it should be mentioned that this list of properties
is certainly not exhaustive. For more properties of effectivity functions we refer the
reader to Abdou and Keiding (1992).
Let E: Po(N) -+ 2'°(A) be an effectivity function.
(i)  E is A-monotonic if for all S € Po(N) and all B, B' C Po(A) with B C B' and
B € E(S), we have B' E E(S).
(ii)  E is N-monotonic if for all S, S'  E Po(N) with S C  S', and all B E Po(A),
with B E E(S), we have B E E(S').
(iiii) E is maximal if for all S € Po(N) and all B E Po(A) such that B % E(S), we
have  A   B  E  E(N \  S).
(iv) E is neutral if for all S E Po(N), all B E E(S) and all B' E Po(A) with
1B'  =  B , we have B' E E(S).
(v)  E is superadditive if for all St, S2 E Po(N), with Si FIS2 = 0' and all Bi € E(St),
82 E ECS,), we have Bl fl 82 € E(Si U S,)·
(Vi) E is upper cycle free if for all St,···,Sk € Po(N) with Sr n St = 0 for all
r, t c {1,...,k}, r 96 1 and all Bl,···,Bk E Po(A) with Br € E(S,) for all
r E {1,...,k}, we have Ali B, 96 0.
(Vii) E is convex if for all Si,·52 E Po(N), and all Bl € E(Si), 82 E ECS,)' we have
Bl n 82 € E(Si U S2) or Bl u 82 E E(St n sij
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It is easy to check that if E is convex, then E is also superadditive, and if E is
superadditive, then E is upper cycle free and N-monotonic.
For every game form G the effectivity functions E2 and E  are both A- and N-
monotonic. Furthermore, EoG is superadditive and EBG is maximal.  So if a game form
G is tight, then Ef is maximal. That the converse also holds is shown in the following
lemma which can be found in Peleg (1984a).
Lemma 8.2.1  Let G be a game form. Then G is tight if and only if Ef is maximal.
Since the game form Ge introduced in Example 8.1.3 is tight it follows from the
previous lemma that the effectivity function E is maximal. In Section 8.4 we willm,r
see that E is even convex.m,r
The superadditive cover E of an effectivity function E is introduced in Peleg (1984a).
In the remaining part of this section we establish some relations between E and E
which will be used in Chapter 10.
Let E : Po(N) -+ 2"°(A) be an effectivity function. The superadditive cover E of E
is a map that assigns to each S € Po(N) a subset of 2'4 such that it satisfies the
following property:  B E 2/l is an element of E(S) if and only if there exist a partition
{S l, ' ' - 'S k}  of  S  and  sets  B. E E(Sr) for all r e {l, . . . , k} such that B= re-1 Br.
So, E is a function from Po(N) to 22A. It is easy to see that E C E for all effectivity
functions E, i.e., E(S) C E(S) for all S € Po(N). It is clear that E is an effectivity
function (0 0 E(S) for all S € Po(N)) if and only if E is upper cycle free. The name
'superadditive cover' is explained in the next two lemmas.
Lemma 8.2.2 Let E : Po(N) -+ 21°(A) be an effectivity function. The following
three properties are equivalent.
(i) E is upper cycle free.
(ii) E is a superadditive effectivity function.
(iii) There exists a superadditive effectivity function E' such that E C E'.
proof  (i)=*(ii) Let E be upper cycle free. Then by definition 0 0 E(S) for all
S E Po(N). Hence E is an effectivity function. Let S, T € Po(N) with S n T = 0
and let B E E(S) and D€ E(T). Then there are partitions {Sl, ···,Sk} of S and
{Tl,..., 11}of T and there are B l, . . . ,B k and D i, . . . ,D i with B,  C  E(Sr) for all
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r  E  {1, . . . ,k} and D.  C  E(T,) for all s  €  {1, . . . ,t}  such that B = fti Br  and
D= ALi D..  Then {St, ···,Sk, T, . . . ' 71} is a partition of S U T and therefore by
definition of E w e obtain B fl D C 12(S U T). So E i s superadditive.
(ii) =* (iii) Trivial because ECE.
(iii)=*(i) Let E' be a superadditive effectivity function such that E C E'. Since E'
is superadditive, E' is upper cycle free. But then E, too, is upper cycle free because
E C E',                                                                               O
The following lemma shows that for an upper cycle free effectivity function E, E is
the smallest superadditive effectivity function containing E.
Lemma 8.2.3 Let E : Po(N) -+ 2p°(A) be an effectivity function. Then for each
superadditive effectivity function E' with E C E'w e have E C E C E'.
proof Let E' be a superadditive effectivity function such that E C E'. Since E C E'
and E' is superadditive, it follows from Lemma 8.2.2 that E is upper cycle free and
that E is superadditive. Let S E Po(N) and let B E E(S). Then there is a partition
{ Sl,'- , Sk   of S and there are Bi,···,Bk with Br E E(Sr) for all r E {1,...,k}
such that  B = ALi B..  Then by superadditivity of E' and E C E' it follows that
B € E'(S).                                                                             0
8.3    Stability of effectivity functions
Given an effectivity function that describes coalitional power in society and a profile
reflecting the individual preferences of all agents, the problem of interest is how to
find an alternative, or a set of alternatives, which every agent can agree upon. Since
we study situations in which agents behave cooperatively, a rather natural solution
concept is the core of an effectivity function (Moulin and Peleg (1982)). The core
describes whether the situation is stable with respect to coalitional deviations.
Let E : Po(N) -4 21°(A) be an effectivity function and RN f RN a profile. An
alternative a€A i s dominated by a subset B E Po(A) of alternatives via a coalition
S E Po(N) if B C E(S) and b Ps a for all b E B.  The core of E at Riv, Core(E, RN),
consists of all alternatives a€A which are not dominated by any subset of alterna-
tives via any coalition. An effectivity function E is called stable if Core(E, RN) 0 0
for all profiles  RN  €  RN ·
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Stability of effectivity functions is a desirable requirement, since it excludes situations
where every alternative that can be chosen is unstable with respect to coalitional op-
position. Stability of effectivity functions has been studied by several authors.  In
this section we summarize some of the results.
The first general results on stability of effectivity are due to Peleg (1982), who showed
that convex effectivity functions are stable.
Theorem 8.3.1 Let E: Po(N) -4 27'0(A) be a effectivity function.
(i) If E is convex, then E is stable.
(ii) If E is stable and maximal, then E is convex.
We will not give a formal proof of this theorem, but we illustrate the idea of Peleg's
proof of (i). To prove (i), Peleg associated with each effectivity function and a
preference profile an NTU-game (cf. Section 2.4). He proved that if E is convex, then
the associated NTU-game is ordinal convex and hence has a non-empty core. The
proof is concluded by showing that a core element of the NTU-game 'corresponds' to
a core element of the effectivity function. Elementary proofs of (i) not making use of
cooperative game theory have been provided by Ishiishi (1985) and Demange (1987).
Theorem 8.3.1 yields a characterization of the class of stable effectivity functions
which are maximal. A characterization of stable effectivity functions is due to Keiding
(1985) who introduced the notion of acyclicity. As it is very technical, we will not
discuss this result and refer the interested reader to Keiding (1985).
8.4 Special classes of effectivity functions
In this section we discuss three subclasses of effectivity functions, all introduced in
Moulin and Peleg (1982), which play an important role in the literature. Successively,
we discuss effectivity functions corresponding to simple games, additive effectivity
functions, and effectivity functions corresponding to veto functions.
Simple games
Let N be a society and A a finite set of alternatives. A simple game on N is a pair
(N,u) (often denoted simply by v), where u : 2N = {0,1} is a function with u(0) = 0
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and u(N)  =  1. A simple game v is monotonic if for all S, T E Po(N) with S C  T
and v(S) =lit holds that v(T) = 1. Let S be a coalition.  If v(S) = 1, then S is a
winning coalition, and if u(S) = 0, then S is called losing.
A way of associating an effectivity function Ev : Po(N) -+ 270(A) to a monotonic
simple game (N, u) is the following.  For S € Po(N)
Ev(S) :=   Po(A)  if S
is winning
{A}     if is losing.
Winning coalitions have the power to enforce every subset of alternatives, whereas a
losing coalition has no power at all. In Peleg (1984a) this effectivity function is called
the standard efectivity function associated with v.  It is clear that Ev is A-monotonic
and N-monotonic. Furthermore, if v is proper, i.e., v(S) = 1 implies v(N \ S) = 0,
then Ev is superadditive, and if u is strong, i.e., u(S) = 0 implies u(N j S) = 1,
then E" is maximal. Finally, if v is balanced (cf. Section 2.1), then Ev is stable. A
complete characterization of stable effectivity functions associated with a monotonic
simple games is provided by Nakamura (1979).
Additive effectivity functions
Let A €RN and BERA betwo positive probability measures on N and A, respec-
tively. So, 1,>0 for all i E N and E,EN A,  =  1,  and B.  >  0 for all a €  A and
E.€A pa = 1. The vectors A and B give rise to an effectivity function Ex,1, in the
following way. For S E Po(N) and B E Po(A)
B € E,,x(S) if and only if E A, >   E  Ba
1€s a€A\B
Analogous to Example 8.1.3 the interpretation is that S is effective for B if the total
veto power of S exceeds the total veto resistance of A \ B. Using the fact that
 «€A Ba = 1 we see that
B E Ex.t.(S) if and only if E A. + E /1, > 1.
:€S aEB
It is left to the reader to check that Ex., is indeed an effectivity function. An effectivity
function E : Po(N) -0 270(A) is called additive if there exist positive probability
measures A E R  and p E RA such that E = Ex,„. It is clear that these probability
measures need not be uniquely determined.
Additive effectivity functions play a prominent role in the literature on effectivity
functions. One of the reasons is that additive effectivity functions are stable. This is
a consequence of the following theorem by Peleg (1982).
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Theorem 8.4.1 Additive effectivity functions are convex.
An important application of additive effectivity functions is the class of effectivity
functions corresponding to a voting by veto method (see Example 8.1.3). Moulin
(1983) showed that each effectivity function E associated with the voting bym,r,
veto method where m and r are the veto power and veto resistance, is additive.
The converse however, does not hold. Not each additive effectivity function can be
considered as an effectivity function Em., associated with a voting by veto method for
certain m and r. This is due to the fact that additive effectivity functions need not
be maximal (it can be shown that an additive effectivity function Ex,u is maximal if
and only if A(S) + B(B) 0 1 for all S E Po(N) and all B E Po(A)). If maximality is
added then the converse implication does hold as is shown in Moulin (1983).
Storcken (1994) characterizes the class of additive effectivity functions by associating
a simple game with each effectivity function and using Elgot's (1961) characterization
of the class of all weighted simple games. For details on this result the reader is
referred to Storcken   ( 1994).
Veto functions
A veto function (cf. Moulin (1982)) is a function v:2 N -i {0,1,... JAI -1} with
v(0) := 0 and t,(N) := lAI - 1.
Given a veto function v, the efectivity function Ee  corresponding to v is defined by
E (S):= {B E Po(A) 1 1,(S) 2 lA \Bl}
for all S f Po(N).
We leave it to the reader to verify that Ev is an effectivity function. Again, the
interpretation is that a coalition S is effective for a subset of alternatives if S can
veto all alternatives outside B, where the veto power of coalitions is described by
the veto function v (which is a TU-game). Since in this case the veto power of
coalitions need not be additive, it is clear that effectivity functions corresponding to
veto functions need not be additive effectivity functions.
Several properties of E' can be formulated in terms of the veto function v (cf. Abdou
and Keiding (1992)). For example, E' is superadditive if and only if v is superadditive,
i.e., 1,(Sl U .92) 2 p(St) + v(S,) for all St, S2 E Po(N) with Si n .92 = 0. Further, Eg
is maximal if and only if v(S) + v(N \ S) 21Al - 1 for all S € Po(N). The following
proposition shows that, analogous to effectivity functions associated with monotonic
simple games, balancedness of v is a sufficient condition for stability of E:
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Proposition 8.4.2  Let E' be the effectivity function corresponding to the veto func-
tion v : Po(N) -i {0,1,...,  Al - 1}. If v i s balanced, then E is stable.
Prooj. Suppose that z E C(v), i.e., =(N) =  A -1 andz(S) 2 1,(S) for all S E Po(N)
Define positive probability measures A f RN and p € RA by
1,  :=  -17(z, + 1) for all i EN, (8.1)
1Al     n
1p.  ·=  -for allac A. (8.2)
1Al
Let Ex,„ be the additive effectivity function generated by A and p
Claim: EV(S) C EA,„(S) for all S E Po(N).
Proof of the claim: Let S 6 Po(N) and B € Ev(S). Then 1,(S) 2 lA \ 81, and so
ISIv(S) + 1812 lAI > 1Al - -.n
Since z(S) 2 v(S), it follows that
ISI(z(S) + -) + IBI > 1Al.n
Using (8.1) and (8.2) we obtain
A(S) + B(B)> 1.
Hence B € EX,x(S), which proves the claim.
Since Ex,B is stable (by Theorem 8.4.1 and Theorem 8.3.1), it directly follows that
E" is also stable.                                                                          0
Contrary to the class of additive effectivity functions, it is rather easy to characterize
the class of effectivity functions corresponding to veto functions. The effectivity
function E' corresponding to veto function v is neutral and A-monotonic. Conversely,
every neutral and A-monotonic effectivity function E generates a veto function vE
defined by
VE(S):= max {I A\B l l BEE(S)}
for all S € Po(N), such that EVE = E.
Since efrectivity functions associated with monotonic simple games are both neutral
and A-monotonic, it follows that this class is a subclass of the effectivity functions
corresponding to veto functions. Additive effectivity functions however, need not be
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neutral, so this class is not a subclass of the class of effectivity functions corresponding
to veto functions.
In Chapter 9 we introduce another class of effectivity functions, called decomposable
effectivity functions, which incorporates all three classes of efrectivity functions that
we discussed in this section.
8.5 Game forms and effectivity functions
In Section 8.1 we have associated the a- and B-effectivity functions with a game form.
It is interesting to investigate when a given effectivity function can be obtained as the
a- or B-effectivity function associated with a game form. In Section 8.2 we have seen
that for a game form G the effectivity function < is superadditive and A-monotonic.
Moulin (1983) also proved the following converse result.
Theorem 8.5.1 Let E be an effectivity function. Then there exists a game form G
such that E2 = E if and only if E is superadditive and A-monotonic.
In Section 10.4 we provide an alternative proof of this theorem.
Another result by Moulin (1983) is that every maximal and superadditive effectivity
function can be obtained by a tight game form (note that A-monotonicity is not
required since  this is implied by superadditivity and maximality)
Theorem 8.5.2 Let E be an effectivity function. Then there exists a tight game
form G such that E2 - E  = E if and only if E is superadditive and maximal.
In Chapter 10 we associate with an effectivity function a game correspondence, i.e., a
game form with an outcome correspondence instead of an outcome function. Among
others we characterize the class of effectivity functions associated with tight game
correspondences. It turns out that these effectivity functions need not be maxirnal.
In the last part of this section we examine relations between solution concepts of
effectivity functions and game forms (at a certain preference profile). As noticed in
Section 8.1 a game form and a profile give rise to a game in strategic form.  For
these kind of games many solution concepts have been investigated in the literature.
The most prominent one is the concept of Nash equilibrium (Nash (1951)). A Nash
equilibrium is robust against individual deviations of the agents.  As our framework is
of a cooperative nature, we are interested in solution concepts that are robust against
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coordinated deviations of coalitions.  For our purposes an appropriate modification of
the Nash equilibrium concept is the notion of strong Nash equilibrium (cf. Aumann
(1959)).
Let  G  =  (Xl , · · · ,X n, A, T)  be  a  game  form  and  RN  a  profile  on  A. A strategy
vector  N f XN is called a strong Nash equilibrium of G at RN if there do not exist
S E Po(N) and Ts E Xs such that r(Ts, aN\S) PS T(aN).By SNE(G, RN) we denote
the set of all strong Nash equilibria of G at Riv. G is called strongly consistent (cf.
Moulin and Peleg (1982)) if SNE(G, Riv) 0 0 for all RN E RN·
Moulin and Peleg (1982) proved that if G is a game form and RN is a profile, then
each strong Nash equilibrium of G at Riv yields an outcome which belongs to the
core of the a-effectivity function associated with G. Moreover, they showed that a
strongly consistent game form is tight. So if G is a strongly consistent game form,
then EG (= Ef) is stable and maximal. The following converse implication is also
due to Moulin and Peleg (1982).
Theorem 8.5.3 Let E be a stable and maximal effectivity function and let RN be
a profile. Then there exists a strongly consistent game form G such that
(i) E = Ef = Ef and
(ii) Core(E, RN) = :r(SNE(G, Riv))·
In Chapter 10 we show that if we consider game correspondences and associated
effectivity functions, then we can obtain a counterpart of Theorem 8.5.3 for a larger




In Section 8.4 we discussed three special classes of effectivity functions which play
a prominent role in the literature on effectivity functions. We have seen that ef-
fectivity functions associated with monotonic simple games form a subclass of the
class of effectivity functions corresponding to veto functions and that there is no
inclusion relation between the class of additive effectivity functions and the class of
effectivity functions corresponding to veto functions. In this chapter, which is based
on Otten, Borm, Storcken and Tijs (1995), we introduce another class of effectiv-
ity functions, called decomposable effectivity functions, which comprises the classes
rnentioned above.
In Section 9.1 we introduce decomposable effectivity functions as a natural extension
of additive effectivity functions where the veto power of coalitions and the veto resis-
tance of subsets of alternatives can be described by TU-games being not necessarily
additive.
In Section 9.2 we examine relations between the properties of decomposable effectiv-
ity functions and the properties of TU-games that generate these effectivity functions.
Among others, it is shown that a decomposable effectivity function is monotonic if
and only if it can be generated by monotonic TU-games and, that a decomposable
effectivity function is stable whenever it can be generated by balanced TU-games.
Sections 9.3 and 9.4 provide two characterizations of the class of decomposable effec-
tivity functions. First, it is shown that an effectivity function is decomposable if and
only if it satisfies the revealed power property. This property can be seen as a modi-
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fication of the more familiar WARP condition (=weak axiom of revealed preference)
in social choice theory. Next, we show that an effectivity function is decomposable
if and only if it is possible to represent the effectivity function by a {0, 1}-matrix in
echelon form.
9.1 Decomposable effectivity functions
Additive effectivity functions correspond to situations where the veto power is dis-
tributed  in an additive way among the coalitions,   i.e., the total veto power  of  the
union of two disjoint coalitions equals the sum of the veto powers of the separate
coalitions. Also the veto resistance of subsets of alternatives is distributed in an ad-
ditive way. The reason that effectivity functions corresponding to veto functions need
not be additive is that the veto power of coalitions is described by a veto function
which need not be additive.
In this section we introduce a generalization of additive effectivity functions, which
also incorporates effectivity functions corresponding to veto functions.
Based on the observation that additive effectivity functions can be generated by pos-
itive probability measures on N and A, which can be regarded as additive TU-games
on N and A, we introduce the following generalization of additive effectivity func-
tions.
Let  u  :  2N  -4  10,11 and w  :  2't  -0  [0,11 be TU-games on  N  and A, which satisfy
v(N) = 1 and v(S) > 0 for all S € Po(N), w(A) = 1 and w(B) > 0 for all B € Po(A).
The games v and w generate an effectivity function  E(v, w) : Po(N) -+ 2r°(A) as fol-
lows. For S € Po(N) and B € Po(A)
B € E(v,w)(S)  if and only if v(S) + w(B)  >  1.
An effectivity function E : Po(N) -0 21°(A) is called decomposable if there exist TU-
games u and w as above such that E = E(v, w).  For such TU-games u and w, E(v, w)
is called the efectivity function generated by v and to.
Here the TU-game v represents the veto power of coalitions and w represents the
veto resistance of subsets of alternatives.
It readily follows from this definition that additive effectivity functions are decom-
posable. The following proposition illustrates that also effectivity functions corre-
sponding to veto functions are decomposable.
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Proposition 9.1.1 Let E : Po(N) -0 2 '0(A) be an effectivity function. The following
statements are equivalent
(i) E is decomposable
(ii) there exist v : Po(N) -+ [0,11 and w : Po(A) -1 [0,1] such that for all S € Po(N)
and all B € Po(A) it holds that
B € E(S) if and only if v(S) + w(B) > 1
(iii) there exist vi : Po(N)  -+  [0,11  and  wl  :  Po(A)  -+  [0,1}  such  that  for  all
S E Po(N) and all B E Po(A) it holds that
B E E(S) if and only if vt(S) + wl(B) 2 1
(iv) there exist u2 : Po(N) -+ [0,11 and w2   2'1 -+ 10,1] with u,2(0) := 0 such that
for all S € Po(N) and all B E Po(A) it holds that
B C E(S) if and only if t,2(S) 2 102(A \ B)
(v) there exist u3 . Po(N) -4 [0,11 and w3 . 2'4 -4 [O, 1] with w:1(0) := 0 such that
for all S € Po(N) and all B E Po(A) it holds that
B € E(S) if and only if v3(S) > U'3(A \ B)
As the proof of this proposition is quite technical but straightforward, it is omitted.
From Proposition 9.1.1 (iv) we can derive the following corollary.
Corollary 9.1.2 Effectivity functions associated with monotonic simple games  and
effectivity functions corresponding to veto functions are decomposable.
9.2  Properties of TU-games and decomposable
effectivity functions
In this section we examine relations between properties of the TU-games v and w
and the effectivity function E(u, w).
The following proposition shows that if u and  w are monotonic,  then  E(v,w)  is  N-
and A-monotonic. The proof is straightforward.
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Proposition 9.2.1 Let E = E(v , w)  : Po(N) . 2Po(A) be the decomposable effec-
tivity function generated by the TU-games v and w. Then
(i) if v is monotonic, then E is N-monotonic
(ii) if w is monotonic, then E is A-monotonic.
With respect to the converse of this proposition it can be seen that if E is N-
monotonic (A-monotonic) and decomposable, then there exist TU-games u and w
with u (w) monotonic such that E = E(u, w). (The TU-games u and w constructed
in the proof of Theorem 9.3.4 are monotonic if E is monotonic.)
Proposition 9.2.2 shows that a decomposable effectivity function is convex if it can
be generated by convex TU-games.
Proposition 9.2.2  Let E = E(v, w) : Po(N) 0 270(A) be the decomposable effec-
tivity function generated by the TU-games v and w. If v and w are convex, then E
is convex.
proof Let u be convex, i.e., for all S, T € Po(N):  v(S) tv(T) 5 v(S U T) t v(S n T)
(cf. Section 2.1), and let w be convex. Let S, T E Po(N), B E E(S) and D E E(T).
We have to show that E i s convex, i.e.,BrIDE E(S U T)o r B U D e E(S n T).
Since u(S) + w(B) > 1 and v(T) + w(D) > 1, we have
u(S) + v(T) + w(B) + w(D) > 2.
Using convexity of u and w now yields
u(S U T) + w(B n D) + u(S n T) + w(B u D) > 2.
Hence, v(SUT) + w(BnD)  >  1  or  v(SnT) + w(BUD)  >1. So , B n D € E(SuT)
or BUDEE(SnT).                     0
The next example shows that E(u, w) is not necessarily superadditive, if both v and
w are superadditive.
Example 9.2.3  Let  N  =  {1,2,3}  and  A  =  {a, b, c}. Define u  :  2N  -+  [0,1]  by
v(0) = 0, v({1}) = u({2}) = u({3}) = 1/3, v({1,2}) = v({1,3}) = u({2,3}) = 2/3,
and v(N) = 1, and define w : 2/1 -+ [0,11  by w(0)  =  0,  w({a})  =  w({b})  =
w({c}) = 1/4, w({a, b}) = w({a, c}) = w({b, c}) = 3/4, and w(A) = 1. Then for
all  S, T  €  Po(N)  with  S n T=  0  we have v(S) + u(T)  S  v(S U T),  and for  all
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B, D f Po(A) with Bn D - 0 we have w(B) + w(D) S w(BUD). So v and w are
superadditive. Furthermore, {a, b}  C  E(u, w)({1})  and {a, c}  C  E(u, w)({2}),  but
{a} / E(v, w)({1,2}). Hence, E(u, w) is not superadditive.
It  can be shown  that  E(u, w) is superadditive whenever  v is superadditive and w
convex.
Theorem 9.2.4 states that if both v and w have a non-empty core, then also the core
of E(u, w) is non-empty for every preference profile.
Theorem 9.2.4  Let E = E(u, w) : Po(N) -+ 2 '0(A) be the decomposable effectivity
function generated by the TU-games v and w. If v and w are balanced, then E is
stable.
Proof  Let z E C(u) and y E C(w).  Then Zi€N xi = 1 and E.€A Y. - 1. Further-
more, x, 2 v({i}) >0 for all i€N and y  2 w({a}) >0 for all a€A. So, the vectors
z and y determine an additive effectivity function E=,w. Moreover, E(S) C E=,g(S)
for  all  S  E Po(N), since v(S) + w(B)  >  1  implies  E,es zi + E.€B 110  >  1.   Now
stability of E follows directly from the fact that E.,v is stable.                        0
It is an open problem whether each stable decomposable effectivity function can be
generated by TU-games v and w both having an non-empty core.
9.3   A characterization of decomposable effectiv-
ity functions
Moulin and Peleg (1982) showed that each neutral and A-monotonic effectivity func-
tion corresponds to a veto function and conversely. A characterization of additive
effectivity functions is provided by Storcken (1994) using a property that strengthens
convexity. In this section we will provide a characterization of the class of decompos-
able effectivity functions using a modification of the 'weak axiom of revealed prefer-
ence' in social choice theory. This property is called the revealed power property.
Let E : Po(N) --+ 29°(A) be an effectivity function. Suppose that for all coalitions
S, T E Po(N) and all subsets B E Po(A) of alternatives with B E E(S) and B 0 E(T)
we have, if D E Po(A) and D E E(T), then D E E(S). In this case we say that E
satisfies the revealed power property.
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The interpretation of this property is the following: If an effectivity function satis-
fies the revealed power property and a coalition S is effective for a certain subset of
alternatives for which coalition T is not effective, then this 'reveals' that S has more
power than T, i.e., S is effective for every subset that T is effective for.
It is clear that an effectivity function E satisfies the revealed power property if and
only if for all S, T f Po(N) we have
E(S) C E(T) or E(T) C E(S).
The following proposition shows that the revealed power property is a necessary
condition to characterize decomposable effectivity functions.
Proposition 9.3.1 Let E : Po(N) -+ 21'0(A) be an effectivity function.  If E is
decomposable, then E satisfies the revealed power property.
proof Let E be decomposable. Then there exist TU-games v and w such that
E = E(u, w). Let S, T C Po(N) with E(S) ¢ E(T). We show that E(T) c E(S).
Since there is a B E Po(A) with v(S) tw(B) >1 and v(T) + w(B) f l,i t follows hat
v(S) > u(T). Now let D E E(T). Then v(T)+w(D) > 1 and hence v(S) + w(D) > 1,
which implies that D € E(S). So we may conclude that E(T) C E(S).           0
It turns out that the revealed power property is also a suffcient condition to char-
acterize decomposability. In order to prove this, we first introduce some additional
notation.
Let E : Po(N) -+ 2p°(A) be an effectivity function.  The dual of E (Peleg (1984b)),
Ed : po(A) -0 270(N) is defined as follows. For B € Po(A)
Ed(B) = {S E Po(N) I B E ECS)}.
(Note that Ed can be seen as an effectivity function for which the roles of N and A
are interchanged.) We can also restate the revealed power property in terms of the
dual of an effectivity function.
Lemma 9.3.2 Let E : Po(N) -+ 2p°(A) be an effectivity function. Then E satisfies
the revealed power property if and only if for all B, D E Po(A) we have Ed(B) c
Ed(D) or Ed(D) c Ed(B).
Proof. we only prove the only if part. The other implication is similar.
Let  E satisfy the revealed power property.  Let  B, D E Po(A) with Ed(B) 0 Ed(D).
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Then there exists a coalition S E Po(N) with B E E(S) and D % E(S). Now let
T E Ed(D). Then D E E(T), and since E satisfies the revealed power property,
we have E(S) C E(T). Since B E E(S), it follows that B E E(T), which implies
T e Ed(B). Hence, Ed(D) C Ed(B).                                                   0
In the following we use the equivalence relations -N on Po(N) and -A on Po(A),
corresponding to an arbitrary effectivity function E, defined by
S  -N  T     *     E(S)  = E<T) for all S, T € Po(N), (9.1)
B -AD   ** Ed(B)=Ed(D) for all B,DE Po(A). (9.2)
If E satisfies the revealed power property, it is possible to order the equivalence classes
[Sll' [s2l' ' ' . , [skl induced by -N in a decreasing way, i.e.,
S c [S,1, T E [Sj],i<j=* ECS)  ECT). (9.3)
(Note that N E [St]).
By Lemma 9.3.2 it follows that if E satisfies the revealed power property, it is possible
to order the equivalence classes [Bl , [821, · · · , [BE] induced by -A such that
B E [B,1, D E [B,],r<s* Ed(B)  Ed(D). (9.4)
(Note that A E [Bl})·
Lemma 9.3.3 Let E: Po(N) -4 2F°(A) be an effectivity function which satisfies the
revealed power property. Let -N and -A be the equivalence relations as defined
in (9.1) and (9.2).  Let the corresponding equivalence classes [S11, [s2l'     ,[sk} and
[Bl], [B,1, · · · , [B,] be ordered as in (9.3) and (9.4), respectively. Then we have
(i)  for all i€ {1, . . . ,k} there exists an s€ {l, . . . ,1} such that for all S E [S,1
ECS) = U [Br]
r=1
(ii)  for all r E{1, . . . ,l} there exists an j€ {l, . . . ,k} such that for all B E [B,]
J
Ed(B) = U [S,l
t=1
(iii) k=l
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(iv)  foralliC{ 1, . . . ,k} and S E [S,}
k+1-i
ECS) =  U [B,1.
r=1
Proof (i) Let i E {1,...,k} and S E [S,]. Itsuffices toshow that fort E {1,...,1},
for B E [Bt] with B E E(S), and for D E [Br] with 1 5 r f t,w e have D E E(S).
This follows immediately from the fact that E (B) C Ed(D).
(ii) Similar to (i).
(iii) From (i) we derive that t k k and from (ii) it follows that k 2 1 Hence,k=l.
(iv) Follows immediately from (i) and (iii).                                            0
Now we are able to prove
Theorem 9.3.4 Let E : Po(N) -+ 21°(A) be an effectivity function. Then E is
decomposable if and only if it satisfies the revealed power property.
proof The only if part follows from Proposition 9.3.1. To prove the if part, let E
satisfy the revealed power property.   Let  [St], IS,], . . . , [Sk]  be the equivalence classes
corresponding to .vN ordered as in (9.3), and let [Bl , [82],..., [BE] be the equivalence
classes corresponding to -A ordered as in (9.4). By Lemma 9.3.3 we have k=l and
for all S c [S,1 it holds that
ktlv
ECS) =  U [Br].
T=1
Now define TU-games v : 2N -0 10,11 and w : 2'1 -0 10,1] as follows.
u(0):= 0, w(0):= 0, and
u(S):= (k +1- i)/k for all S € IS,] and i € { 1,..., k},
w(B) := (k +1- r)lk for all B E [Brland r€ {1,...,k}.
Let S € IS,] and B E [B, 1. Then
u(S) + w(B)>1   **   (k +1- i) /k t(k t l- r)/k > 1
4  k+2-z>r
**  r f k t l-i
**B e E(S).
Hence E = E(v, w), which completes the proof.                                                            0
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9.4  Decomposability and echelon matrices
In Section 8.2 we have seen that an effectivity function E can be represented by a
{0,1}-matrix IE of size 2' - 1 by 2'Al - 1, where for S € Po(N) and B E Po(A),
IE(S, B) = 1 if and only if B E E(S).
In this section we provide a characterization of decomposable effectivity functions
in terms of matrices.  We show that an effectivity function is decomposable if and
only if it can be represented by a {0, 1}-matrix in echelon form in which the l's are
'separated' from the 0's. (see Figure 9.1)
/                                          \
1        __3
0
\                                             /
Figure 9.1.
Theorem 9.4.1 Let E : Po(N) -1 2p°(A) be an effectivity function and IE a matrix
that represents E. Then E is decomposable if and only if it is possible to rearrange
the rows and columns of IE in such a way that the rearranged matrix has an echelon
form as in Figure 9.1.
proof Let E be decomposable. By Theorem 9.3.4, E satisfies the revealed power
property. Define a relation Q C Po(N) x Po(N) by T Q S i f and only if E(T) D E(S)
for all S, T E Po(N).  Then Q is transitive and since E satisfies the revealed power
property, Q is also complete. Rearrange the rows of IE in a decreasing order according
to Q, say, in the order Sl, · · · , S2.-1·
Consider the column corresponding to a subset B e Po(A) of alternatives. Define
r(B) := max{r C {1,...,2n-1} I B E E(Sr)} and taker S r(B). Since, B €
E(S,(B)) and E(Sr(B)) c E(Sr), we have IE(S.,B) = 1, from which it immediately
follows that every column of the rearranged matrix has the form (1, . . . ,1,0, . . . ,0)T
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(xtr denotes the transposed of a vector z).  Then obviously, by reordering the columns
of this matrix, we can obtain a matrix in an echelon form.
To prove the if part, suppose it is possible to rearrange the rows and columns of IE in
such a way that we obtain a matrix in the form of Figure 9.1. Suppose the columns
of this matrix are arranged  in the order  Bl, · · · , B2IAI-1.    Let  S E Po(N). Define
m(S)  := max{r € {1,..., 21'41-1}1 IE(S, Br) = 1}. Since the row corresponding to S
has the form (1,...,1,0,...,0), it follows that E(S) = {Bl,•••, B™(s) }· From this
observation it immediately follows  that  for S, T € Po(jV) we have E(S) C E(T) if
and only if m(S) 5 m(T). Hence, E satisfies the revealed power property and hence,
by Theorem 9.3.4, E is decomposable.                                                  0
Chapter 10
Effectivity functions and claim
game correspondences
In Section 8.5 we have studied relations between non-cooperative game forms and
effectivity functions which describe coalitional power in a society. In fact, this line of
research of establishing connections between cooperative and non-cooperative types
of games was initiated by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1994), who showed that
it is possible to construct a superadditive TU-game from a game in strategic form,
and conversely. Later, further relationships between cooperative and non-cooperative
games were established (see for example Nash (1950) and Aumann (1961,1967)).
Borm and Tijs (1992) introduced a 'claim' game in strategic form corresponding to
an NTU-game. In the claim game, strategies of players can be interpreted as claims
on coalitions and payoffs. Among others things Borm and Tijs showed that if the
NTU-game is superadditive, strong core elements of the NTU-game correspond to
strong Nash equilibria of the associated claim game.
In this chapter, which is based on Otten, Borm, Storcken and Tijs (1995), we use
techniques similar to those of Borm and Tijs (1992) to examine relations between
effectivity functions and game correspondences. Game correspondences were intro-
duced in Peleg (1984b) as an extension of game forms. Whereas in a game form
the outcome function assigns to every strategy vector one alternative, in a game
correspondence the outcome function assigns to each strategy vector a subset of al-
ternatives.
In Section 10.1 the formal definition of a game correspondence is given, and, given
a preference profile, we define strong Nash equilibria of game correspondences. Fur-
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thermore, we define the a- and #-effectivity functions associated with a game corre-
spondence as in Peleg (1984b).
In Section 10.2 we extend the definition of the core (at a given preference profile) to
be a collection of subsets of alternatives rather than only one subset. We show that
this extended core, which we call the setcore of an effectivity function, is never empty
if the effectivity function is upper cycle free.
Section 10.3 is the central part of this chapter. We construct the claim game corre-
spondence G(E) associated with an upper cycle free effectivity function E and show
that this game correspondence is tight. Furthermore, we present a result similar to
Theorem 8.5.2, which illustrates that the class of effectivity functions associated with
tight game correspondences is strictly larger than the class of effectivity functions that
can be derived from a tight game form. Moreover, Section 10.3 shows that the setcore
of a superadditive effectivity function (at a certain profile) exactly corresponds to the
outcomes of strong Nash equilibria of the associated claim game correspondence (at
that profile). A combination of these results leads to an analogue of Theorem 8.5.3
for a larger class of effectivity functions.
Finally, Section 10.4 discusses a process for deriving a game form from a claim game
correspondence in such a way that the a-effectivity function does not change. As a
result of this process we obtain an alternative proof of Theorem 8.5.1.
10.1 Game correspondences
In this section we define game correspondences and their associated a- and B-effectivity
functions. Moreover, we extend preferences over a finite set of alternatives A to pref-
erences over Po(A) in order to define strong Nash equilibria for game correspondences.
A game correspondence (Peleg (1984b)) is an (n+2)-tuple G = (Xi ;'-,X„,A,,r)
where X, is a non-empty set of strategies for each ie N, A is a finite set of alterna-
tives, and T :X N- + Po(A) is non-imposed, i.e., for each a€A there is a strategy
aN E XN such that x(aN) = {a}.
The interpretation of G is similar to the interpretation of a game form: Each agent
i € N chooses a strategy 9, E Xi, and then the outcome correspondence ;r determines
a non-empty subset T (aN) of alternatives.
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Peleg (1984b) extended the definition of the a- and 8-effectivity function associated
with a game form to game correspondences.
Let   G=   (Xi,...,Xn, A, T)  bea game correspondence.    The  a-   and  B-e#ectivity
functions  EG  and £1 associated  with  G are defined as follows.  Let  S  E  Po(N).   Then
EIG(S) := {B E Po(A) 1 Bos E Xs VTN\S E XN\S    7,-Cas, TNls) C B}
EBG(S) := {B E Po(A) 1 VTN s E XN\S Bas E Xs :  71-(as, TN,s) C B}.
The reader can easily verify that Ef and E are indeed effectivity functions (since ,r
is non-imposed) and that Ef(S) C E (S) for all S € Po(N) and all game correspon-
dences G. A game correspondence G is called tight if E  = EBG Furthermore, it is
easy to see that for every game correspondence G, E5 and E  are both N-monotonic
and A-monotonic and that E is superadditive. However contrary to game forms,
Ef need not be maximal.
Since the outcome function of a game correspondence is a function to Po(A) instead
of a function to A, we first must extend preference profiles on A to preference profiles
on Po(A) in order to be able to define the concept of a strong Nash equilibrium in
the context of game correspondences.
Let RE R bea preference relation on A and let P be the asymmetric part of R.
We define the extension P of P to Po(A) as follows.  For all B, B' c Po(A) we have
B' P Bif and only if B \ B' 36 0 and
(i) for all b' €B' Band allb€Bwehave b'P b,
(ii) for all b' E B' and allbEB\B'wehave b'P b.
We write Ps instead of (A),es
It readily follows that, if we restrict P to the singletons of Po(A), then this restriction
can be identified with P by identifying a singleton with its unique element.  Note that
P is also transitive. According to this definition B' C Po(A) is (strictly) preferred to
B E Po(A) if, in going from B to B', the elements being added to B (i.e., B' \ B)
are better than the ones already present, and the elements of B being dropped (i.e.,
B j B') are worse than the elements of B which are kept (i.e., B n B').
Note that B' P B implies that B' is not a set that strictly contains B.
Now we are able to give the definition of a strong Nash equilibrium for game corre-
spondences.   Let  G=  (Xl, ···,Xn, A, r)  be  a game correspondence and  RN  E  RN  a
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profile. A strategy vector aN  E XN is called a strong Nash equilibrium of G  at RN if
there do not exist S E Po(N) and Ts € Xs such that :r(aN\S, Ts)  S s(77)· A game
correspondence G is called strongly consistent if the set of strong Nash equilibria of
G at  RN, denoted by S N E<G, RNj is non-empty  for  all  RN  E  RN ·
10.2 The setcore of an effectivity function
In Section 8.3 we defined the core of an effectivity function at a profile as that subset
of the set of alternatives which consists of all undominated elements with respect
to the profile. In order to obtain relations between strong Nash equilibria of game
correspondences and 'core elements' of effectivity functions, we modify the notion of
the core in the sense that it will assign to an effectivity function and a preference
profile a collection of subsets of A rather than one subset. This modification of the
core is called the setcore.
Let E: Po(N) -4 2p°(A) be an effectivity function and let RN be a profile on A. Let
B E Po(A) be a subset of alternatives. B is an element of the setcore  of  E  at  RN,
Setcore(E, RN), if there do not exist S E Po(N) and B' c E(S) such that B' Ps B.
The setcore of E at RN definitionally extends the core to subsets of alternatives.  One
easily checks that a f Core(E, RN) if and only if {a} E Setcore(E, R ). Moreover,
it holds that, if B C Core(E,RN),B 00, then B E Setcore(E, RN)·
For, suppose B / Setcore(E, RN). Then there exist a coalition S E Po(N) and a
B' e Ets) such that B' A B. Hence, B\B'0 0. Take a€B   B'. Since B' Ps B,
we obtain by definition of Ps that b' Ps a for all b' € B'. Hence a 0 Core(E, RN),
which leads to a contradiction.
From the previous remark it follows that the setcore of an effectivity function (at a
profile) is non-empty, whenever the core of the effectivity function (at this profile)
is non-empty. However, the next example shows that if the core of an effectivity
function at a profile is empty, then the setcore is not necessarily empty.
Example 10.2.1 Let N = {1,2,3} and A = {a, b, c}. Define E : Po(N) -+ 21°(A) as
follows. For S E Po(N)
ECS) :=   {A}    if 'SI = 1Po(A)  if ISI > .
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E is the effectivity function associated with the simple game in which any majority
is winning (cf. Section 8.4).
Define the preference profile  RN  =  (Rl, R2, R3)  on  A  by
R l=a b c,
R 2=b c a,
R3=cab.
Here there are no indifferences and the preferences of the players are denoted in
decreasing order, so player 1 likes a the most, then b, and then c, and so on.
One easily checks that Core(E, RN) = 0. However, the setcore of E at RN is non-
empty: Setcore(E, RN) = {A}, which seems a rather natural solution.
Now we formulate the main theorem of this section, which yields an existence theorem
of the setcore on the class of upper cycle free effectivity functions.
Theorem 10.2.2 Let E : Po(N) --+ 290(A) be an upper cycle free effectivity function,
and let RN f RN be a profile on A. Then Setcore(E, RN) 0 0
proof The proof is by  induction on  IAI.
Clearly, if  A j - 1, then Setcore(E, RN) 5£ 0·
Let  A1> 1, and assume that Setcor€(E', Rk,) 96 0 for all upper cycle free effectivity
functions E' : Po(N) -+ 210(A') with IA'I < lAI and all profiles Rk, on A'.
Suppose Setcore(E, RN) = 0. Then, in particular, there exist a coalition T E Po(N)
and an A' E ECT) such that A' PT A. By definition of PT it follows that IA'I < 1Al
and that A' & (A \ A')
Define E' : Po(N) -+ 2p°(A') by E'(N) := Po(A') and for S € Po(N) \ {N} and
B E Po(A')
B  E  E'(S)     4*     B  =  A' or there exist C C A\A' and D C A',D00, such that
B U C E E(S) and (B U C)P s D.
Clearly, E' is an effectivity function. Furthermore, let R'  (PA') be the restriction of
RN (PN) to A'. We will show that
(I) Setcore(E', R ,) = 0
(II) E' is upper cycle free.
(I) Let B' f Po(A'). Since Setcore(E, RN) = 0, there are S E Po(N) and B E E(S)
such that B Ps B'. Let X := B n A'.
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Claim: X E E'(S) and X P; B'.
From the claim it immediately follows that B' fl Setcor€(EI, R )
Hence, Setcore(E', RAT) = 0.
Proof of the claim: First we show that X 9 6 0. Suppose X=0. Then B C A\A'
and therefore, B' n B=0. Since A' 6 (A \ A'), it follows that S n T=0. Since
A' n B=0, this leads to a contradiction with upper cycle freeness of E. Hence,
X40.
Since X U(8\ A') =B E E(S) and B P S B', it follows that X€ E'(S)
Using the fact that B P S B' and B' n B C X C B,i t follows from the definition of
P; that X P; B:
(II) Let Sl,···,Sk E PO(N) with S. n St = 0 for all r, t € {l,..., k}, r 0 1, and let
Bi'...'Bk E PO(A') be such that Br € E'(S,) for all r e {1,..., k}. It suffices to
prove that n:=i Br 0 0
Suppose that Ali B' = 0. We assume, without loss of generality, that B, 0 A' for
all  r.    From the definition  of  E' it follows that there  are  C l, · · · ,C k  C  A \ A' and
Di,...,Dk C A' such that B, U C. E E(Sr) and (B. U Cr) Ps. Dr for all r.  Since
E is upper cycle free, it follows that Af=1(Br U Cr) = flf=1 C. 0 0. Let b E Af-1 Cr
Since b % A' and (Br U (r) PS, D, for all r, it follows that {b} Ps D. for all r. As
A' A (A \ A'), we have T n S, = 0 for all r.
Consider T,Si,...,Skand A' E ECT),Bl U ClEE(Si), · · · ,B k U C k€E(S k) . Since
A:=,(B. U C.) n A' = 0, it follows that E is not upper cycle free. This leads to a
contradiction and hence E' is upper cycle free.
Statements (I) and (II) are in contradiction with the induction hypothesis.
So, Setcore(E, RN) 0 0.                                                                  0
The next example illustrates that upper cycle freeness is not a necessary property to
guarantee non-emptiness of the setcore at every profile.
Example 10.2.3 Let N = {1,2,3} and A = {ao,...,a5}. Let Bl = {ao, al,a3},
B2  - {al, a2, a4}, '83 = {a3, a4, a5 .
Define the effectivity function E by
E({i}) = {B„ A}   i=1,2,3
E(S) = {A} if ISI = 2
E(N) = Po(A).
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Clearly, E is not upper cycle free.
We leave it to the reader to verify that Setcore(E, RN) 0 0 for all profiles RN.
10.3  Claim game correspondences
This section shows how for an upper cycle free effectivity function E, one can con-
struct a game correspondence G(E) such that G(E) is tight and E c E2(E). The
game correspondence G(E) is called the claim game correspondence associated with
E. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on E such that E = E (E). Fi-
nally, this section establishes relationships between the setcore of E at a preference
profile RN and the set of strong Nash equilibria of the claim game correspondence
G(E)  at  RN·
Let E: Po(N) -0 27°(A) be an upper cycle free effectivity function. The claim game
correspondence G(E)  associated with E i s given by G(E) - (Xl, ···,X„, A, 71·), where
for each E E N
Xi := {(S, B) C Po(N) x Po(A) l i E S,B e E(S)},
and for 03 - (S„ B,),EN E XN, 71'((rN) is defined by
f A{B E &(A) I B E F((IN)}  if F(aN) 0 0
11·(aN) = <
  A                                if F(aN) = 0.
Here F : XN -' Po(A) is defined as follows. For oN E XN
F(oN) := {B € Po(A) 1 3 S E Po(N) :B E E(S) and Vi E S, ai = (S, B)}.
Note that r(aN) 0 0 for all aN E XN because E is upper cycle free.
In the claim game correspondence G(E) the strategy (S„ B,) of player f E N can be
interpreted as a claim in the following way. Player i wants to form coalition S, he
belongs to and he wants the final outcome to be in a subset B, of alternatives for
which S, is effective. According to the outcome function ,r, the final outcome will
certainly be in B, if all the players in S, have exactly the same claims. The idea
behind this definition is similar to the construction of Borm and Tijs (1992).
Example 10.3.1 Let N = {1,2,3,4} and A = {ao, al,a2,a3,a4, as,a6 ·
Define E: Po(N) -4 27°(A) by
E({1}) = { {ao, a4 ,  {al,a2,a4i, A}, E({1,2}) = { {al,a2,as,a6},  A},
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E({2,3}) = { {ao,al,a2, as} , A}, E({3,4}) = { {al,a3,ad, aGM A},
E(N) = Po(A), and E(S) = {A} else.
Then E is upper cycle free, so G(E)  = (X i, · · · , X„, A, r) is well-defined.
Note that E is not superadditive. Define the strategy aN E XN by al - ({1}, {ao, a#}),
02 -03 - ({2,3},{ao,al,a2,a5}), and 04 - ({3,4},{al,a3, a4,a6}).
Then FUN)={ {ao,(14}, {ao,at,a2, a5}} and therefore,
lr(ON) = {ao,a4} n {ao, al,a2,as} = {ao}.
Tightness of claim game correspondences associated with upper cycle free effectivity
functions follows from Proposition 10.3.2.
Proposition 10.3.2 Let the effectivity function E: Po(N) -1 2P°(A) be upper cycle
free. Then
E C  EaGCE)  =  Ef(E)
Proof  Let S € Po(N) and B E E(S) Define crs E Xs by a, := (S, B) for all i E S.
Then for all TN\S E XN\S, we have B E F(as, TN\s)·  Hence, gr(os, 7-Ms) C B for all
TN\S E XN\S· So, B C Ef(E)(S).
To prove tightness of G(E) it suffices to show that EBGCE)(S) C EIGCE)(S) for all
S E Po(N).  Let S E Po(N) and B € E;CE)(S). Define 7-N,s E XN\S by 9,· := ({i}, A)
for all i E N\S. Since B€ E;(E)(S), there is a a s<X s such that X(as, TN\S) C B.
Hence, A{D E Po(A) I D€ F(as, WN\S)} c B. Because (F(as, fN\S) \ {A})  C
Flas, TN\s) for all TN\s E XN\S, we obtain rl{D e Po(A) I D E F(crs, TN\S) }  c   B
for all TN\S E XN\S· Hence, B E le(E)(S).                                                             O
The next proposition illustrates the importance of the condition of upper cycle free-
ness.
Proposition 10.3.3 Let E : Po(N) -+ 210(A) be an effectivity function. There exists
a game correspondence G such that E c EaG if and only if E is upper cycle free.
proof· (=*) Since Ef is superadditive this follows immediately from Lemma 8.2.2.
(*) This follows immediately from Proposition 10.3.2.                             0
Theorem 10.3.6 below characterizes the properties an effectivity function E must
satisfy for coincidence  of  E  and  EfCE).   For  this  we  need the monotonicity result  of
Lemma 10.3.4.
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Lemma  10.3.4  Let E and E' be upper cycle free effectivity functions and let G(E) =
(Xl,.''' X , A, ,r) and G(E') = (X£,...,Xi, A, r') be the associated claim game
correspondences. If E C E' then Ef(E) C Ef(E')
Proof Let B E Ef(E)(S) for some S E Po(N).  If B = A, then B E EGCE')(S).
Suppose B 4 A There is a strategy as = (Si, Bikes E Xs such that T((TS,TN\S) c B
for all TN\s E XN\S· Take rN\S E XN\S such that T, = ({i},A) for all i E XN\S·
Let So := {i E S 1 33  € S.[Sj 0  S, or B, 16 8,1}. Since ir(as, TN\S)  C B 96 A, we
have So 0 S and there is a partition {ST,...,ST} of S   So and B; E E(ST) for
all r E {1,...,k} such that (S„B,) = (S;,Bi) for all i E S; and all r E {1,...,k}
and fti B;  C B. Since as E X;, and B; E  F(os, 71\s) for r G  {1, . . . ,k}  and all
TAr\S E ..rl, S' we obtain T'((Ts, 76ils) C B for all Thjs E X5v,s·  So B € EQGCE')(S). O
In Section 8.2 we defined the superadditive cover E of an effectivity function E.
The following proposition states that A-monotonicity is a sufficient condition for
coincidence of E and EosCE).
Proposition 10.3.5 Let E : Po(N) -0 290(A) be an upper cycle free effectivity
function. Then
(i) Ef(E) = E:(E) = E:(In = Ef(El
(ii) E = Ef(E) if and only if E is A-monotonic
proof (i) Because of Proposition  10.3.2 it suffices to prove that  EIGCE)  =  EQGCE)
(C) This follows by Lemma 10.3.4.
(D) Let G(E) := (Xi, ···, n, A, *) and G(E) := (Xi, ···,Xn, A,1).
Let S f Po(N) and B E EGCE)(S). If B = A, then B E Ef(E)(S). Suppose B # A
Then  there is a as  E  Xs  such  that Y(as,TN\s)  C  B for all TN\S  E  XN\S·   Take
TN\s e XN\S such that 7, = ({i},A) for all i E N\S.  As in the proof of Lernma
10.3.4,  since  Y(as, ¥N\S)   c  B  one  can find disjoint subcoalitions  S1,··· , Sk  of S
and Br  E E(S,) for all r E  {1, . . . ,k} such that 9,  =  (S„B ) for all i E  S, and
r € {1,..., k}, and fl=i B, C B.  For all r E {1,-..,k}, by definition of E, there
are partitions {Sri, . . . , Srk.   of S, and there are Br, E E(Sr,) for all s E {1....,k,}
such that Br = Alt B.
Define as E X s b y oi:= (Sr„ Br,) for all i E S„,s€{1,...,k,},andr E{1,...,k}
Then B„ E Ftgs, TN\S) for all s E {1,...,kr}, r G {1,...,k}, and TN\S € XN\S
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Since B D flf-1 Br = fl:=1 All Br, we obtain lr(as, TNjs) C B for all TN,s E XN\S·
Hence, B € E (E)(S)
(ii) (*) Suppose E is A-monotonic. By Proposition 10.3.2 it is sufficient to prove
that  E  D Ef(E). Therefore,  let  S E Po(N) and B € EfCE)(S).  If B = A, then
B E E(S). Suppose B 0 A. Then there exists a as E Xs such that K(as, TN\s) C  B
for all TN\S E XN\S· Take TN\s E XN\S such that T, = ({i},A) for all E E N\S
Since A.(as, iN\S)  C B,  one can find disjoint subsets Si, · · · ,S k o f S and  B.  C E(S.)
for all r E {1, . . ., k} such that Yi'(as,-iN\S) = f'lo=1 Br. Since E is superadditive, we
obtain A:=1 Br E E(Ut-1 S.) Since E is superadditive and hence N-monotonic, this
implies Al,18, E ECS). Hence, since E is A-monotonic and /=1 B. c B it follows
that B C E(S).
(=*)  Suppose  E =  EfCE).   Then  E is A-monotonic since  Ef(E) is A-monotonic.        0
Using Proposition 10.3.5 we are now able to prove the following result.
Theorem 10.3.6 Let E : Po(N) -0 210(A) be an effectivity function. Then
E = Ef(E) = EBGCE) if and only if E is superadditive and A-monotonic.
proof (=>) Clearly, if E = EoGCE) = EfCE), then E is superadditive and A-monotonic,
since Ef(E) is superadditive and A-monotonic.
(*) Let E b e superadditive and A-monotonic. Then E=E b y Lemma 8.2.3. Using
A-monotonicity Proposition 10.3.5 implies that E = <(10 = Ef(E).                 0
As a result of Theorem 10.3.6 we obtain the following counterpart of Theorem 8.5.2.
Corollary 10.3.7 Let E : Po(N) -, 210(A) be an effectivity function. Then there
exists a tight game correspondence G such that E = E2 = Ef if and only if E is
A-monotonic and superadditive.
In the last part of this section we examine relations between solution concepts of
effectivity functions at a profile Riv and solution concepts of the associated claim game
correspondence at R . It is shown that, if the effectivity function is superadditive,
the setcore exactly corresponds to the set of outcomes of strong Nash equilibria of
the associated claim game correspondence.
Theorem 10.3.8 Let E : Po(N) -* 27°(A) be an upper cycle free effectivity function
and RN a profile on  A.  Let G(E)  :=  (XI,···,X„, A, r) be the associated claim game
correspondence. Then the following two assertions hold.
V
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(i)  If aN is a strong Nash equilibrium of G(E) at RN, then ;r(aN) is an element of
the setcore of E at RN.
(ii) If E is superadditive, then for each setcore element B of E at RN there exists
a strong Nash equilibrium aN of G(E) at RN such that lr(aN) = B.
proof  (i) Let aN E XN be a strong Nash equilibrium of G(E) at RN. Define
B := x(aN). Suppose there are S E Po(N) and B' € E(S) such that B' Ps B
Define Ts  E  Xs by Ti  := (S,B') for all i E  S. Then ir(Ts, GN\S)  C  B' and there-
fore B  ,r(TS, ON\S    · Moreover, we have F(Ts, ON\S  { B'} c FWN)· Hence,
71·(TS, aN\S) - A{D I D€ F(Ts,aN\S)} D A{D I D E F(OW)}nB'=Bn B: Since
8   7r(Ts, aN\S) 4 0, B n B' C x(Ts, GN\s) C  B', and B' Ps B, it follows by definition
of Ps that TiTS,aN\S) PS B This leads to a contradiction since aN is a strong Nash
equilibrium of G(E) at R .
(ii) Let E be superadditive and let B be a setcore element of E at RN· Define
crN E XN by cri :- (N,B) for all i EN. Then taN)= B. Suppose that aN is not a
strong Nash equilibrium of G(E) at R . Then there exist S E Po(N) and Ts E Xs
such that K(Ts, ON\S   S T(aN)· Hence, lr(Ts, oN\S) 0 A and there are disjoint sub-
sets Si, . ,S k o f S and Br E E(Sr) for all r E {1, . . . ,k} such that Tj = (S ,Br) for
all j E S, and all r E  {1,...,k}, and x(Ts, oN\s) = Ali Br· Since E i s superadditive,
we have ALi Br E E(Ul,1 S.) C ECS). This leads to a contradiction since B is a
setcore element  of  E  at   RN.                                                                                                                                                          0
Combining Theorem 10.3.6 and Theorem 10.3.8, we obtain the following analogue of
Theorem 8.5.3.
Theorem 10.3.9 Let E : Po(N) -+ 21°(A) be a superadditive and A-monotonic
effectivity function and let RN f RN a profile. Then there exists a strongly consistent
game correspondence G such that
(i) E = Et = E 
(ii)  Setcore(E, RN) = lr(SNE(G, RN))·
10.4  Toward game forms
In the previous section every upper cycle free effectivity function E is associated with
a claim game correspondence G(E) = (Xt,..., Xn, A, ir).  Here ;r is a correspondence
T
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from X  to A.  In this section we derive a claim game form H(E)=(Xl,···,Xn, A, p)
from G(E), where p is a surjective function from XN to A. Moreover, this is done in
such a way that E (E) = E (E).
In his proof of Theorem 8.5.1, Moulin (1983) also describes a process to go from a
game correspondence G to a game form H such that E = Ef, but this construction
only works for a finite set of alternatives, while the construction described in this
section can also be applied to an infinite set of alternatives. As a result this section
yields an alternative proof of Theorem 8.5.1.
An obvious way to go from a game correspondence to a game form is by means of a
choice function.
Lemma 10.4.1 Let C : Po(A) -+ A be a 'choice function', i.e., C(B) E B for all
B f  Po(A).  Let  G=  (X l, · · · , Xn, A, 71-) be a game correspondence. Define p = Cox.
Then
(i) H = (Xi,···, Xn, A, p) isa game form
En) Et C EU and E  C E .
proof (i) The surjectiveness of p follows from the non-imposedness of 7r.
(i i)    Let    S C Po(N) and B E Po(A) and suppose B E E2(S). Then there exists
a strategy os E Xs such that r(os, TN\S)   C   B  for  all  7-N\S  E  XN\S·    But  then
Colr (os, TN\S  C B for all ™js E XN\S· Hence B E EU(S).
The proof of the second assertion is similar.                                                      0
However, in general the inclusions in Lemma 10.4.1 (ii) need not be equalities, not
even if G is a claim game correspondence. The following example shows that there
are claim game correspondences such that for every choice function these inclusions
are not equalities.
Example  10.4.2  Let  N  =  {1,2},  A  =  {a, b}, and define the effectivity function
E : Po(N) -1 2p°(A) as follows. E({1}) = E({2}) = {A}, and E(N) = Po(A). Then
G(E) = (Xl, X2, A, lr), where for all i€N
X, = {({i},A)} U {(N,B)   B E Po(A)} and for all aN E X N
   {a}   if al = 02 - (N, {a})
lr(0N) -    {b}   if al = 02 = (N, {b})
l A  otherwise.
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Let C : Po(A) -, A be a choice function. Suppose, without loss of generality, that
C(A) = {a}.  Let p := Co,r and H(E) := (Xt, X2, A, p). Then
{A} = EBGCE)({i}) = EYE)({i})   EaH(E)({i}) = E;'CE)({i}) = {{a},A} for all
ieN.
In order to establish an equality between E (£) and E (E) for some game form HCE)
derived from G(E), we must go beyond the scope of choice functions. In particular,
P(aN) will have to depend on aN itself, not just on T (ON  ·
Let C : Po(A) -+ A be a choice function. For each B f Po(A) define a surjection h 
from A to B by
h (b):= 4 (10.1)
(b       i f b E B
l C(B)   if b E A\B
Let t: Po(A) x Po(A) -, Po(A) be a binary operation on the non-empty subsets of
A defined for all B, D E Po(A) as
(B ifB=D
B AD:=  1
l (B\D) U (D \B)  if B 0 D.
If B f D, then BAD is the symmetric difference between B and D. Let B,D E
Po(A) with B 0 D. Note that (BAB)AD = BAD and that BA(BAD) = D.
So, A is not associative. In order to avoid parentheses it is necessary to define the
order in which a sequence  of A operations  must be evaluated.    Let  D i, · · · ,D k  be
elements of Po(A). Then Dl6D281)3 means (Di-L-D2)-AD) and for all 3<t s k
DiAD26 . . . ADt means (Dib...AD:-1)AD,  So, the evaluation of DiA . . . ADi
is from left to right.
Proposition  10.4.3  Let 2   k and l  S t S  k.  Let D i, · • • ,D k b e elements of Po(A).
Then {D15...8-Dt-1-6-8-6-D:+16... -A-Dk I B E Po(A)} = Po(A)
proof  Let D, D' 6 Po(A). Then there is a B E Po(A) such that DAB = D': When
D = D', then take B =D, else take B = DbD'
So,{DAB I B E Po(A)} = {BAD I B E Po(A)} = Po(A)
Consequently, {DIA . . . AD*_168 I B E Po(A)} = Po(A). Hence,
{Dia... A-Dt-la-BADi+1 I B€ Po(A)} = {PA-De+1 |P E POCA)} = Po(A).
Hence,
{DIA...ADi-1-ABEDi+18-D:+2 I B€ Po(A)} = {PAD,+2 |P E Po(A)} = Po(A)
Repetition of this argument yields
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{Dia . . . AD,-,ABADt+16 . . . ADk I B E Po(A)} = Po(A).                             0
Now we are able to define a claim game form derived from a claim game correspon-
dence.
Let  G(E)  =  (X l, · · · , XM A, x)  be a claim game correspondence associated  with  an
upper cycle free effectivity function E. Let C: Po(A) -+ A be a choice function and
let {h  1 8€ Po(A)} be as defined in (10.1).
Define fE : XN -* PO(A) as follows.
For aN = (Si, Bi),EN E XN, fE(ON) := Bl,  ...WBn· Then the claim game form
H(E):= (Xl,· ··, X„A, p) corresponding to G(E) and C is defined by
P(aN) := h (IN)(CofE(aN))
for all aN  E XN· Clearly, P(aN) E lr(aN) for all aN E XN. So by the non-imposedness
of T it follows that p is surjective.
We now show that the a-effectivity functions of G(E) and H(E) coincide for every
upper cycle free effectivity function E.
Theorem 10.4.4 Let E : Po(N) -0 21'0(A) be an upper cycle free effectivity function.
Let  G(E) =  (Xl,···,X„, A, lr) be the claim game correspondence associated with E,
and let H(E) = (Xi, · · ·, Xn, A, p) be the claim game form corresponding to G(E)
and a choice function C. Then
EIGCE)  =  EQHCE)
Proof  As in the proof of Lemma 10.4.1 (ii) one can show that Ef(E) c E:(E). It
remains to prove that EaGCE)(S) D Et'(E)(S) for all S E Po(N). Let S E Po(N) and
B E EQHCE)(S). We have to prove that B E E (E)(S). This is obvious if B=A o r
if S = N. Therefore, suppose B 96 A and S 4 N. Since B E EUCE)(S), there is a
strategy os E Xs such that for all 7-Njs E XN\S we have Ptas, TN\S) E B.
Claim:  For each D€ Po(A) there is an i€S such that 0 96 (N, D).
proof of the  claim:  Let  D  E Po(A). Suppose for  all  i  ES,  0,  =  (N,D).   Take
a E A\B. By Proposition 10.4.3 it follows that there are Dj € Po(A),JEN\S,
such that DiAD26...ADn - {a}, where for ease of notation D, = D if i C S.  Let
5 = (N,Dj) for all j€N\S. Then
P(as, TN\S) = h9(,S.TN\S)(CofE(as, TN\SD = h,c(as.TN\S)(C({a})) = h5(as.TN\S)(a)
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If Dj =D for all j€N\S, then {a} = DADA . . . -I D=D and ir(as, TN\S) = D.
However, this would imply that Pcas, TN\s) =a g B.
So, there is a j E N\S such that Dj #D Hence, ,r(as, TN\S) = A and again
PCas, TN\S) =a/B. So, there is no D E Po(A) such that for all i€S w e have
0 = (N, D), and this proves the claim.
Fix i€N j S.  For each D E Po(A), consider the strategy vector r#ls E XN\S defined
by d = (N,D) and go = (N,A) for all j E N\(SU{i}). Then it follows that there
exists a Z E Po(A) such that for all D E Po(A), T(Os, TND S  = Z.
By definition P(as, T# S   =  h (CofE(as, TNDjS  By Proposition 10.4.3 we have
{fE(os, TNDJS) I D E Po(A)} = Po(A) and therefore {p(as,T#ls) I D E Po(A)} =Z.
Since p(os, TAS)  C  B for all  D  E  Po(A),  we have ir(as, TAS)  =  Z  C  B for all
D E Po(A). But then it readily follows that 'r(as, TN\S) c B for all TN\S E XN\S·
Hence, B E E7(E)(S).                                                                 O
Corollary 10.4.5 Let E : Po(N) -0 270(A) be an upper cycle free effectivity function.
Then there exists a game form H stich that Ef = E if and only if E is superadditive
and A-monotonic.
proof· Combine Theorems 10.3.6 and 10.4.4.                                           0
Example 10.4.6 Again consider Example 10.4.2. Applying Theorem 10.4.4 yields
PCON) = b if 01 = 02 = (N, {b}) or if both 01 - (N, {a}) and 02 E {(N, A),({2},A)}
orif both 02 = (N, {a}) and al E {(N, A),({1}, A)} Inallother cases p(aN)= a.
Now it follows that Ef(E)( 1 ) = Ef(E)({2})= {{a},A} Moreover, since E is not
maximal, it follows that there is no game form H such that E# = E.
We do not know whether for a stable and maximal effectivity function E and a pref-
erence profile RN, the strong Nash equilibria of the claim game form corresponding
to G(E) and a choice function C exactly correspond to the core of E at RN· SO it is
an open problem whether the construction we presented in this section is appropriate
to obtain an alternative proof of Theorem 8.5.3.
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Er zijn talloze situaties te bedenken waarin meerdere partijen met tegenstrijdige be-
langen betrokken zijn in een gezamenlijk beslissingsproces. Het probleem in deze
situaties is dan vaak hoe een goede oplossing gevonden kan worden?  In de lite-
ratuur zijn diverse wiskundige modellen geintroduceerd om hierin een beter inzicht
te verkrijgen. In de drie delen van dit proefschrift worden enkele van deze modellen
bestudeerd. Het proefschrift begint met een algemene inleiding in hoofdstuk  1.
Deel   I bestudeert situaties waar partijen samenwerken   in een gezamenlij k project.
De opbrengsten of kostenbesparingen die door de samenwerking ontstaan, dienen
op een rechtvaardige manier te worden verdeeld over de deelnemende partijen. Een
wiskundig instrument om dit soort problemen te analyseren wordt aangedragen door
de coi;peratieve speltheorie. Binnen de cooperatieve speltheorie zijn diverse modellen
ontwikkeld om een goed inzicht te verkrijgen in 'samenwerkingssituaties'. Promi-
nente modellen zijn cooperatieve spelen met/zonder zijdelingse betalingen (TU- en
NTU-spelen) en onderhandelingsproblemen. Voor elk van deze modellen zijn in de li-
teratuur diverse verdeelmethoden (oplossingsconcepten) geintroduceerd. In de hoofd-
stukken 2 tot en met 5 van dit proefschrift concentreren we ons op een bepaald type
oplossingsconcepten, de zogenaamde compromiswaarden. Het algemene principe dat
ten grondslag ligt aan deze oplossingsconcepten is dat het deel van de gezamenlijke
opbrengst dat aan een afzonderlijke partij wordt toegekend, bepaald wordt door mid-
del van een compromis tussen een pessimistische ondergrens en een optimistische
bovengrens voor deze uitbetaling.
Hoofdstuk 2 geeft een overzicht van comprorniswaarden binnen de co6peratieve spel-
theorie. De meeste aandacht wordt besteed aar. de r-waarde voor TU-spelen, de
Raiffa-Kalai- Smorodinsky (RKS) oplossing voor onderhandelingsproblemen en de
compromiswaarde voor NTU-spelen. We besluiten hoofdstuk 2 met een aantal toe-





Een belangrijke toepassing van coEperatieve speltheorie ligt binnen kostenallocatie-
problemen. In hoofdstuk 3 bestuderen we een kostenallocatiemethode, die in de
dertiger jaren al werd toegepast door de Tennessee Valley Authority. Het blijkt dat
deze verdeelmethode te beschouwen is als een compromiswaarde.
In de hoofdstukken 4 en 5 concentreren we ons op NTU-spelen. Hoofdstuk 4 bestudeert
de compromiswaarde voor NTU-spelen. Er worden bekende resultaten uitgebreid
naar een grotere klasse van spelen.
Hoofdstuk 5 introduceert een nieuw oplossingsconcept voor NTU-spelen, de MC-
waarde. De MC-waarde is een uitbreiding van een bekende verdeelmethode voor
TU-spelen en is eveneens te beschouwen als een compromiswaarde. Naast diverse
eigenschappen van de MC-waarde geven we twee karakteriseringen van dit oplos-
singsconcept.
In deel II van dit proefschrift bestuderen we situaties waarin een bepaalde hoeveelheid
van een (oneindig deelbaar) goed verdeeld moet worden onder een aantal economi-
sche agenten. Aangenomen wordt dat elk van deze agenten preferenties heeft over
het goed die 'single-peaked' zijn, dat wil zeggen tot aan een bepaalde hoeveelheid wil
een agent meer van het goed consumeren, na deze hoeveelheid geldt het omgekeerde.
De hoeveelheid van het goed die door een agent het meest wordt geprefereerd, wordt
de 'piek' genoemd. Het probleem is dat het totaal van de pieken van de verschillende
agenten in het algemeen niet gelijk is aan de hoeveelheid van het goed die verdeeld
dient te worden.
Het bovengenoemde verdeelprobleem is de afgelopen jaren uitgebreid in de litera-
tuur bestudeerd. De eerste die dit probleem op een systematische wijze analyseerde
was Sprumont (1991). Zijn hoofdresultaat toont aan dat er een unieke verdeelregel
voor dit type problemen is die voldoet aan Pareto optimaliteit, anonimiteit en niet-
manipuleerbaarheid. Sprumont noemde deze regel de uniforme regel. Ook uit late-
re analyses blijkt dat de uniforme regel beschouwd kan worden als een prominente
verdeelregel voor dit soort problemen. Hoofdstuk 6 geeft naast een formele beschrij-
ving van het model ook een overzicht van de belangrijkste resultaten uit de literatuur.
In hoofdstuk 7 worden relaties beschreven tussen de uniforme regel enerzijds en
de Nash en lexicografisch egalitaire onderhandelingsoplossing anderzijds. Gebaseerd
op bekende resultaten uit de theorie van onderhandelingsproblemen, worden nieuwe




Deel III bestudeert sociale keuzeproblemen. Een centraal probleem in de sociale
keuzetheorie is, gegeven de individuele preferenties van agenten   over een bepaalde
verzameling alternatieven, om een deelverzameling van alternatieven te kiezen die
voor iedereen accepteerbaar is in de zin dat zij een goede afspiegeling vormt van
de individuele preferenties. In de literatuur zijn diverse van dit soort keuzeregels
bestudeerd. Bij een gegeven keuzeregel is het interessant om te bestuderen welke
mogelijkheden individuele agenten of groepen agenten hebben om de uitkomst te
beinvloeden door het opgeven van andere dan hun werkelijke preferenties. Het is
duidelijk dat door de mogelijkheden die coalities hebben om de uitkomst te mani-
puleren een bepaalde machtsverdeling binnen de gemeenschap ontstaat. Deze col-
lectieve machtsverdeling kan worden gemodelleerd door gebruik te maken van effec-
tiviteitsfunkties. Een effectiviteitsfunktie specificeert voor elke coalitie de collectie
van deelverzamelingen van alternatieven waarvoor deze coalitie 'effectief' is in de zin
dat zij kan garanderen dat de uiteindelijke uitkomst binnen een zo'n verzameling ligt.
In de hoofdstukken 8, 9 en 10 bestuderen we effectiviteitsfunkties.
Hoofdstuk 8 geeft een overzicht van de meest belangrijke resultaten uit de literatuur
over efrectiviteitsfunkties.
In hoofdstuk 9 introduceren we een nieuwe klasse van effectiviteitsfunkties die diverse
bestaande klassen generaliseert. Voorts worden diverse eigenschappen van de effec-
tiviteitsfunkties binnen deze klasse bestudeerd.
Hoofdstuk 10 onderzoekt relaties tussen effectiviteitsfunkties en (niet-coi;peratieve)
spelkiemen. In tegenstelling tot de bestaande literatuur kijken we hierbij niet naar
spelkiemen waar de uitbetalingsafbeelding een funktie is, maar waar deze een corres-
pondentie (multifunktie) is. We laten onder andere zien dat enkele van de resultaten




De schrijver van dit proefschrift werd geboren op 28 november 1967 te Nijmegen. Na
in  1972  te zijn verhuisd naar Arnhem, volgde hij  van  1980 tot  1986 het voorbereidend
wetenschappelijk onderwijs aan het Nederrijn College te Arnhem.
In september 1986 begon hij met de studie wiskunde aan de Katholieke Universiteit
Nijmegen. Het propaedeutisch examen werd afgelegd in augustus 1987. Het doc-
toraal examen met als hoofdrichtingen speltheorie, operations research en statistiek
werd behaald in maart 1991.
Per 1 april 1991 trad hij in dienst als AIO bij de vakgroep Econometrie van de
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